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This dissertation examines the litigation and legal liability exposure of auditors related to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Three separate studies were conducted to examine how 
auditor‘s litigation exposure is evaluated by potential litigants (lawyers), and how auditor 
liability is evaluated by jurors, following the bankruptcy of a client. The first study examines 
whether the auditor‘s SOX Section 404 reporting decisions influence lawyers‘ assessments of 
their litigation exposure. The second study investigates whether voluntary disclosures of 
significant deficiencies in internal controls within the SOX Section 404 report, and the 
subjectivity of the internal control judgments made by the auditor, influence jurors‘ perceptions 
of auditor liability for negligence. The third study examines how the requirements of SOX 
Section 302 related to audit committee independence and audit committee expertise influence 
jurors‘ perceptions of auditor independence and auditor liability for negligence. Overall, these 
three studies provide insights on how different provisions of SOX, specifically the Section 404 
report and audit committee requirements, influence the likelihood that auditors will be sued and 
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THREE STUDIES 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has been hailed as one of ―the most far-reaching 
reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin D. Roosevelt‖ (Bumiller, 
2002).  The legislation was enacted primarily in response to a string of accounting failures in 
large corporations with the purpose of increasing the quality of the standards followed by public 
companies and their auditors (Canada et al., 2007). As SOX had a far reaching impact on the 
auditing and financial reporting process, a significant amount of research has been conducted to 
examine the successes, failures, costs, and benefits of this Act (Boyle and Webb, 2007). Some 
researchers conclude that SOX was a huge success for protecting the public interest (Canada et 
al., 2007), as others argue that the costs to comply with SOX may outweigh the benefits (DeFond 
and Francis, 2005; Solomon, 2005).  
One of the major SOX-related costs is audit fees, which remain high because of the 
increased reporting responsibilities and resulting liability exposure for auditors (DeZoort et al., 
2008). Although auditors have a long trend of campaigning for limitations in legal liability 
exposure (Roberts et al., 2003), the recent failure of a large, international audit firm renewed the 
debate over whether auditors should be protected from liability exposure (Sukhraj, 2008). In 
2008, auditors and various members from practice asked the U.S. Treasury Department‘s 
Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to recommend placing restrictions on auditor 
liability exposure.  Supporters of this recent movement for auditor liability reform claim that 
auditors are currently faced with exposure to billions of dollars in damages related to pending 
lawsuits which often settle out of court because the risk of trial is too great (Sukhraj, 2008). 




auditor liability to prevent another collapse of a large audit firm (Sukhraj, 2008). After reviewing 
the evidence presented, the U.S. Treasury Committee voted against making any outright 
recommendations for liability limitations, citing lack of consensus on the issue (Advisory 
Committee on the Auditing Profession, 2008). The treasury also encouraged the debate on 
auditor liability exposure to continue, opening the opportunity for future discussions at the 
policy-making level about the concerns and solutions expressed by members of the professional 
community.  
This research examines different factors related to provisions of SOX that could 
potentially impact the litigation and legal liability exposure of auditors. Since auditors are not 
likely to be awarded increased protection from litigation in the near future, as indicated by the 
lack of consensus in the U.S. Treasury Committee (Advisory Committee on the Auditing 
Profession, 2008), an examination of the legal liability exposure of auditors in the current context 
of SOX is highly relevant. Research on this topic could provide auditors with insight into how 
their reporting decisions and client characteristics can influence both the likelihood that they will 
be sued and the outcome of potential litigation. Results of this research could also be used in 
future discussions of auditor liability exposure to argue for or against future legislation to repeal 
or change SOX, or to provide a safe harbor specifically related to internal control reporting. The 
research will also add to the growing body of academic literature on SOX, which has been a 
highly published topic area in recent journals. Although many studies have been conducted in the 
past to examine legal liability, how SOX provisions may affect auditor legal liability is relatively 
unknown. The findings of this research adds to the body of literature by answering pivotal 





Three studies were conducted to address how specific SOX provisions may influence 
auditor litigation risk and liability exposure. Controlled experiments were conducted in each 
study to understand how certain SOX-related conditions can influence the decisions of both 
potential litigators, who decide whether the auditor should be sued, and jurors, who decide the 
fate of the auditor in a trial setting. In the next chapter of this document, a review of the literature 
is presented to provide a background on Sections 404, 301 and 407 of SOX. This review chapter 
also provides a discussion of the literature on the current legal environment for auditors. Then, 
study one examines how the auditor‘s internal control report influences the likelihood that 
potential litigators will recommend suing the auditor for negligence. Study two extends this line 
of research by assuming the auditor has been sued, and examines how the internal control report 
influences jurors‘ decisions on the auditor‘s liability for negligence. Finally, study three 
examines how the characteristics of the audit committee may influence how independent auditors 
are perceived, and ultimately influence whether jurors will find the auditor guilty. The following 
sections introduce each of these chapters in more detail to provide an overview of the 
motivations, research method, and contributions of each study.  
Literature Review: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Auditor Liability  
 
The literature review chapter provides an overview of SOX. Specifically, the chapter 
reviews Sections 404, 301, and 407 and discusses the provisions of this legislation that may 
influence the legal liability landscape for auditors under securities and common law. Related 
research is reviewed and synthesized. Overall, the literature review chapter introduces the 
literature in this area to provide a framework and motivation for three studies investigating 




Study One: SOX Section 404 and Auditor Litigation Exposure: an Investigation of Potential 
Litigators‘ Consideration of the Auditor‘s Report on Internal Controls 
 
Study one examines whether Section 404 disclosures influence auditor litigation risk.  
Audit firms have argued that they are unnecessarily exposed to litigation risk from frivolous 
lawsuits, no matter how high quality their audits may be (Sukhraj, 2008). Some researchers 
argue the reputation losses that occur with audit firms being associated with lawsuits, regardless 
of outcome, can be detrimental to the firm (Chaney and Philipich, 2002; Krishnamurthy et al., 
2006). This study investigates whether the disclosures within the audit opinion on internal 
controls can operate as a red flag that ultimately lessens the likelihood that potential litigators 
will recommend suing the auditor. Therefore, this study examines how SOX Section 404 
disclosures may perhaps prevent auditor litigation by providing an opportunity for auditors to 
increase the quality of their disclosures and provide adequate signals to stakeholders about 
potential internal control issues.  
A 3x1 between-subjects experiment was conducted with lawyers, manipulating the 
auditor‘s opinion on internal controls as unqualified, unqualified with description of significant 
deficiencies, or adverse with description of material weakness. Lawyers reviewed a scenario 
where the auditor issued an unqualified audit opinion on financial statements on a company that 
ended up declaring bankruptcy. They also viewed the auditor‘s opinion on internal controls 
(manipulated as described above). Then, when they finished reviewing the information provided, 
participants were asked to provide their opinion on whether they would recommend that the 
auditor be sued for negligence in this situation.   
Results of this study indicate that the auditor‘s report on controls has the potential to 




controls were assessed most favorably by lawyers. However, voluntary disclosures of significant 
deficiencies in internal controls did not significantly influence auditor litigation exposure in this 
study, indicating that the stronger message provided by an adverse Section 404 opinion is 
necessary in order to decrease litigation exposure. Results suggest that auditors should consider 
the potential impact of the Section 404 report on litigation risk, which could potentially influence 
planning and reporting decisions during an audit. 
Study Two: Auditor Liability for Section 404 Reports: An Investigation of Jurors‘ Consideration 
of Auditor Disclosure of Internal Control Deficiencies  
 
Study two builds on the results from study one by examining whether additional 
disclosures within the auditor‘s report on internal controls can provide a solid defense to 
influence jurors‘ decisions in a trial setting. Study one emphasizes how auditors‘ reporting 
decisions can potentially prevent the auditor from being sued for negligence. In contrast, study 
two assumes that the auditor has already been sued for negligence, and focuses on how internal 
control reporting decisions and the nature of the internal control in question can influence trial 
outcomes. Although results of study one suggest that voluntary disclosures of internal control 
issues do not significantly influence the likelihood that auditors will be sued for negligence, this 
study proposes that auditors providing voluntary disclosures may benefit from a reduced liability 
risk in the event of a jury trial. 
This study also provides insight into the potential for increased liability exposure when 
auditors fail to disclose specific types of material weaknesses, based on the auditability of the 
deficiency related to the audit failure. Auditability represents the ability for the auditor to 
perform procedures to test the control (Hammersley et al., 2008). For example, controls at the 




procedures auditors perform to evaluate these controls can involve a statistical sampling of the 
transactions that occurred during the period to test for compliance. In contrast, the less auditable 
controls (i.e., management integrity, tone at the top policies, etc.) often rely solely on subjective 
evidence, such as interviews, placing the responsibility more heavily on the auditor to decide 
whether the control is effective (Hammersley et al., 2008).  
A 2x2 between-subjects experiment was conducted to examine the impact of the nature 
of the internal control weakness (more auditable/less auditable) and the contents of the auditor‘s 
report on internal controls (disclosure/no disclosure of significant deficiency) on the decisions of 
jury eligible individuals in a fictitious trial setting. Members from the community, recruited to 
represent jury eligible individuals, were presented with a written scenario of a trial where the 
auditor is being sued for negligence. Participants were then asked to provide their opinions, as a 
jury member, on whether the auditor should be found liable for negligence.  
Results suggest that auditors are exposed to the least liability when they have provided a 
voluntary disclosure of a more auditable internal control issue within the Section 404 report. The 
insights from this study are important, as little is known about the impact of Section 404 
reporting on jurors‘ perceptions of auditors in a trial setting. Since auditors currently are arguing 
for limitations on liability, but are not likely to achieve this goal in the immediate future 
(Sukhraj, 2008), the results of this study could provide auditors with information that could assist 
them with the decision of whether to risk a trial in certain situations. Results also suggest that 
different types of internal controls may expose auditors to more liability, which could be useful 
knowledge for auditors at the planning and reporting stages of the audit. Also, by providing 




in a trial setting, the study could encourage auditors to increase the quality and transparency of 
their Section 404 reports by providing more detailed disclosures of internal control deficiencies.  
Study Three: The Influence of Audit Committee Member Independence and Expertise on Jurors‘ 
Perceptions of Auditor Independence and Attributions of Liability  
 
Study three examines how audit committee characteristics can influence jurors‘ 
perceptions of auditor independence and liability in a trial setting. This study specifically focuses 
on the characteristics of audit committee member independence and expertise. According to the 
provisions of SOX Section 407, public companies are required to disclose whether they have at 
least one expert member on the committee. SOX Section 301 also requires that all audit 
committee members meet minimum standards for independence (U.S. House of Representatives,  
2002)
1
. These provisions were intended to increase the quality of the financial reporting and 
audit processes by providing a setting where auditors operate under increased independence from 
management‘s influence (DeZoort et al., 2002). Past research on juror decision-making suggests 
that when auditors are perceived as less independent, they are more likely to be held liable for 
negligence (Brandon and Mueller, 2006). Therefore, this study examines how characteristics of a 
client‘s audit committee can influence how the auditor‘s reporting decisions are perceived by 
jurors.  
A 2x2 between-subjects design was implemented to examine whether audit committee 
expertise (high/low) and audit committee independence (high/low) influence perceptions of 
auditor negligence in a case where auditors are being sued for negligence following a failure to 
identify fraud within a company. Members of the community, representing jury eligible 
                                                 
1
 See detailed discussion of these provisions in the section below titled SOX Sections 301 and 407: Provisions on 





individuals, reviewed this case and answered questions related to their perceptions of audit 
committee independence, audit committee expertise, auditor independence and auditor liability 
for negligence. Responses were tested in a PLS model to determine the influence of jurors‘ 
perceptions of audit committee expertise and audit committee independence on auditor 
independence and auditor liability. 
Results strongly suggest that perceptions of audit committee independence directly 
influence perceptions of auditor independence. In addition, perceptions of auditor independence 
significantly influenced jurors‘ assessments of auditor liability, such that auditors were exposed 
to more liability when they were perceived as less independent. Although audit committee 
expertise was not found to significantly influence perceptions of auditor independence, the 
interaction between audit committee expertise and audit committee independence was found to 
directly influence liability assessments. Specifically, auditors were exposed to the most liability 
when audit committee members were perceived to have higher levels of expertise and lower 
levels of independence.  
The outcome of this study provides auditors with important insights about how the audit 
committee can influence auditor liability exposure. These insights could be used to assess 
litigation risk when deciding whether to accept a client. This increased understanding of potential 
jury outcomes could also be utilized by auditors and their legal council to determine trial strategy 
when auditors are sued for negligence. Results suggest that auditors should carefully assess the 
independence and expertise of the members of the audit committee, since each quality has the 







Overall, the three studies outlined above provide insights that may assist auditors in the 
planning, evidence collection, and reporting stages of the audit, and inform legal counsel of 
specific risks associated with jury trials in the current legal liability setting following SOX 
implementation. The next chapter provides an overview of the literature on SOX and auditor 
liability. Then, three studies are presented which examine the impact of specific aspects of SOX 
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LITERATURE REVIEW: THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 AND AUDITOR 
LIABILITY 
  
Introduction to SOX 
 
 SOX is often referred to as the most historic intervention in the regulation of accountants 
since the 1930‘s great depression era (DeFond and Francis, 2005). Following a trend of highly 
publicized accounting failures, Congress intervened by creating legislation to significantly 
increase the responsibilities of individuals involved with the financial reporting process for 
public companies and heightened the level of oversight with the audit process. The many 
provisions outlined within this act sparked an active debate among professionals, standard 
setters, and researchers, generating a wide body of research to examine the impact of SOX (see 
review of literature in Boyle and Webb, 2007). The feedback has been mixed, with some 
research proposing that SOX has had an overall positive effect on the quality of financial 
reporting (Boyle and Webb, 2007), and others citing increased costs and liability exposure as 
unwanted and unintended negative consequences (Pritchard, 2008). This research specifically 
examines two of the major research areas emerging as a result of SOX legislation: internal 
control reporting requirements under Section 404, and corporate governance requirements under 
Sections 301 and 407. The following sections discuss these requirements in detail, and overview 
the related research on Sections 404, 301, and 407. 
SOX Section 404: Internal Control over Financial Reporting 
 
 One of the most highly criticized requirements of SOX was the significant increase in 
responsibility for managers and auditors to evaluate and provide a report on the effectiveness of 




requires management to compile a report on internal controls that includes a discussion of any 
issues that could prevent the company from reporting financial statements free of material 
misstatement (Krishnan et al., 2008). Then, the auditors are required to conduct their own 
independent evaluation of internal controls as part of an integrated audit of financial statements, 
and issue a separate opinion on internal controls based on their findings. Although the auditor 
may choose to rely on some of the work conducted by management in their assessment of 
internal controls, much this evaluation is based on work conducted independently by the auditor 
so that they may develop their own assessment of internal controls. The auditor‘s opinion on 
internal controls is disclosed in the Auditor‘s report on internal controls (Section 404 report), 
which can be presented as a separate report or combined with the auditor‘s report on financial 
statements. In this report, auditors are required to report any control deficiencies that are deemed 
to be material weaknesses in internal controls that could result in material misstatement of the 
financial statements (PCAOB, 2007).  
 The requirements outlined by Section 404 created a public outcry for clarification on the 
correct way to interpret specific portions of the act, as auditors and managers both experienced 
significant delays in reporting in an unfamiliar regulatory environment (Ettredge et al., 2006; 
Parles et al., 2007). As a result, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)
2
 have issued standards and implementation 
guidance that outline specific steps that should be taken by management and auditors in 
completing their evaluation of internal controls and generating Section 404 reports (Barlas, 2007; 
                                                 
2
 Similar to the way the SEC oversees the financial reporting of public companies, the PCAOB was created by SOX 
to oversee the auditors of public companies in the U.S. All audit firms who audit public companies are required to 
register with the PCAOB and the organization conducts random reviews of a sample of the audits conducted each 
year. In addition, the PCAOB issues standards and implementation guidance for how public company audits are 




Coates, 2007).  This enhanced guidance outlined the process by which auditors should conduct 
their audit of internal controls and how deficiencies should be evaluated. The implementation 
guidance also provides specific details outlining how the results of the audit of internal controls 
should be reflected within the Section 404 report (PCAOB, 2007).  
As one of the main requirements of Section 404, auditors are specifically required to 
integrate their audit of internal controls with their audit of the financial statements by conducting 
the audits simultaneously in order to reach conclusions based on outcomes of both audits 
(PCAOB, 2007). Completing these activities simultaneously allow the auditor to adjust their 
financial statement audit workload based on their internal control assessments. For example, if 
findings indicate that internal controls are strong in a certain area, then the auditor may decrease 
the amount of substantive testing for financial audit purposes. If internal control is deemed 
ineffective, auditors should adjust their procedures to test the impact of any deficiency on the 
financial statements. This may require additional compliance testing to gauge the pervasiveness 
of the control deficiency, and greater substantive testing at the account level to maintain an 
appropriate level of audit risk. Recent evidence suggests that this practice has been implemented 
by auditors, as indicated by a significant difference in audit fees, a common proxy for audit 
effort, associated with companies reporting material weaknesses in internal controls (Hogan and 
Wilkins, 2008).  
 Figure 1 provides a detailed outline of the decision process that auditors undergo with 
each internal control they evaluate during an audit. First, auditors must decide whether sufficient 
controls are in place and working properly. When the proper internal control is not in place, the 
auditor must document a control deficiency. A control deficiency occurs when ―the design or 




2007, p. 57). Once control deficiencies are identified the auditor must then assess the likelihood 
of the deficiencies to result in a material misstatement. If there is a reasonable possibility that the 
control will fail to allow management to detect or prevent misstatements, the auditor concludes 
that there is a significant deficiency in internal controls. If not, the issue remains solely a control 
deficiency.  Significant deficiencies are considered to be ―less severe than a material weakness, 
yet important enough to merit attention by those responsible for oversight of the company's 
financial reporting‖ (PCAOB, 2007, p. 60). Once significant deficiencies are identified, the 
auditor must then evaluate how material the impact on financial statements would be if the 
control failed to detect or prevent misstatements. If the auditor concludes that the significant 
deficiency would not cause a material misstatement, then the auditor issues an unqualified 
opinion on internal controls and no disclosure is required for public companies but is required for 
non-public companies. If, on the other hand, the auditor concludes that the significant deficiency 
would result in a material misstatement, the auditor must issue an adverse opinion on internal 
controls and disclose the nature of the material weakness. A material weakness is identified 
when ―there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the company's annual or 
interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis‖ (PCAOB, 2007, 
p. 85). Therefore, the main difference between significant deficiencies and material weaknesses 
is materiality.  
The identification of control deficiencies, and the further classification as significant 
deficiencies or material weaknesses, has important implications for the Section 404 report. As 
shown in Figure 1, if the auditor only identifies control deficiencies or significant deficiencies 
they should issue an unqualified opinion on internal controls in the Section 404 report (PCAOB, 




significant deficiencies in the Section 404 report, they are also not required to provide any 
related disclosures within this report referencing deficiencies they found during the audit. 
However, if one or more material weakness in internal controls is found during the audit, the 
auditor must issue an adverse opinion on internal controls (PCAOB, 2007). A Section 404 report 
with an adverse opinion on internal controls must provide a discussion of the controls that were 
deemed ineffective and disclose the potential impact on financial statements (PCAOB, 2007). 
Therefore, the assessment of materiality has important implications on what is disclosed within 
the Section 404 report.  
This evaluation of materiality has been cited as a highly complex and inherently 
subjective component of the audit, as this task relies heavily on professional judgment (Tackett 
et al., 2006). One main difference between the audit of internal controls and the audit of financial 
statements is that the evaluation of a control deficiency does not focus on whether a 
misstatement has actually occurred, but whether the internal control is able to effectively prevent 
or detect a potential misstatement in the event of error or fraud (PCAOB, 2007). For evaluating 
internal controls, the focus for the auditor should be on risk factors that would indicate potential 
for errors or fraud to occur that could result in misstatement of the financial statements. The 
PCAOB specifically states, ―The evaluation of whether a control deficiency presents a 
reasonable possibility of misstatement can be made without quantifying the probability of 
occurrence as a specific percentage or range‖ (PCAOB, 2007, p. 419). This indicates that the 
auditor‘s evaluation of internal controls may be qualitative in nature, which means less physical 
evidence is available to back-up the auditor‘s judgment. 
Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) additionally outlines specific factors that may signal to 




the following: management fraud, restatement activity, detection of material misstatements in 
current period, and ineffective oversight (PCAOB, 2007). The last example, ineffective 
oversight, is perhaps the indicator that relies most heavily on the auditor to make a qualitative 
judgment of materiality. In fact, research has often classified this particular internal control as 
less auditable, meaning that the auditor cannot necessarily provide direct evidence or 
documentation to support their judgment (Doyle et al., 2007). Therefore, one may argue that the 
evaluation of internal controls, at least in part, is inherently more complex and reliant on 
professional judgment than the financial statement audit task, in which the auditor often relies 
heavily on quantitative materiality ranges to reach conclusions. 
 Because of this uncertainty and heavy reliance on professional judgment, the evaluation 
of control deficiencies has been cited as one of the most taxing and time consuming requirements 
for auditors in their efforts to classify deficiencies accurately (Sentar, 2007).  This classification 
is important, because auditors are required to report an adverse opinion on internal controls in the 
event that they identify material weaknesses in internal controls. If they only find significant 
deficiencies or control deficiencies, the auditor can issue an unqualified report on internal 
controls. While not required, auditors may also decide to disclose within an unqualified report 
any deficiencies that they decide would be important to emphasize (PCAOB, 2007).    
 Although the discovery of material weaknesses in internal control requires the auditor to 
issue an adverse opinion on internal controls (See Figure 1), this does not necessarily result in 
any modification to the auditor‘s opinion on financial statements. If the auditor decides that the 
material weakness has not resulted in a misstatement of the current year financial statements they 
are able to issue an unqualified opinion on the financial statements, but must explain why they 




in internal controls only suggests the potential for misstatements to occur (PCAOB, 2007). 
Therefore, some argue that the auditor‘s opinion on internal controls provides more of a signal of 
the potential for controls to prevent future material misstatements than assurance that the current 
statements are presented fairly (Cunningham, 2004).  
The auditor‘s responsibility for reporting on internal controls, as described in the 
paragraphs above, has been argued to significantly increase liability for auditors which are 
passed down to the client in the form of increased fees (Asare et al., 2007). This increase in costs 
related to Section 404 reporting has sparked a large amount of research debating whether the 
benefits are worth the excessive costs and unintended consequences that have been associated 
with the legislation (Boyle and Webb, 2007). The sections below provide a discussion of this 
debate to gain an understanding of the costs and benefits of Section 404.  
Research on Section 404: Are the Benefits Worth the Costs? 
 
 The auditing and reporting processes required by Section 404, as described above, are 
often cited as a significant source of increased costs to public companies.  These costs occur as a 
result of the effort and resources needed to effectively comply with the provisions of Section 404 
(Krishnan et al., 2008). These costs have been primarily attributed to increased audit fees, labor 
costs generated internally, and investments in new technology (Krishnan et al., 2008). Extensive 
amounts of labor and resources are necessary to effectively implement the requirements of 
Section 404. For example, managers must conduct their own assessment of internal controls, 
both on a periodic and continuing basis, and are responsible for making sure that any weaknesses 
are corrected in a timely manner. This often requires significant labor and investment in 




estimated from an average of $2.2 million (Krishnan et al., 2008) to $3.14 million (Tackett et al., 
2006) per company. Labor hours needed to comply with SOX have been estimated at 24,000 
hours per company (Tackett et al., 2006). Audit fees have also been cited for the marked increase 
in costs, with increases in fees of 50% or more (Tackett et al., 2006).  Critics of Section 404 
assert that the increased requirements placed undue financial stress on companies, particularly 
smaller companies (Ezrati, 2007). Some additionally propose that the excessive costs of SOX 
have influenced companies‘ decisions to go private, as the benefits of being a public company 
are weighed against the costs to comply (Engel et al., 2007).    
In contrast, others believe that these increased costs are worth the short-term financial 
stress, and that firms investing in their internal control foundations will most likely see long-term 
benefits of increased productivity (Bedard et al., 2007). Having high standards for internal 
controls within a company should decrease the likelihood of errors and fraud (Dyck et al., 2007), 
and significantly improve financial reporting by discouraging earnings management. This notion 
has been substantiated by archival research that indicates companies with material weaknesses in 
their internal controls are more likely to manage earnings (Doyle et al., 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife 
et al., 2008; Chan et al., 2008). Research also indicates earnings management is particularly 
evident when the weak internal control is considered less auditable, such as the control 
environment (Doyle et al., 2007), and that firms who resolve their internal control weaknesses in 
following years tend to have less earnings management activity than firms who do not resolve 
their weaknesses (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008). Since earnings management is often viewed as 
an indicator of low quality financial reporting, this research indicates that Section 404 reports 




provides a strong argument to support the proposal that internal control improvements can lead 
to higher quality financial reporting.  
In addition to improving reporting quality, research suggests that Section 404 reports 
provide valuable information to external users. For example, lenders‘ are less inclined to rely on 
the financial statements when an adverse opinion on internal controls is issued, indicating that 
internal control weaknesses may signal users to question the reliability of financial statements 
(Schneider and Church, 2008). Although research supporting this proposition is mixed (Boyle 
and Webb, 2007), some have found that the market tends to react to companies who disclose 
material weaknesses in internal controls (Hammersley et al., 2008). Overall, research generally 
appears to indicate that external users are absorbing the information contained in Section 404 
reports, and that the reports contain useful information.  
While Section 404 provides benefits in the form of improved internal controls and useful 
information to users, some researchers suggest that the legislation created excessive amounts of 
liability exposure for the auditor when a negative event associated with a client occurs 
(Cunningham, 2004). The root of this argument is based on the additional disclosures contained 
within the Section 404 report, which indicate that auditors are now responsible for not only 
detecting misstatements in their financial audit, but for preventing future misstatements 
(Cunningham, 2004). The following section discusses this prospect, and provides a more in 
depth review of how Section 404 impacts auditors‘ exposure to legal liability given the current 







SOX Sections 301 and 407: Provisions on Audit Committee Composition 
 
Sections 301 and 407 provides guidance and requirements for the establishment of high 
quality audit committees. Audit committees function as the primary contact with external 
auditors for hiring decisions and as an intermediary between the auditor and management when 
disagreements occur during the audit (DeZoort et al., 2008). Auditors are required to 
communicate important matters to the audit committee, such as the identification of significant 
deficiencies in internal controls (Cohen et al., 2008). Overall, the audit committee is considered a 
key element of the corporate governance of a company as well as a crucial part of the financial 
reporting and auditing process (Jennings et al., 2006).  
Research indicates that the post-SOX role of the audit committee has increased, as audit 
committee members are becoming more involved in the auditing and financial reporting process 
(DeZoort et al., 2008). In recent research, increased scrutiny has been placed on the specific 
characteristics and composition of the audit committee (Cohen et al., 2008). In particular, the 
research related to SOX provisions for audit committees has focused mainly on the issues related 
to the independence (Section 301) and expertise (Section 407) of audit committee members. 
These particular provisions still provide some flexibility and may account for much of the 
remaining variation in the effectiveness of audit committees (Zhang et al., 2007).   
Section 301 designated that ―each member of the audit committee... shall be a member of 
the board of directors of the issuer, and shall otherwise be independent‖ (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 2002, p. 32). The definition of independent as defined by SOX requires that the 
member not ―accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer‖ or ―be 
an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary‖ (U.S. House of Representatives, 2002, p. 32). 




the company (U.S. House of Representatives, 2002). The SEC also allows exemptions for 
companies that could result in a less than 100% independent audit committee. Since audit 
committee members can be shareholders, and the SEC makes exceptions for some companies 
that allow non-independent individuals to serve as audit committee members, there still remains 
some variation in the level of independence among public companies (Zhang et al., 2007).   
Section 407 requires that companies disclose whether their audit committee contains at 
least one expert member. This member can be either an accounting expert or a financial expert. 
Accounting experts should have experience as a public accountant, auditor, principal or chief 
financial officer, controller, or principal or chief accounting officer (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 2002; Zhang et al., 2007). Financial experts should have experience as a chief 
executive officer, president, or chairman of the board in a for-profit corporation, or who has 
experience as the managing director, partner or principal in venture financing, investment 
banking, or money management (U.S. House of Representatives, 2002; Zhang et al., 2007). This 
particular audit committee requirement has received much attention from researchers, as the 
flexibility of the standard has created a large amount of variation in audit committee 
characteristics across companies (Bedard et al., 2004).  
Research on Audit Committee Composition  
 
 Overall, the response to the Audit Committee composition provisions for expertise 
(Section 407) and independence (Section 301) as outlined by SOX has been positive, as both 
researchers and practitioners are in agreement that high levels of expertise and independence are 
associated with multiple indicators of higher quality financial reporting (Cohen et al., 2007). 




always be aligned with that of the shareholder, audit committees fulfill an important role in the 
financial reporting process as providers of additional assurance that management is acting in the 
best interests of the shareholder (DeZoort et al., 2002). Audit committees are not involved in the 
day-to-day operations of the company, and provide a form of oversight of the financial reporting 
process that is considered a necessary element of corporate governance (DeZoort et al., 2002).  
However, not all audit committees are deemed equal in quality, and different audit committee 
characteristics have often been associated with varying levels of auditing and reporting quality.  
 One characteristic that has been highlighted in past research is the importance of an audit 
committee containing members that are qualified, have the authority, and have the resources 
available to provide effective oversight (DeZoort et al., 2002). One widely accepted taxonomy of 
audit committee characteristics identifies the following four important components to audit 
committee composition: expertise, independence, integrity, and objectivity (DeZoort et al., 2002)
 
3
. All four of these components are considered highly important to maintaining a high quality 
audit committee. However, expertise and independence have been the primary focus in past 
research on audit committee composition. This trend of research may have occurred because 
regulators and standard setters have placed an emphasis on improving these particular audit 
committee characteristics. This emphasis is evidenced by Sections 301 and 407 of SOX, which is 
the most recent attempt to regulate audit committee expertise and independence. The following 
sections provide a detailed discussion of the research related to audit committee expertise and 
independence.  
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 In addition to identifying characteristics of audit committee composition as an important dimension to audit 
committee effectiveness, this taxonomy identifies three other elements: authority, resources, and diligence. See 




Audit committee independence 
 
Independence has been viewed by researchers as the most important characteristic of an 
audit committee member (DeZoort et al., 2002). Overall, research indicates that higher levels of 
independence on audit committees promote higher quality financial reporting (DeZoort et al., 
2002). However, the definition of independence is quite varied, ranging from the most lenient 
(i.e., as anyone who is not directly employed by the company in a capacity other than a board 
role), to more stringent suggestions (i.e., individuals who have no financial ties to the company 
in any way other than audit committee-related monetary compensation) (Chan and Li, 2008). 
Past studies most often measure independence as the percentage or number of outside members 
(i.e., members not compensated by the company in any role other than board membership), or 
the percentage or number of members with some type of stock ownership in the company 
(Bedard et al., 2004).  Some have identified grey area directors, who may have additional ties to 
the company that may not violate any formal independence requirements, but still provide the 
potential to impair objectivity, such as family members or close business associates (DeZoort et 
al., 2002; Chan and Li, 2008).  
Many studies suggest that audit committee independence is a contributing factor to a high 
quality audit (DeZoort et al., 2002). For example, audit committees with more independent 
members are more likely to hire auditors that specialize in their particular industry (Abbott and 
Parker, 2000), and end up paying significantly more audit fees (Carcello, 2002), both of which 
provide a solid argument that independent members may be more motivated to pursue the 
highest quality audit possible for the company. Research also indicates audit committees that are 
entirely independent are more likely to promote situations where auditors will be more 




independence and lower non-audit fees for auditors (Abbott et al., 2003).  In addition, companies 
in financial distress are more likely to receive a qualified audit opinion and less likely to change 
their auditors when the audit committee is more independent (Carcello and Neal, 2000; Carcello 
and Neal, 2003). Overall, these results provide evidence to support the argument that 
independent audit committees appear to demand higher quality audits, which is strong support 
for the importance of the independence provisions of SOX.  
Audit committee independence has also been associated with indications of higher 
quality financial reporting (DeZoort et al., 2002). For example, audit committee independence is 
associated with fewer incidents of SEC-led fraud investigations (Abbott and Parker, 2000). 
Research also indicates that higher levels of independence of audit committee members are 
associated with lower abnormal accruals, a common measure of financial reporting quality 
(Klein, 2002; Bedard et al., 2004). Finally, firms with higher levels of audit committee 
independence are less likely to restate earnings, a factor which has also been commonly deemed 
as a measure of reporting quality (Abbott et al., 2004). Overall, this stream of research provides 
support for the argument that independent audit committees provide more effective oversight of 
the financial reporting process, thus leading to improved financial reporting quality.   
Higher levels of audit committee independence are also associated with other positive 
company traits, such as higher firm value (Chan and Li, 2008), and lower incidence of internal 
control issues (Krishnan, 2005). Stakeholders of firms also seem to value the independence of 
audit committees. For example, firms with entirely independent audit committees tend to have a 
lower cost of debt, indicating that creditors may perceive these companies as lower risk 
(Anderson et al., 2004). In conclusion, there appears to be a consensus in research that having 




and auditing processes, and the SOX provisions related to independence appear to be well 
accepted in both research and practice.   
Audit committee expertise 
 
The expertise of audit committee members has become a popular topic of recent research, 
motivated by the Section 407 requirement for companies to report whether they have at least one 
expert member on the audit committee (U.S. House of Representatives, 2002).  A wide body of 
literature expresses agreement that expertise is an important element of the characteristics of an 
audit committee, due to the complex nature of the issues that are often discussed as part of a 
financial audit and reporting process (DeZoort et al., 2002). SOX requirements are still 
somewhat vague and allow for a large amount of discretion in this definition, as the member can 
be deemed as either an expert in accounting or finance. This particular issue, how to measure 
expertise, has been a large component of the recent research in this area, as different 
measurements of expertise tend to lead to different results (DeZoort et al., 2002).  
SOX states that accounting-specific expertise is one way members of the audit committee 
can qualify as independent (U.S. House of Representatives, 2002). Accounting expertise in past 
research been defined as having experience as a public accountant, auditor, principal or chief 
financial officer, controller, or principal or chief accounting officer (Defond, 2005; Zhang et al., 
2007). This definition has been utilized in multiple studies to measure the percentage of audit 
committee members that are deemed accounting experts, a characteristic which has been linked 
to significant positive abnormal returns following the appointment of such an expert (Defond, 
2005). Accounting experts, as defined above, are also linked to a lower occurrence of internal 




expertise on audit committees has been to identify whether members are Certified Public 
Accountants (CPAs) (McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996; DeZoort et al., 2008). Research 
utilizing this measure suggests that companies experiencing financial reporting issues (i.e., SEC 
investigations or restatements of earnings) were less likely to have CPA‘s on their audit 
committees, indicating that audit committees containing accounting experts may promote higher 
quality financial reporting (McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996).  An increase in the number of 
CPA‘s on audit committees following SOX also appears to have improved communication 
between auditors and audit committees, and contributed to an increase in the likelihood that audit 
committees will side with the auditor in the event of a dispute between managers and auditors 
(DeZoort et al., 2008). This is an important finding, as the researchers suggest that audit 
committees, and ultimately auditors, have more power over reporting outcomes, and are utilizing 
this power to enforce more conservative reporting decisions (DeZoort et al., 2008).  
Another option to qualify as an expert member of the audit committee is to be a financial 
expert; commonly defined as ―a non-accounting financial expert who has experience as the chief 
executive officer, president, or chairman of the board for-profit corporation, or who has 
experience as the managing director, partner or principal in venture financing, investment 
banking, or money management‖ (Zhang et al., 2007, p. 7). Committees containing expert 
members utilizing this particular definition of audit committee financial expertise have been 
associated with lower abnormal discretionary accruals (Xie et al., 2003), and are less likely to be 
involved in a restatement of earnings (Abbott et al., 2004), both of which are often perceived as 
indicators of higher quality reporting. Firms with financial experts as audit committee members 




Although this wide body of research on audit committee expertise generally indicates that 
expert members on audit committees are associated with higher quality reporting, no clear 
consensus has been reached on which types of expertise are most valuable. However, since 
different types of expertise are associated with different outcomes, as described in the paragraphs 
above, companies may be able to choose which qualities are most important to their current 
situation, and develop the audit committee based on their specific priorities.   
Overall Conclusions: Audit Committee Characteristics 
 
Overall, research indicates that both independence and expertise are important 
characteristics of audit committee members (DeZoort et al., 2002), with some support that high 
levels of both characteristics may be important for creating an effective level of oversight and 
corporate governance on audit committees for public companies (Krishnan, 2005; Chan and Li, 
2008). Since SOX still offers some opportunity for variation in audit committee member 
independence and expertise, there are still unanswered questions for future research on audit 
committees (Lutzy, 2003). For example, perceptions of auditor independence may be tied to 
audit committee independence and/or expertise, which can potentially impact the auditor‘s legal 
liability exposure and the assessment of blame in the event of an audit failure. Past research 
indicates that judges may consider elements of corporate governance when forming opinions of 
auditor independence (Jennings et al., 2006). However, more research is needed to examine how 
the individual or combined characteristics of auditor expertise and independence could uniquely 





Auditor Legal Liability Exposure 
 
 Both research and practice have indicated that Section 404 increased the litigation exposure 
for auditors, and that auditors pass this cost on to clients with in the form of higher audit fees 
(Cunningham, 2004). This increase in litigation exposure was primarily due to the increased 
responsibility placed on auditors for Section 404 reporting. Since SOX did not modify the 
current laws and regulations governing how auditors can be sued, many argue that this increased 
liability exposure is excessive and could lead to an increase in frivolous lawsuits (Cunningham, 
2004).  The sections below provide an understanding of the legal environment in which audit 
firms operate. First, the laws and regulations are summarized to provide an understanding of the 
types of litigation that most concerns auditors. Then, research on auditor liability is discussed to 
understand the conditions that most likely lead to auditor litigation and unfavorable trial 
outcomes.  
Laws and Regulations 
 
 Auditors are subject to legal liability from multiple statutes and laws, both at the state and 
federal level. Currently, many argue that auditors are most vulnerable to monetary losses for 
liability under federal law protecting the sales and purchases of securities, as indicated by 
evidence of over $14 billion paid by U.S. accounting firms in securities related cases over the 
past three decades (Talley, 2006). Although some of this liability has been a result of SEC 
action, a large portion is also attributed to class action lawsuits initiated by shareholders. 
Specifically, Section 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act of 1934) 
(USC, 1934) and Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (USC, 1933) allow for private courses 




al., 2007). Auditors are also open to enforcements from the SEC, and criminal liability under the 
Exchange Act of 1934 or other anti-fraud statutes at the federal level (Talley, 2006). At the state 
level, auditors are exposed to being sued for negligence under tort law. Audit firms have argued 
that lawsuits filed at the state level pose the largest exposure to excessive and unnecessary 
liability for auditors, primarily because of the lack of consistency in how laws are interpreted and 
applied in state courts (Talley, 2006). 
 The Exchange Act of 1934 has been cited as a source of increased liability exposure 
resulting from Section 404 reporting (Asare et al., 2007).  This act allows for private action when 
the plaintiff can link monetary losses to an act of recklessness on the part of the auditors (Talley, 
2006). Since the Exchange Act of 1934 was implemented, The Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (USC, 1995) along with clarifications in court have increased the burden of 
proof for those seeking damages from auditors. The plaintiff must now prove both a monetary 
loss and reliance on disclosures which provides clear limitations to auditor liability exposure 
under the Exchange Act of 1934 (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2001; Talley, 2006).  
 Some argue that the additional disclosures required by Section 404 provide a new excuse for 
suing the auditor under the Exchange Act of 1934 (Talley, 2006).  In past lawsuits, auditors most 
likely were implicated as secondary actors (i.e., aiding and abetting in fraud) as opposed to 
primary actors (i.e., directly active in committing fraud), as most of the cases were brought 
against the auditor for omitting information that would have influenced the shareholders‘ 
decision to purchase or sell stock (Asare et al., 2007). Auditors' classification as a secondary 
actor in past lawsuits was motivated by the fact that auditors were not required to report on 
internal controls, thus preventing auditors from being held liable as a primary actor for disclosing 




the language required in Section 404 reports potentially exposes auditors to additional liability 
when they specifically discuss material weaknesses and the resulting impact on the financial 
statements (Asare et al., 2007). This particular requirement arguably creates a situation where 
auditors may be exposed to more liability for even mentioning material weaknesses (Asare et al., 
2007). 
 An additional source of liability cited as a significant issue in the current legal 
environment is at the state level. Currently, there is a large overlap between federal and state 
laws.  Class action lawsuits that are filed citing the Securities Act of 1933 or the Exchange Act 
of 1934 must be tried in federal court (Talley, 2006). However, class action suits can still be tried 
at the state level under common law tort principles. The class action suit at the state level allows 
for punitive damages when the auditor is negligent in performing the audit, as long as the 
plaintiff can prove that the auditor should have been able to reasonably foresee the possibility 
that users, such as creditors or shareholders, would rely on the auditor‘s statements (Talley, 
2006). This particular liability exposure has been highly criticized by auditors, as it does not 
require any proof of intent to mislead (scienter), as would the Exchange Act of 1934 (Talley, 
2006).  All the plaintiff must prove is negligence, or that the auditor did not perform to a 
minimum standard of care during the audit (Talley, 2006). The fact that state courts oversee 
these trials has been criticized for a lack of consistent application of the standards. As a result, 
audit firms petitioned the U.S. Treasury Committee to limit their liability to federal courts under 
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934, and to prohibit class action lawsuits at 
the state level under tort law (Sukhraj, 2008). However, the committee recently issued a report 
indicating that they did not come to a consensus on this matter, and decided not to form an 




auditors remain exposed to liability at the state level under tort law for negligence (Advisory 
Committee on the Auditing Profession, 2008).    
Some researchers believe that the increased liability exposure for auditors described in 
the paragraphs above is a positive side effect of SOX (Krishnan et al., 2008). The general 
argument to support this perspective is that this increased litigation risk motivates auditors to 
increase quality and effort; thus, the additional audit costs attributed to litigation risk are worth 
the benefit (Krishnan et al., 2008). Others argue that this additional liability exposure is 
excessive to the detriment of the audit industry as a whole, and the increased costs passed down 
to their clients are not worth the minimal assurance provided with additional audit efforts 
(Cunningham, 2004). Research indicates that, although jurors may be inherently biased against 
the auditor, contextual factors about the case can influence perceptions of the auditor.  These 
contextual factors can influence whether the auditor will be sued or will be found blameworthy 
in a trial setting. Some research indicates that the changes imposed by SOX may in fact have a 
positive impact on auditor litigation outcomes (Jennings et al., 2006). The following sections 
provide an overview of attribution theory and a discussion of how decisions are made in jury 
trials. This is followed by a discussion of the contextual factors that can impact the likelihood of 
auditor litigation and outcomes of trials.  
Attribution Theory and Juror Decisions 
 
 Attribution theory is often employed to explain how jurors and judges construct their 
decisions (Arrington et al., 1985). This theory suggests that there are antecedents and 
consequences to attributions (Kelley and Michela, 1980). Antecedents are circumstances or 




another person‘s decision (Kelley and Michela, 1980). For example, the juror may either believe 
that the auditors made decisions based on internal reasons (i.e., professional judgment) or 
external reasons (i.e., pressures from client, time pressure, compliance with strict rules, etc.). 
This perception is often presumably based on the jurors‘ belief of how much power the auditor 
had over their decisions (Kelley and Michela, 1980). These perceptions can be based on a 
number of things, such as the individuals‘ beliefs and expectations or contextual factors related 
to the specific situation. 
 According to attribution theory, this judgment of internal vs. external motivation has an 
impact on the individual‘s decision (Kelley and Michela, 1980). For example, when a juror 
perceives the motivation for an auditor‘s decision to be internal, they are more likely to attribute 
the control over the decision to the auditor and expect that the auditor will rely on professional 
judgment. When the motivation is seen as external, they are more likely to perceive that the 
auditor was under pressure to make a specific decision, and therefore had less control over their 
decision. Research has shown that observers, such as jurors and judges, are more likely to 
attribute acts to external motivational factors, which is called attributional bias (Lipsitt and 
Sales, 1980; Block and Funder, 1986; Olgoff, 2003).  In addition, when jurors perceive the 
environment to be controllable or not controllable, they evaluate auditors more or less harshly 











Outcome Effects: Bias against Auditors in a Trial Setting 
 
One form of bias in juror and judge decisions is the widely researched notion of outcome 
effects (Lowe and Reckers, 2006)
4
. Outcome effects are biases that are said to occur because 
jurors are aware of the outcome of an event during a trial (i.e., a company bankruptcy, significant 
stakeholder losses). Therefore, when the individual is asked to judge an auditor‘s decisions and 
actions based on the auditor‘s knowledge before the event occurred, they are not able to be 
objective (Lowe and Reckers, 2006). Research has supported the existence of outcome effects, 
finding that jurors and judges both tend to make harsher judgments when they are aware of the 
outcome and when an outcome is more severe (Hawkins and Hastie. 1990; Lowe and Reckers 
1994; Becker et al., 2007). Some have proposed ways to mitigate this bias, such as specifically 
addressing and discrediting the negative bias during the trial (Kadous, 2001), or drawing 
attention to the likelihood of an audit failure in a specific situation (Peecher and Piercey, 2008). 
Many have also found that accountants are less inclined to exhibit outcome bias than non-
accountants (Arrington et al., 1985), which indicates that there may be a difference in the 
reasoning between the groups. This additional complication to juror decisions is the concept of 
the ‗expectation gap‘, which is the difference between what a juror perceives the auditor‘s 
responsibilities to be and what an accountant perceives the auditor‘s responsibility to be (Frank, 
2001; Lowe and Reckers, 2006). Researchers suggest that this difference is based on non-
accountants‘ lack of understanding of the audit process, or perhaps a pre-conceived negative 
opinion of auditors (Frank, 2001; Lowe and Reckers, 2006).  
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Contextual Factors Contributing to Auditor Liability Exposure  
 
Other studies in this area do not focus primarily on juror bias, and instead examine the 
conditions under which auditors are exposed to the least amount of liability. Many of these 
studies are motivated by empirical/archival research, which often provides valuable information 
to identify basic relationships between characteristics of the audit or company and the auditor‘s 
likelihood of being sued. These studies primarily examine how contextual factors can lead to the 
auditor being sued and influence trial outcomes. Some studies examine contextual factors within 
a behavioral setting to isolate specific factors that could influence decisions of jurors and judges. 
The following paragraphs discuss the main conclusions provided by both empirical/archival 
research and judgment and decision-making research on auditor litigation to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the combined insights of the research areas.  
One common stream of research identifies factors that are most likely to lead to litigation 
involving the auditor. These studies consistently find a link between increased auditor litigation 
and audit clients with a larger size, restatement activity, bankruptcy, and publicly traded status 
(Fuerman, 1997; 1998; 1999; Latham and Linville, 1998
5
). In addition, clients in the technology 
manufacturing, finance, real estate, and insurance industries are more likely to expose the auditor 
to litigation (Latham and Linville, 1998). Further, the presence of fraud tends to increase the 
likelihood that the auditor will be sued, particularly when the fraud is more prevalent or common 
and when there is evidence of fraudulent transactions (Bonner et al., 1998). This research 
indicates that perhaps the nature of the fraud can influence expectations of the auditor, and the 
perceptions of whether the auditor was negligent for not discovering and disclosing the fraud.  
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Research indicates that other factors, such as disclosure quality, may actually decrease 
the likelihood that the auditor will become involved in litigation. Other findings that play a role 
in predicting whether auditors will be involved in litigation include the general perception of the 
audit firm and the amount of effort the auditor made during the audit. First, the size of the audit 
firm is important, as larger audit firms are consistently associated with less litigation (Palmrose, 
1988). This particular finding has been used to argue that large audit firms are associated with 
higher audit quality (either actual or assumed); therefore, they are sued less often (Latham and 
Linville, 1998).   The disclosures made by auditors are viewed as a key component of the 
reporting process, as the disclosures reduce information asymmetry that exists between the 
managers and stakeholders of companies (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  Therefore, research 
proposes that auditors can potentially impact their risk of litigation by how well they 
communicate information in their reports; disclosure quality combined with an underlying audit 
quality can effectively deter litigation risk (Latham and Linville, 1998). 
Perhaps the first of these studies to find a link between auditor disclosure and litigation 
risk is a study conducted by Carcello and Palmrose (1994) that proposes that auditors issuing 
timely modified going concern opinions, which can warn of possible going concern issues but 
stop short of qualifying the audit opinion, can reduce the likelihood that the auditor will be sued 
when their client ends up in bankruptcy. Further supporting this argument, a recent behavioral 
study examining audit disclosures and litigation risk finds that potential litigators may be less 
likely to recommend suing the auditor when the auditor has provided a red flag in the form of a 
modified audit opinion that warns of a possible going concern issue with the company (Mong 
and Roebuck, 2005). Therefore, the auditor‘s disclosures are important as a potential signal to 




a quarterly review report is negatively associated with auditor litigation, and that the market 
positively responds to the release of such a report. Overall, these studies provide evidence 
supporting the idea that auditors may be able to decrease their litigation exposure by signaling 
quality audits (Latham and Linville, 1998), particularly by providing disclosures that create 
signals to stakeholders concerning future risks within the company (Mong and Roebuck, 2005). 
 Another recent stream of research in this area identifies the factors that are most likely to 
lead to a favorable outcome in litigation involving the auditor. This research focuses primarily on 
how current changes within the audit environment may impact trial outcomes. Although the 
current trend is for auditors to settle out of court, understanding how court decisions are made is 
still important, as audit firms and their legal counsel rely heavily on their expectations of what 
will occur in court to make decisions of whether or not to settle, and how much the settlement 
should be (Brandon and Mueller, 2008). The pool of litigation cases that result in actual trial 
outcomes with a judge and jury is quite small, which leads to difficulties for researchers 
attempting to develop an understanding of jury trial outcomes (Latham and Linville, 1998).  As a 
result of this small data pool, the predominant method for examining litigation outcomes in this 
particular light has been in a behavioral context. This type of research can provide valuable 
insights about how suggested, pending, or recent changes in the audit environment can influence 
litigation outcomes. Therefore, the conclusions reached by examining juror and judge decision-
making is highly relevant to the current debate on auditor‘s legal liability exposure, particularly 
as it relates to how SOX and other recent changes have influenced the likelihood of auditors 
being held liable in courts.  
 Past research on auditor liability is consistent with behavioral law research, such that 




For example, studies indicate that perceptions of auditor independence and audit quality are 
important to judges and jurors, and that these perceptions can be influenced by circumstances of 
the case (Jennings et al., 2006). In a recent study conducted with U.S. judges, researchers found 
that perceptions of independence are highest when the auditors were identified as working with 
clients who had corporate governance characteristics that are beyond the minimally compliant 
levels of corporate governance, and under conditions of audit firm rotation (Jennings et al., 
2006). This study suggests that an overall high level of corporate governance is desirable for 
auditors when choosing clients, and that auditor tenure can influence perceptions of auditor 
independence. In another recent study examining auditor tenure, researchers found that auditor 
tenure negatively impact jurors‘ perceptions of auditor independence, but positively impacts their 
perceptions of auditor competence (Brandon and Mueller, 2008). As perceptions of auditor 
independence were found to increase blame, and perceptions of competence were found to 
decrease blame, perceptions of auditor tenure may be a double edged sword and that the issues 
must be strategically addressed in court (Brandon and Mueller, 2008). Perceptions of client 
importance have also been found to influence perception of auditor independence, resulting in a 
negative relationship between client importance and independence (Brandon and Mueller, 2006). 
The inverse link between perceptions of auditor independence and blameworthiness, which 
appears to be a common factor in recent research in this area, has also been confirmed (Brandon 
and Mueller, 2006). Overall, these studies indicate that one of the main goals of SOX legislation, 
increasing auditor independence, may have a significant (positive) impact on how auditors are 





The Impact of Litigation: Reputation Loss  
 
Audit firms claim they are exposed to both monetary losses and reputation losses in the 
event of litigation. Auditors estimate that they are currently exposed to billions of dollars in 
damages should the current cases against them result in negative outcomes (Sukhraj, 2008).  In 
addition to exposure to potential monetary losses, reputation loss has been cited as one of the 
most detrimental side effects of litigation, as reputation loss can ultimately lead to monetary 
losses with the increased threat of clients abandoning the audit firm (Barton 2005; 
Krishnamurthy et al., 2006). For example, an audit firm‘s non-litigating clients experience an 
immediate negative reaction in financial markets when an auditor is announced to be associated 
with litigation (Franz et al., 1998).  This implies that markets do consider the quality of an 
auditor‘s work when valuing their clients and that lower audit quality is automatically assumed 
by the auditor‘s involvement with litigation. The findings of Franz et al. (1998) suggest that 
being associated with litigation, no matter what the outcome, has the potential to negatively 
impact an audit firm. 
Recent studies have examined one specific event that is placed at the center of audit 
firms‘ pleas for liability limitations--the demise of Arthur Andersen. Some researchers suggest 
the reputation losses suffered from a string of failures of Andersen‘s high profile clients started 
the decline of this firm, initially leading to large clients withdrawing from the audit firm‘s 
services (Barton, 2005). As a result of highly publicized press releases related to the case (i.e., 
document shredding, federal indictments, publicity surrounding the firm‘s significant non-audit 
fees, etc.), the firm began to suffer further reputation losses from a declining public perception of 




2006). Researchers argue that these reputation losses were instrumental in bringing down the 
company, as clients did not wish to be associated with a firm with such a poor public perception 
of audit quality (Barton, 2005; Krishnamurthy et al., 2006).  
Others question whether the reputation losses argued to be a significant factor in the 
demise of Arthur Andersen are valid. Such critics suggest instead that Andersen‘s clients 
experienced a downturn in the market driven by other events that occurred within the same time 
frame (Nelson et al., 2008). This alternative argument undermines one of the key arguments 
supporting the notion that reputation losses that occur solely from the announcement of litigation 
can directly lead to monetary losses for audit firms. The conditions surrounding the specific case 
of Arthur Andersen also suggest that perceived audit quality is important, as clients did not begin 
to abandon the firm until it was clear that the public perceived their audits to be substandard 
(Chaney and Philipich, 2002; Krishnamurthy et al., 2006). Overall, the conclusions reached 
concerning the Arthur Andersen case may provide further support for the argument that audit 
quality and increased standards for independence that are provided by SOX can have a positive 
impact on auditor liability exposure, by perhaps decreasing the potential for negative 
repercussions by being associated with litigation.  
Using the collapse of Arthur Andersen as an example, auditors recently argued to the 
U.S. Treasury Department‘s Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession that both the 
monetary and reputational losses associated with frivolous lawsuits are placing other auditing 
firms at risk of a similar fate. This example, combined with their arguments that SOX opens up 
the auditors to an even greater liability, provided the foundations for the arguments that liability 
limitations are crucial in order to prevent another large audit firm from collapsing under the 




on this committee recognized that the current litigation exposure of auditors might threaten the 
future of large audit firms, the committee members expressed different opinions on how this 
issue should be addressed. Other committee members disagreed with the audit firms‘ argument 
that their litigation exposure is threatening enough to warrant changes in the current litigation 
environment. Overall, this committee‘s considerations were inconclusive on the issue, citing that 
members were not able to reach a consensus (Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession, 
2008). In light of the current market conditions that could lead to an increase in litigation 
exposure following the decline of financial markets, researchers have an opportunity to 
contribute to future discourse on auditor litigation by gaining a better understanding of the links 
between litigation and reputation losses, as well as how audit quality influences the initiation and 
outcome of litigation involving auditors. Not only could this information be used to assist future 
legislators and regulators with their decisions on how to move forward with the auditor‘s 
requests for liability limitations, but audit firms could certainly benefit from a greater 
understanding of how to deal with their liability exposure as it currently stands.  
Overall Conclusion 
 
The contrasting viewpoints presented in paragraphs above concerning the debate over the 
link between reputation losses and the failure of Arthur Andersen highlight the difficulty of 
gaining a full understanding of the public‘s perception of auditors following an audit failure. 
This creates a strong argument for the need to examine the phenomenon from a behavioral 
perspective, which will enable isolation of key factors of the debate from economic events that 
occur within the same time frame. The studies reported in following chapters contribute to this 




exposure. The overall conclusions reached by these three studies contribute to research on 
auditor liability, audit committee composition, and internal control reporting. Overall, these 
studies provide a link between the provisions of SOX and auditor legal liability, which has been 
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STUDY ONE: SOX SECTION 404 AND AUDITOR LITIGATION EXPOSURE: AN 
INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL LITIGATORS’ CONSIDERATION OF THE 




Section 404 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) significantly expanded auditors‘ 
responsibility for evaluating a client‘s internal controls (Parles et al., 2007). Section 404 requires 
the auditor to conduct an integrated audit of internal controls along with the audit of financial 
statements, and to express an opinion on internal controls based on the results of this audit 
(PCAOB, 2007). This increased responsibility for assessing and reporting on internal controls 
has been cited as the main source of audit fee increases following SOX implementation, as 
auditors have increased their efforts to assure that they meet the requirements of the legislation 
(Foster et al., 2007; Hogan and Wilkins, 2008; Krishnan et al., 2008). This upward trend in audit 
fees has also been attributed to an increase in liability exposure related to the new opinion and 
disclosures required by Section 404 (Asare et al., 2007).  
Auditors claim that this increased liability exposure creates a litigation environment that 
is unfairly risky for auditors (Asare et al., 2007). Audit firms argue that the assessment of 
internal controls and the impact of control deficiencies on the financial statements is a highly 
complex process, requiring auditors to rely heavily on professional judgment (Tackett et al., 
2006). Others argue that the auditor‘s report on internal controls provides disclosures that assure 
users that controls are in place to prevent material misstatement, which increases the culpability 
of auditors for internal control failures within a company (Asare et al., 2007). In addition to 
potential financial losses that may occur in the case of auditor litigation, auditors are exposed to 




Research suggests that the failure of Arthur Anderson may have been attributed to reputation 
losses, perhaps even before the indictment stage, and that monetary losses began long before any 
awards related to legal liability (Chaney and Philipich, 2002). Therefore, the reputation loss 
associated with a suit brought against an auditor can potentially have significant negative effects 
on the firm, no matter the outcome. 
 The purpose of this study is to examine whether auditors may be able to protect 
themselves from litigation by taking actions that will decrease the likelihood of being sued, 
specifically whether the auditor‘s opinion and disclosures required by Section 404 may be 
deemed to be red flags and deter litigation by potential litigators. Auditors are currently only 
required to disclose material weaknesses in internal controls, which are only those internal 
control deficiencies considered to have a potential material impact on financial reporting 
(Hammersley et al., 2008). Even when auditors report an adverse opinion on internal controls 
upon the discovery of a material weakness, they are not required to make any modifications to 
the auditor‘s opinion on the financial statements unless they have reason to believe that the 
financial statements are materially misstated (PCAOB, 2007).  Therefore, the main purpose of 
this study is to investigate whether providing an adverse opinion on internal controls, or 
voluntarily disclosing significant deficiencies, is considered an adequate red flag to investors of 
the potential for material misstatements, even when the auditor provides an unqualified opinion 
on the financial statements. This red flag could be viewed as a signal to users that a potential 
failure in internal controls may lead to material misstatement and the ultimate failure of a 
company. Past research indicates that audit disclosures can lead to a decreased likelihood of 




This study expands on this research by providing insight into the decision-making of lawyers 
considering a potential case against auditors.  
To gain this enhanced understanding of lawyers‘ decisions, a 3x1 between subjects 
experiment was conducted with 100 lawyers specializing in business law and/or securities law, 
who provided their opinions about a potential shareholder lawsuit against an auditor of a 
bankrupt company. Participants were told that the auditor of a public company discovered a 
deficiency in internal controls during a previous audit, but failed to assess accurately the 
likelihood that the deficiency would result in a material misstatement of the financial statements 
for the company. This company eventually declares bankruptcy after discovering pervasive 
fraudulent financial reporting within the company, and participants were told that the 
shareholders of the company are exploring options to recover their losses. The SOX Section 404 
report was manipulated across three conditions, with one condition communicating that the 
auditor had previously reported an unqualified opinion on internal controls with no disclosure of 
the deficiency the auditor found during the audit. The second condition communicated that the 
auditor reported an unqualified opinion on internal controls, but provided a voluntary disclosure 
of the deficiency, and the third condition stated that the auditor reported an adverse opinion on 
internal controls.  
Results indicate that auditor litigation exposure is lower when the auditor reports an 
adverse opinion on internal controls, in comparison to reporting an unqualified opinion with or 
without disclosures. These results support the argument that an adverse opinion within the 
Section 404 report may be perceived as a red flag to users, resulting in a decreased likelihood of 
litigation. The findings of this study indicate that auditors should carefully consider Section 404 




impact on their litigation exposure. Since auditors‘ Section 404 reporting decisions are often 
subjective, the results of this study may provide important insight into how such decisions could 
influence the likelihood of the auditor being sued in the event of a client‘s bankruptcy.  This 
implication is important, as the auditor‘s assessment of litigation risk directly influences the 
timing and extent of audit procedures and the resulting fees for the audit.  
 The following section provides a discussion of the requirements of Section 404 and the 
auditor‘s reporting decisions related to internal controls. Then, hypotheses are developed based 
on signaling theory to predict how potential litigators will perceive auditors under different 
reporting conditions, should the failure of a company be attributed to internal controls. An 
experiment is conducted to test these predictions, and results are discussed to understand the 
implications of the findings. Finally, overall conclusions, limitations, and future research 
opportunities will be highlighted to provide a summary of the overall contributions of this study.  
  
Theory and Hypothesis Development 
 
SOX Section 404: Responsibilities of the Auditor 
 
SOX Section 404 requires additional assurance from the auditor in the form of an 
integrated audit on internal controls and financial reporting (McConnell and Banks, 2003). First, 
management is required to establish and maintain internal controls over financial reporting, and 
provide the annual release of their financial statements indicating whether their internal controls 
are sufficient to prevent or detect material misstatement. Then, auditors are required to perform 
their own independent procedures to evaluate internal controls and state their opinion on these 




The auditor‘s opinion on internal controls is formed based on the auditor‘s judgment on 
the likelihood that the company has sufficient internal controls in place to prevent or detect a 
material weakness in the financial statements. Figure 1 provides a detailed outline of the decision 
process described below which explains the relationship between the auditor‘s Section 404 
opinion and their assessment of internal controls. There are three important definitions that 
provide guidance to assist auditors in forming their opinion on internal controls: control 
deficiencies, significant deficiencies, and material weaknesses. A control deficiency is ―when the 
design or operation of a control does not allow management or employees, in the normal course 
of performing their assigned functions, to prevent or detect misstatements on a timely basis‖ 
(PCAOB, 2007, p. 57). Control deficiencies are very common within a company, and are often 
discovered by either management or the auditor. Once a control deficiency is identified, the 
auditor and/or management must then assess the likelihood of a material misstatement due to the 
deficiency. If the deficiency has more than a remote likelihood of leading to a more than 
inconsequential misstatement, then it is classified as a significant deficiency. If the deficiency is 
deemed to have the potential for a material misstatement, it is classified as a material weakness 
(PCAOB, 2007).  
 The differentiation between control deficiencies, significant deficiencies, and material 
weaknesses is important to the auditor‘s reporting decisions due to specific rules for the auditor‘s  
opinion on internal controls under different conditions. If only control deficiencies and 
significant deficiencies are identified, the auditor reports an unqualified opinion on internal 
controls (PCAOB, 2007). Although auditors of non-public companies are required to disclose 
significant deficiencies in their report on internal controls, no additional disclosures are required 




auditor is aware of any material weaknesses in internal controls. This report would contain 
details on the material weakness and mention any steps management will take in the future to 
solve the problem. The auditor must then assess how material the weakness is to the financial 
statements, and consider modification of the auditor‘s opinion on financial statements. If the 
auditor deems the weakness to be contained and not have enough of an impact to warrant such a 
modification, the reasons for coming to this conclusion must be explained within the Section 404 
report (PCAOB, 2007).  
Signaling Theory and the Use of SOX Section 404 Reports 
 
Although the PCAOB released AS-5 to clarify the provisions of SOX and provide 
implementation guidance specifically related to Section 404 reporting (PCAOB, 2007), the 
reporting decisions made by auditors are still highly ambiguous and at times may still lack clarity 
(Parles et al., 2007). For example, the differences between significant deficiencies and material 
weaknesses are difficult to assess, particularly when they are assessing both qualitative and 
quantitative materiality (Tackett et al., 2006). This decision relies heavily on professional 
judgment and arguably exposes the auditor to an increased amount of legal liability (Asare et al., 
2007). Because of this potential increase in liability exposure, auditors appear to have increased 
their efforts to assure that they identify and assess control deficiencies effectively (Boyle and 
Webb, 2007). This strategy has led to a significant increase in audit costs, which have been 
attributed primarily to this increase in responsibility (Boyle and Webb, 2007; Krishnan et al., 
2008).   
Some argue that this additional cost is worth the effort, as Section 404 reports provide 




internal controls (Canada et al., 2007). Signaling theory is often utilized to understand why high 
quality information, such as audit reports, would be in demand even when such disclosures are 
costly to a company (Titman and Trueman, 1986; Bagnoli and Watts, 2005; Levine and Hughes, 
2005). Although signaling theory originated in research investigating job searches and the 
interactions between potential employers and employees, this theory provides higher-level 
insights into human behavior when one party is privy to more information than another party, 
otherwise known as information asymmetry. Signaling theory suggests that as two parties 
interact, information will be exchanged when one party provides a signal that is interpreted by 
the other party. Once the signal is received, the decisions of the party receiving the signal are 
presumably influenced by the information, but only if they perceive the information to be 
reliable. Signaling theory suggests that reliability perceptions are influenced by many 
considerations, one of which is the perceived cost of providing the signal (Akerlof, 1970).  
 In past research, audit reports and related disclosures are often represented as one way 
that the information asymmetry between a company and stakeholders can be reduced (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). Research also suggests that perceptions of the quality of such disclosures may 
influence how users perceive the company and impact the extent of influence the information has 
on their decisions (Latham and Linville, 1998). Consistent with signaling theory, past research 
indicates audit reports and disclosures matter to users as well as provide signals that are 
incorporated into the users‘ evaluation of the company. For example, the market responds to 
differences in audit opinions (Strawser, 1991) and disclosures within the audit report, such as an 
emphasis of a matter paragraph (Craswell, 1999). Research specifically indicates that the Section 
404 report contains useful information, as investors tend to respond to different characteristics 




decisions (Schneider and Church, 2008). The results of past research are consistent with 
signaling theory.  This research suggests that, although Section 404 reporting is costly to the 
company, the information provides a useful signal to both investors and creditors (Boyle and 
Webb, 2007).   
Prior research also indicates that audit reports can limit an auditor‘s exposure to litigation 
by providing a signal to users indicating potential problems within a company (Carcello and 
Palmrose, 1994; Mong and Roebuck, 2005). This finding is aligned with signaling theory, 
indicating that audit reports that are modified are perceived as costly to the auditor (i.e., increase 
the potential of losing the client), and users respond to the information contained in the report. 
Specifically, when auditors include an emphasis of a matter paragraph to warn users of a 
potential going concern issue with the company, they are less likely to be sued (Carcello and 
Palmrose, 1994; Mong and Roebuck, 2005).  Research also indicates that the market appreciates 
voluntary disclosures from auditors, as evidenced by a market reaction to the release of quarterly 
review reports (Krishnan and Zhang, 2005). Krishnan and Zhang (2005) also find voluntarily 
providing a quarterly review report is negatively associated with auditor litigation. These 
findings support the notion that certain audit disclosures may be deemed as sufficient signals to 
investors that a company may have problems in the future. These findings also indicate that 
potential litigators consider audit disclosures when deciding whether the auditor should be sued. 
Since auditors are motivated to avoid the incidence of lawsuits, for both the direct costs of 
litigation and indirect costs related to their reputation (Barton 2005; Krushnamurthy et al., 2006), 
such a finding may provide an incentive for auditors to increase the transparency of their audit 




Overall, research indicates that users value the auditor‘s Section 404 opinion, and audit 
disclosures have the potential to reduce the likelihood of litigation (Carcello and Palmrose, 1994; 
Mong and Roebuck, 2005). Therefore, this study investigates whether the additional reporting 
requirements of Section 404 may provide an opportunity for auditors to signal their concerns 
about a company without modifying the auditor‘s report on financial statements, and ultimately 
lessen their litigation exposure. This opportunity is important in light of the negative perceptions 
of how costly Section 404 is for firms. This information could provide additional incentives for 
auditors to conduct high quality audits and increase the transparency of their disclosures related 
to the audit of internal controls.   
Although auditors of public companies are not currently required to make any disclosures 
related to significant deficiencies as long as they are deemed immaterial (PCAOB, 2007), this 
study proposes that auditors have an incentive to provide such disclosures voluntarily, even 
though the opinion on internal controls is unqualified. Such voluntary disclosures of significant 
deficiencies are already appearing in managements‘ reports on internal controls (Hammersley et 
al., 2008), but auditors have not currently taken this step in their own reports on internal controls. 
Neither party is expressly prohibited from disclosing significant deficiencies, but both 
management and auditors are only required to disclose specific details concerning significant 
deficiencies to the audit committee (Hammersley et al., 2008). However, disclosing significant 
deficiencies within the auditor‘s report on internal controls is required for audit reports of non-
public companies (AICPA, 2006) and is similar in nature to including an emphasis of a matter 





Past research indicates that disclosures of significant deficiencies are important to 
investors (Hammersley et al., 2008). Therefore, a voluntary disclosure of deficiencies within the 
Section 404 report for public companies could provide the auditor a chance to communicate a 
potential problem with internal controls when there is not enough evidence to report an adverse 
opinion on internal controls. In the event that the auditor decides to issue an unqualified or clean 
report on internal controls, both signaling theory and past research suggests that providing 
additional disclosures to emphasize potential problems within a company can provide a red flag 
that will signal to users a potential issue within the company (Mong and Roebuck, 2005). The 
research in this area also indicates that a red flag signal can offer protection from liability 
exposure by decreasing the likelihood that litigation will be pursued against the auditor (Mong 
and Roebuck, 2005). This study proposes that, in the event that an undetected material 
misstatement is discovered after the issuance of the annual report that is directly attributed to a 
failure in internal controls, potential litigators will perceive the auditor‘s voluntary disclosures to 
be a red flag signaling risk in the company, and will adjust their evaluations of the auditor 
accordingly. Therefore, H1 is formally stated as follows: 
H1: Auditors reporting an unqualified opinion on internal controls containing voluntary 
disclosures of control deficiencies will be evaluated more favorably by potential litigators 
than auditors reporting an unqualified opinion on internal controls with no additional 
disclosures.  
 
 In the event that the auditors identify a control deficiency, they must then assess the 
likelihood of the deficiency leading to material misstatements. This materiality can be qualitative 
or quantitative, and is often highly subjective. If the weakness is determined to be material, the 
auditor must report an adverse opinion on internal controls as shown in Figure 1. However, even 




controls, the weakness may not be pervasive enough to warrant modifying the opinion on the 
financial statements (PCAOB, 2007). In this case, the auditor would still indicate that the 
financial statements are reliable, even if an internal control weakness exists. However, the 
auditor‘s adverse opinion on internal controls explicitly states it is likely that a material 
misstatement in the financial statements will not be prevented or detected due to a weakness in 
internal controls, which is a much stronger statement of risk than what is suggested by a 
significant deficiency (see Figure 1). Therefore, an adverse opinion on internal controls arguably 
provides a stronger signal of potential material misstatement in comparison to an unqualified 
opinion, even if the unqualified opinion is accompanied by voluntary disclosures of significant 
deficiencies.  
The ability of the internal control opinion (unqualified or adverse) to impact auditor 
liability exposure and likelihood of litigation in the event of an audit failure has not been 
examined by researchers. However, as signaling theory and past research indicates that an 
auditor‘s report containing signals that act as a red flag to potential litigators can lessen the 
likelihood of litigation, an adverse opinion on internal controls should theoretically provide a 
stronger signal of potential misstatements to users (Mong and Roebuck, 2005). In the event that 
an undetected material misstatement that is directly attributed to a failure in internal controls is 
discovered after issuing the annual report, potential litigators should consider an adverse opinion 
on internal controls to be a stronger red flag signaling internal control risk than an unqualified 
opinion on internal controls, with or without voluntary disclosures, and will adjust their 






H2: Auditors reporting an adverse opinion on internal controls will be evaluated more 
favorably by potential litigators than auditors reporting an unqualified opinion on internal 
controls containing voluntary disclosures of control deficiencies or an unqualified 




A 3x1 between-subjects experiment was conducted to examine how the information 
contained within the auditor‘s report on internal controls can influence potential litigators‘ 
likelihood of attributing blame to the auditor in the event of an audit failure. Three different 
conditions were examined, with all three stating that the auditor reported an unqualified opinion 
on financial statements, and the manipulation occurring based on whether the auditor‘s opinion 
on internal controls was either (1) unqualified with no additional disclosures, (2) unqualified 
with additional disclosures of significant deficiencies, or (3) adverse (contains description of 
material deficiencies). Table 1 provides an overview of the research design.   
Experimental Task and Procedures 
 
Participants were presented with information about a company that recently declared 
bankruptcy following an announcement of the discovery that the company had falsely inflated 
revenue figures to conceal significant declines in demand for products. This announcement was 
accompanied by a significant downward restatement of income for previously reported financial 
statements. Shortly after this announcement, the company declared bankruptcy. The shareholders 
of the company sustained significant losses when the company declared bankruptcy, and the 
stock became worthless. The participants were presented with details about the previous years‘ 
audit, indicating that the auditor discovered a deficiency in internal controls. This particular 




to prevent or detect the falsely inflated revenue figures. After reviewing these details, the 
participants were provided the option of viewing the reports on internal control for both 
management and the auditor for 2007. Participants were then asked whether they viewed the 
reports and whether the reports influenced their decisions for the task. In response to this 
question, 72% of the participants indicated that they viewed the auditor‘s report, and 67% 
viewed management‘s report. On a scale of one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree), the 
mean rating for decision relevance was 5.231 for management‘s report and 5.623 for the 
auditor‘s report, indicating that the reports were on average slightly relevant to somewhat 
relevant to their decisions. See Appendix B for a copy of all three versions of this case. 
To increase the external validity of the case study, the main factors were developed based 
on actual court cases. The case study was then subjected to multiple rounds of edits based on 
direct feedback in the pre-test round from professionals with expertise in auditing, audit 
committees, securities law, tort law, accountants‘ professional liability, and litigation. In the pre-
test round, five lawyers reviewed the case materials in depth and provided direct feedback on the 
understandability and external validity of the case. An anonymous pre-test of the online 
experiment was also conducted with six law students and five lawyers to further test the 
understandability of the case study materials. The case study was edited based on feedback from 
this pre-testing to assure that the appropriate legal terminology was used in both the case study 
and questionnaire.  
Overall, the facts in the case were intended to reflect a scenario that would normally 
heighten the likelihood that the auditor would be sued, with a realistic pattern and timeline of 
events (i.e., undetected falsely inflated revenue figures, downward restatement of income, stock 




reviewing the case, who indicated that most lawyers would not consider a lawsuit against 
auditors if these particular conditions were not present. However, the scenario implies a high 
level of audit quality, as the auditor in the case identified a deficiency in internal controls during 
the 2007 audit and followed the appropriate procedures by reporting the discovery to the audit 
committee. Therefore, the ambiguity of the situation involves the auditor‘s Section 404 reporting 
decision, which was based on professional judgment of the evidence available at the time. As an 
additional measure of external validity, participants were asked, ‗How realistic was this 
scenario?‘ using a Likert scale with one (not realistic at all) to seven (completely realistic), and 
answered with a mean response of 4.411 (slightly realistic). 
In a similar manner to Mong and Roebuck (2005), participants were asked questions to 
gauge their understanding of the auditor‘s opinions, which provided assurance to the researcher 
that the manipulation was both read and understood by the participant. Then, participants were 
asked a series of questions to assess the likelihood that a lawsuit would be filed against the 
auditor, how strong the potential case against the auditor would be, and whether they would 
recommend that the shareholders pursue/not pursue litigation against the auditor. This series of 
questions was asked to gain an understanding of the litigation exposure of auditors in this 
scenario. Following this series of questions, the participants were prompted to provide 
predictions about the outcome of potential lawsuits against the auditor in this scenario. These 
questions were asked to provide a measure of the auditor‘s potential liability exposure in the 
event that they were sued. Participants were also asked to provide their opinions about a potential 
case against the audit committee and top management of the bankrupt company. Finally, 
participants were asked to provide demographic information to assess the likelihood that they are 




would be made (i.e., income level, investment experience, education, career path, etc.). See 
Appendix B for a copy of the questionnaire provided to all participants. 
Initial contact was made by sending an email to potential participants with a description 
of the study and an invitation to participate. Each participant was randomly assigned into one of 
the three experimental conditions for this study. This email contained a link to the study. If the 
link was clicked, the individual was forwarded to a page that overviewed the study and provided 
assurance that all answers were anonymous but would be used for research at the aggregate level. 
After consenting to participate, participants were forwarded to the study, which was completed 
entirely online, and were randomly assigned into one of the three experimental groups outlined 
in Table 1. This online format allowed the researcher to record the length of time each 
participant took to complete the task. Overall, participants spent an average of 21 minutes on the 
task, with a range five minutes (minimum) to 54 minutes (maximum).  
Over 10% of the individuals responding to the study contacted the researcher by email or 
telephone after completing the task, which allowed the researcher to further understand the 
decision processes of lawyers presented with this scenario and confirm that the scenario was 
understood and realistic. Although some issues with the case were identified by these parties that 
could be the subject of future research (i.e., differing state laws, influence of bankruptcy judges), 
no clear issues emerged that would likely influence the results of the study. Overall, the majority 
of these individuals indicated that they found the study interesting, and were motivated to initiate 
direct contact with the researcher to request a copy of the study results. This direct feedback 
from participants provided additional assurance that the case was externally valid, and that 






 The population for this study was identified as lawyers specializing in business law, 
bankruptcies, and/or securities litigation. These individuals are most likely to be in the position 
of deciding whether to pursue litigation against auditors or providing legal advice to individuals 
or organizations seeking recovery of losses from auditors (Mong and Roebuck, 2005). To obtain 
a representative sample from this population, lawyers were identified using practice area 
segmented lists of lawyers located on the American Bar Association website (www.abanet.org) 
and the National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees website (www.nabt.com).  
Approximately 3,216
6
 email invitations were sent to lawyers for the final data collection 
phase. Out of this mailing, 212 unique entries to the online instrument were recorded (response 
rate of 6.5%). 119 of these individuals completed the task (dropout rate of 43.8%, response rate 
of 3.7%). A total of 19 individuals did not pass the manipulation check question, ‗What did the 
independent auditors of Clovitech, Inc. conclude in their report on internal controls for the 2007 
financial statements?‘ These individuals were not included in the sample for analysis. Therefore, 
100 responses were usable out of this sample (useable response rate of 3.1%). The researcher 
communicated with multiple individuals who did not complete the study by email and/or 
telephone. Many of these individuals, although listed as specialists in securities law and/or 
business law on the ABA website, indicated that they did not feel professionally qualified to 
answer the questionnaire. Also, four emails were received in the weeks following the end of the 
data collection period indicating that the individuals did not complete the task because they were 
out of town during the study period. Finally, although the researcher was able to track and note 
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any emails that immediately bounced back, the large amount of emails sent for this study are 
susceptible to being labeled as junk email and may not have reached many of the potential 
participants. Consideration of these factors may partially explain why low overall response rates 
occurred in this study. 
To test for non-response bias, responses and demographic characteristics from 
individuals completing the study at the end of the allotted time period were compared to 
responses received at the beginning of the allotted time period. No significant differences were 
found, indicating that non-response bias should not be an issue with the results of this study. 
After accounting for individuals that did not pass the manipulation check, the final sample size 
for the study was 100 participants, with 33 responses in the ‗Unqualified/No Disclosure‘ 
condition, 30 responses in the ‗Unqualified/Disclosure‘ condition and 37 responses for the 
‗Adverse‘ condition.  
Overall, the participants were an average of 54 years of age, and 91.8% of the 
respondents were male.  All participants in the sample indicated that they either were currently 
practicing lawyers or recently retired. All of the participants indicated that they had a graduate 
degree in law, with 22.2% indicating that they also completed a major or minor degree in a 
business-related field.  On average participants indicated that they spend over 50% of their time 
working on civil cases, and all participants indicated that they were specialists in at least one area 
that would likely qualify them as experts in the type of case presented in this study (i.e., 
Securities Law or Business Law). In addition, over 50% of the sample have been professionally 
involved in cases where the auditor was implicated for damages. Overall, the participants 




presented in the case for this study, and were qualified to make the types of decisions asked of 
them in the questionnaire.  
A detailed analysis of the demographic characteristics of this sample, categorized by 
experimental condition, is shown in Table 2 and 3 in Appendix A. T-tests of these items reveal 
no statistically significant differences across conditions in the demographic characteristics of the 
individual participants. Demographic variables were also entered as covariates in the analyses 
described in the results below to test whether the demographic characteristics of the participants 
significantly influenced the dependent variables in this study. No significant covariates were 
identified in this analysis.    
Measurement of Variables 
 
 The main independent variable of interest in this study (‗404 Report‘) was manipulated 
between-subjects by randomly assigning lawyers into groups, and presenting each group with 
one of the three scenarios. The three scenarios are as follows: (1) unqualified with no additional 
disclosures (identified in the study as ‗Unqualified/No Disclosure‘ or ‗Group 1‘), (2) unqualified 
with additional disclosures of significant deficiencies (identified in the study as 
‗Unqualified/Disclosure‘ or ‗Group 2‘), or (3) adverse (identified in the study as ‗Adverse‘ or 
‗Group 3‘).  
The main dependent variable in this study, ‗Auditor Litigation Exposure‘, was measured 
with three questions. Participants were first asked for the percentage likelihood, from 0-100%, 
that the auditor in the scenario presented would be sued by stockholders. Then, the participants 
were asked to rate the strength of the potential case against the auditor on a scale from one 




express their level of agreement on a scale from one (completely disagree) to seven (completely 
agree) with the statement ‗I would advise stockholders to file a lawsuit against the auditors‘. The 
measures in this study each represent an underlying variable that is continuous, and will be 
treated as continuous variables for analysis purposes. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
The first hypothesis in the study examines whether voluntary disclosures within an 
unqualified Section 404 report will generate more favorable evaluations of the auditor when 
compared to unqualified opinions without such a disclosure. The second hypothesis examines 
whether auditors are viewed more favorably when they report an adverse opinion on internal 
controls, compared to when they report an unqualified opinion with or without voluntary 
disclosures. Each of these hypotheses are first tested by conducting a multiple analysis of 
variance (MANOVA), followed by an individual analysis of the influence of the Section 404 
reporting conditions on each of the three different measures of auditor litigation exposure (% 
likelihood of being sued, strength of the case against the auditor, and advice to file/not file a 
lawsuit against the auditor). Table 4 provides an overall summary of the responses to these three 
measures for each of the three Section 404 reporting conditions examined in the study. 
Descriptive statistics indicate that when auditors reported an unqualified opinion with no 
disclosure of internal control deficiencies, the mean response from lawyers was 84.8% when 
asked to evaluate the likelihood of the auditor being sued, compared to the 
‗Unqualified/Disclosure‘ group mean of 88.2%, and ‗Adverse‘ group mean of 74.1%. The mean 




be sued across all scenarios. When asked to evaluate the strength of the case against the auditor 
on a scale from one (extremely weak case) to seven (extremely strong case), the ‗Unqualified/No 
Disclosure‘ group responded with a mean of 5.636, the ‗Unqualified/Disclosure‘ group mean 
was 5.333, and the ‗Adverse‘ group mean was 4.703.  The overall mean for all participants in 
response to this question was 5.200 (between slightly strong case and somewhat strong case). 
When asked if they would recommend filing a lawsuit against the auditor, the ‗Unqualified/No 
Disclosure‘ group responded with a mean of 6.091 on a scale from one (completely disagree) to 
seven (completely agree), compared to a mean of 6.100 for the ‗Unqualified/Disclosure‘ group, 
and 5.000 for the ‗Adverse‘ group.  The mean response overall to this question was 5.690 
(between slightly agree and somewhat agree), indicating that the participants were generally 
inclined to recommend that the auditors be sued by stockholders to recover losses.  
H1: Unqualified without Disclosure vs. Unqualified with Voluntary Disclosure 
 
To test H1, a MANOVA was performed to examine the impact of the independent 
variable ‗404 Report‘ on the dependent variable ‗Auditor Litigation Exposure‘
7
. The variable 
‗404 Report‘ for H1 represents two different conditions in which the auditor provided either an 
unqualified opinion on internal controls with no disclosure (‗Unqualified/No Disclosure‘) or an 
unqualified opinion on internal controls with a voluntary disclosure (‗Unqualified/Disclosure‘). 
The dependent variable was measured by the lawyers‘ perception of the likelihood that the 
auditor would be sued, their opinion on the strength of the case against the auditor, and their 
recommendation to shareholders on whether to sue the auditor to recover damages.  As shown in 
Table 5 Panel 1A, MANOVA results indicate no significant effect for the independent variable 
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‗404 Report‘, Wilks lambda= 0.941, F(1,61) = 1.244, p=0.151 (one-tailed). The partial Eta 
squared was 0.059, which means that the independent variable accounted for 5.9% of the 
variance in the dependent variable. Table 5 Panel 1B also shows the univariate analysis of the 
variance (ANOVA) results for each individual measure of ‗Auditor Litigation Exposure‘. The 
ANOVAs provide similar results, with no significant effects indicated for the likelihood of 
auditors being sued, F(1,61)=0.376, p=0.271 (one-tailed), the strength of the case against the 
auditor, F(1,61)=0.602, p=0.221 (one-tailed),  or the recommendation to sue the auditor, 
F(1,61)=0.001, p=0.490 (one-tailed).  
Overall, these results fail to support H1, finding no difference in lawyers‘ evaluations of 
auditor litigation exposure when auditors provide either an unqualified opinion on internal 
controls without disclosures of internal control deficiencies or an unqualified opinion on internal 
controls with voluntarily disclosure of deficiencies. These results appear to indicate that 
providing voluntary disclosure within a Section 404 report does not reduce the likelihood of 
being sued in the event of an audit failure. Potential implications of these results are further 
discussed in the Conclusion section below.  
H2: Adverse Opinion on Internal Controls  
 
H2 predicted that auditors providing an adverse opinion on internal controls would be 
evaluated more favorably by litigators than auditors providing an unqualified opinion on internal 
controls, with or without disclosures of significant deficiencies. The analysis for H2 differs from 
H1 with the addition of a third group for the independent variable ‗404 Report‘, representing 
participants in the ‗Adverse‘ Section 404 report condition. Dependent variable measures for 




responding to three questions assessing the likelihood of the auditor being sued, the strength of 
the case against the auditor, and agreement with a recommendation to sue the auditor.  
As shown in Table 5 Panel 2A, MANOVA results for H2 indicate a significant effect for 
the independent variable ‗404 Report‘, Wilks lambda= 0.868, F(2,97) = 2.319, p=.035 (two-
tailed), indicating that the auditor‘s report on internal controls influenced lawyers‘ perceptions of 
their litigation exposure, as represented by all three dependent variable measures. The partial Eta 
squared was 0.068, which means that the independent variable accounted for 6.8% of the 
variance in the dependent variable. ANOVAs were also performed for each of the three 
individual dependent variable measures to further understand how the auditor‘s Section 404 
report influences lawyers‘ evaluations of auditor litigation exposure.  
Table 5 Panel 2B provides the results for the separate ANOVAs on the three different 
dependent variables. An ANOVA of the participants‘ responses to the likelihood (from 0-100%) 
that auditors would be sued indicate marginally significant differences in the dependent variable 
between Section 404 reporting conditions, F(2,97)=3.021, p=0.053 (two-tailed). Using pairwise 
comparison of the means, the ‗Adverse‘ group (mean of 74.1%) evaluated auditors more 
favorably when compared to both the ‗Unqualified/No Disclosure‘ (mean of 84.8%), p=0.073 
(two-tailed), and ‗Unqualified/Disclosure‘ groups (mean of 88.2%), p=0.023 (two-tailed). This 
result provides support for H2, which predicted that auditors reporting an adverse opinion on 
internal controls would be evaluated more favorably than auditors who reported an unqualified 
opinion on internal controls, with or without a voluntary disclosure.  
An ANOVA of the participants‘ assessment of the strength of the potential case against 
the auditors (on a scale from one (extremely weak case) to seven (extremely strong case)) 




conditions, F(2,97)=3.253, p=0.043 (two-tailed). The ANOVA results also report significant 
differences in a pairwise comparison of the means of the strength of the case against the auditor 
between the ‗Adverse‘ group (mean of 4.702 on a scale from one to seven) and the 
‗Unqualified/No Disclosure‘ group (mean of 5.636) at p=0.015, and marginally significant 
differences between the ‗Adverse‘ group and the ‗Unqualified/Disclosure‘ group (mean of 5.333) 
at p=0.100. Overall, the ‗Adverse‘ group‘s mean responses were  lower in comparison to both 
other groups, meaning that participants in this group assessed the case against the auditors to be 
weaker when the auditor‘s Section 404 report communicates an adverse opinion on internal 
controls. 
An ANOVA of the participants‘ assessment of their agreement with the statement that 
they would advise shareholders to sue the auditor (on a scale from one (strongly disagree) to 
seven (strongly agree)) indicated highly significant differences in the dependent variable 
between Section 404 reporting conditions, F(2,97)=5.394, p=0.006 (two-tailed). The ANOVA 
results also report significant differences in a pairwise comparison of the means of responses to 
this measure between the ‗Adverse‘ group (mean of 5.000 on a scale from one to seven) and the 
‗Unqualified/No Disclosure‘ group (mean of 6.090) at p=0.006 and the ‗Unqualified/Disclosure‘ 
group (mean of 6.100) at p=0.007. The groups receiving a scenario with an unqualified opinion 
(with or without disclosures) reported means significantly higher than the mean of the ‗Adverse‘ 
group, meaning that participants in the ‗Adverse‘ group were less likely to recommend that the 
stockholders sue the auditor in comparison to the other groups.  
Review of the above results consistently support differences between the ‗Adverse‘ group 
and the ‗Unqualified/No Disclosure‘ and ‗Unqualified/Disclosure‘ groups, indicating that H2 is 




Disclosure‘ and ‗Unqualified/Disclosure‘ groups, indicating that H1 is not supported. Therefore, 
results suggest auditors litigation exposure will decrease by providing an adverse opinion on 
internal controls, but not through voluntary disclosures in an unqualified opinion on internal 
controls.  
Additional Analysis: Litigation Exposure of Other Parties 
 
Although the main purpose of this study is to examine how auditors are perceived by 
potential litigators, other parties involved in the financial reporting process may also be 
implicated in the event that shareholders experience a significant financial loss of investment. 
Although the auditor‘s Section 404 reporting decisions are not decided upon directly by top 
management and the audit committee, these parties are actively involved in financial reporting 
decisions and have significant influence over the audit process. Therefore, an additional six 
questions were asked to assess the litigation exposure of the top managers and the audit 
committee members of the failed company (three questions for each potentially liable party). 
Initially, these questions were asked in order to decrease the potential demand effect of asking 
participants only to consider the auditor as a source for stockholders to recover their losses, and 
to increase the external validity of the task. However, answers to these questions could provide 
interesting insights on how auditor reporting decisions can influence the litigation exposure of 
other parties.  
To measure the dependent variables ‗Top Management Litigation Exposure‘ and ‗Audit 
Committee Litigation Exposure‘ participants were asked to respond to a series of three questions 
concerning both management and the audit committee.  First, participants were asked to provide 




100%). Participants were also asked to provide their opinion on the strength of the potential case 
against the managers (audit committee) on a scale from one (extremely weak case) to seven 
(extremely strong case). Finally, the participants were asked to rate their level of agreement, on a 
scale from one (completely disagree) to seven (completely agree), with the statement ‗I would 
advise stockholders to file a lawsuit against the managers (audit committee).‘  
Top Management Litigation Exposure 
Management has the primary role of maintaining effective internal controls and reporting 
on their effectiveness. They also provide auditors with much of the information that they need to 
formulate the auditor‘s opinion on internal controls reported in the Section 404 report. Therefore, 
in the event that stakeholders experience significant losses, management‘s litigation exposure 
may be influenced by the auditor‘s Section 404 report.  
Table 6 provides a summary of the responses relative to the likelihood of suing 
management.  Participants first responded with their assessment of the percent likelihood that the 
managers would be sued (0-100%), with an average response of 86.2% overall to this question
8
. 
Next, participants responded with an overall mean of 5.930 when asked to assess the strength of 
a potential case against the managers on a scale from one (extremely weak case) to seven 
(extremely strong case). Finally, average responses were 6.160 overall on a scale from one 
(completely disagree) to seven (completely agree) when asked if they would advise suing 
management. 
To examine the potential impact of the auditor‘s Section 404 report on the litigation 
exposure of the top managers of the failed company, a MANOVA was performed with the 
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dependent variable ‗Top Management Litigation Exposure‘ measured as the response to 
questions requiring participants to assess the % likelihood of management being sued, strength of 
the case against management, and their advice to file/not file a lawsuit against management. As 
shown in Table 8 Panel 1, no significant effect was found for the independent variable ‗404 
Report‘, Wilks lambda= 0.917, F(2,97) = 1.395, p=0.218 (two-tailed). Table 8 Panel 2 also 
shows the separate ANOVAs which were performed on each of the individual measures of 
litigation exposure. No significant effects were found. Overall, potential litigators‘ assessment of 
management‘s litigation exposure does not appear to be influenced by the auditor‘s Section 404 
reporting decisions. As shown in Table 8 Panel 2, participants assessed managements‘ litigation 
exposure to be high across all conditions, indicating that management may be highly exposed to 
litigation in the event of significant stakeholder losses regardless of the auditor‘s Section 404 
reporting decision. 
Audit Committee Litigation Exposure 
Audit committees are charged with the oversight of the auditing and financial reporting 
process, and often actively participate in discussions with the auditor and management 
concerning Section 404 reporting decisions. Therefore, audit committees are likely to be 
implicated in the event of a significant stakeholder loss, and their litigation exposure may be 
linked to the auditor‘s Section 404 reporting conclusions.  
Table 7 provides a summary of the responses relative to the likelihood of suing the audit 
committee. Participants first responded with their assessment of the percent likelihood that the 
audit committee would be sued (0-100%), with an average response of 79.4% overall to this 




strength of a potential case against the audit committee on a scale from one (extremely weak 
case) to seven (extremely strong case). Finally, average responses were 5.253 overall on a scale 
from one (completely disagree) to seven (completely agree) when asked if they would advise 
suing the audit committee. 
A MANOVA performed with the main dependent variable Audit Committee Litigation 
Exposure, which was measured as described in the section above. As shown in Table 9 Panel 1, 
the independent variable ‗404 Report‘, resulted in a marginally significant effect, Wilks lambda= 
0.879, F(2,97) = 2.093, p=0.056 (two-tailed). The partial Eta squared was 0.063, which means 
that the independent variable accounted for 6.3% of the variance in the dependent variable. This 
result indicates that potential litigators‘ evaluation of audit committee litigation exposure is 
influenced by the auditor‘s Section 404 reporting decisions. To further examine this result, 
ANOVAs were performed for each of the three individual dependent variable measures. 
 As shown in Table 9 Panel 2, an ANOVA of the participants‘ responses to the likelihood 
(from 0-100%)  that the audit committee would be sued indicated significant differences in the 
dependent variable between Section 404 reporting conditions, F(2,97)=4.032, p=0.021 (two-
tailed). Further investigation with a pairwise comparison of the means indicated that significant 
differences in the dependent variable exist between the ‗Unqualified/No Disclosure‘ group 
(mean of 70.0%) and the Unqualified Disclosure group (mean of 87.1%) at p=0.007. Further, 
significant differences exist between the ‗Unqualified/No Disclosure‘ group and the ‗Adverse‘ 
group (mean of 81.3%) at p=0.057. The ‗Unqualified/No Disclosure‘ group mean is significantly 
lower in comparison to both other groups. No significant differences were indicated between the 




An ANOVA of the participants‘ assessment of the strength of the potential case against 
the audit committee (on a scale from one (extremely weak case) to seven (extremely strong 
case)) indicated no significant differences in the dependent variable between Section 404 
reporting conditions, F(2,97)=1.882, p=0.158 (two-tailed). A pairwise comparison of the means 
of responses to this measure between all three groups indicates that there were no significant 
differences between the ‗Unqualified/Disclosure‘ group (mean of 4.968), the ‗Unqualified/No 
Disclosure‘ group (mean of 5.666) and the ‗Adverse‘ group (mean of 5.162). 
An ANOVA of the participants‘ assessment of their agreement with the statement that 
they would recommend that the shareholders file a lawsuit against the audit committee (on a 
scale from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree)) indicated marginally significant 
differences in the dependent variable between Section 404 reporting conditions, F(2,97)=3.057, 
p=0.052 (two-tailed). A pairwise comparison of the means of responses to this measure between 
the ‗Unqualified/Disclosure‘ group (mean of 6.200) and both the ‗Unqualified/No Disclosure‘ 
(mean of 5.343) and ‗Adverse‘ (mean of 5.351) groups at p=0.035 and p=0.031 respectively.   
Overall, the ‗Unqualified/Disclosure‘ group reported significantly less favorable 
predictions in comparison to the ‗Unqualified/No Disclosure‘ group for two of the measures of 
audit committee litigation exposure, implying that audit committee members may be exposed to 
more litigation under this condition. Lawyers also were more likely to recommend filing a 
lawsuit against the audit committee in the ‗Unqualified/Disclosure‘ group, when compared to 
both other groups. This result indicates that audit committees may be more exposed to litigation 
when the auditor provides voluntary disclosures within an unqualified Section 404 report, 
compared to when an auditor provides an unqualified opinion on internal controls with no 




committee litigation exposure measures are significantly lower in comparison to the results for 
management litigation exposure (p=0.001). Therefore, although the audit committee is likely to 
be sued, management appears to be exposed to more litigation risk. This may be due to the audit 
committee‘s lack of direct involvement in the everyday business of the company and lack of 
direct responsibility for establishing internal controls over financial reporting.   
Conclusion  
 
 To summarize the overall findings, H1 was not supported, but H2 was supported for all 
measures of the dependent variable ‗Auditor Litigation Exposure‘. These results suggest that the 
auditor‘s report on internal controls reduces litigation exposure when the auditor communicates 
an adverse report on internal controls, but litigation exposure is not reduced by providing 
additional disclosures within an unqualified report on internal controls. These results may 
indicate that a voluntary disclosure of a significant deficiency in internal controls is not 
perceived as a strong enough signal of risk by potential litigators, and that an adverse opinion 
provides a stronger signal of risk to stakeholders of the potential for material misstatements in 
the financial statements. This finding means that auditors have the opportunity to decrease 
litigation exposure by providing information in the Section 404 report that signals a potential risk 
of material misstatements as a result of a failure in internal controls. Therefore, in the event that 
the auditor fails to uncover fraudulent financial reporting or material errors within the financial 
statements, the signal created by an adverse Section 404 report may be sufficient to decrease the 
likelihood that they will be sued in the future.  
 Another interesting result of this study is found in the examination of the audit committee 




Management appears to have the more litigation exposure overall, no matter what the auditor‘s 
Section 404 report concluded. This result suggests that litigators place most of the responsibility 
for financial reporting on management, and that management is likely to be implicated no matter 
what the auditor reports communicate. The audit committee appears to be exposed to greater 
litigation risk when the auditor reports an unqualified opinion on internal controls with voluntary 
disclosures of a significant deficiency. This result could suggest that litigators believe that the 
auditor should have reported an adverse Section 404 opinion after uncovering the issues in 
internal controls within the company, and that these litigators are placing blame on the audit 
committee for neglecting to support the auditor‘s findings. 
Future research in this area could focus on the litigation exposure of management and the 
audit committee. Although management‘s litigation exposure was not influenced by the auditor‘s 
Section 404 reporting decisions in this study, future research could examine management and 
their responsibilities and disclosures related to internal controls. Since results in this study 
suggest that audit committee litigation exposure is influenced by the auditor‘s reporting 
decisions, future research could also explore how the decisions made by each party in the 
auditing and financial reporting process influences litigation risk of the auditor, audit committee, 
and management. For example, future research could examine whether decisions made by the 
audit committee influence auditor litigation exposure. 
The main limitation of this study is the use of an online data collection method, which 
raises minor issues with the inability to control the attentiveness of the respondent to the task or 
to be certain of the exact calculation of response rates. This method also increases the risk of low 
overall response rates due to the potential that emails were not received (i.e., individual out of 




an issue in this study, as indicated by the lack of significant differences in the sample 
characteristics and responses in early vs. late completions. An additional limitation of this study 
is the use of summary case materials. Although the facts of the case are based on real cases, 
lawyers most likely would collect information differently when providing advice to shareholders 
and/or considering taking on a new case. However, the pre-test phase allowed for the addition of 
material facts as suggested by lawyers with expertise in this area, and the lawyers overall 
assessed the situation to be realistic.  Future research conducted with lawyers as participants 
could be improved by contacting individuals by telephone or in person at a professional 
conference, which would likely address many of the limitations described above.   
In conclusion, this study focused on the auditor‘s report on internal controls as a potential 
deterrent to litigation in the event of a reporting failure that is attributed to deficient internal 
controls. The results provide evidence that Section 404 reports are relevant to lawyers when 
asked to evaluate the strength of a potential case against an auditor and provide legal 
recommendations to shareholders seeking to recover losses. Although results do not suggest that 
auditors can decrease their litigation exposure by voluntarily disclosing significant deficiencies 
in internal controls within their Section 404 reports, results do suggest that an adverse opinion on 
internal controls may decrease auditor litigation risk in the event of significant shareholder 
losses.   
Results of this study should not be interpreted as a lack of support for any potential 
benefits of voluntary disclosures for auditors, but do suggest that voluntary disclosures may not 
prevent the auditor from being sued. However, this study was limited in nature by focusing on 
the potential for voluntary disclosures within the Section 404 report to decrease litigation 




related to lawsuits. Related research was conducted in a second study investigating how 
disclosures within Section 404 reports can represent a strong defense in a trial setting when 
shareholder litigation is pursued against the auditor. Since a trial setting provides opportunities 
for the plaintiff (representing shareholders) to argue why the auditor should be found guilty of 
negligence, and for the auditor‘s council to argue why the auditor‘s actions were appropriate 
given their knowledge at the time, the second study more directly addresses how individuals 
perceive the signals provided by Section 404 reports. This second study focuses on juror 
decisions, which can provide insight into potential losses in the event of litigation, and further 
assist auditors and their legal counsel in decisions to settle or risk a trial. Overall, the combined 
perspective of these separate studies will provide a comprehensive understanding of how Section 
404 influences auditor litigation exposure (study one) and legal liability exposure in the event of 
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STUDY TWO: AUDITOR LIABILITY FOR SOX SECTION 404 REPORTS: AN 
INVESTIGATION OF JURORS’ CONSIDERATION OF AUDITOR DISCLOSURE OF 





Many of the criticisms surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) concern the 
increased legal liability exposure for auditors, specifically related to the provisions under Section 
404. Researchers have argued that the marked increase in audit fees following SOX are partially 
due to this increased risk of litigation (Asare et al., 2007; Bush et al., 2007). Since the downfall 
of Arthur Andersen, other large audit firms remain concerned that a highly publicized audit 
failure could lead to a similar detriment for any audit firm (Younglai, 2008). Motivated by this 
concern, the chairperson of the SEC submitted a formal request in 2007 to the senate proposing a 
safe harbor for auditors by limiting the awards from class action lawsuits for audit failures 
related to the Section 404 reporting requirements. As a result of the SEC proposal and other 
encouragement from the business community, a U.S. Treasury Department panel agreed to 
consider recommending some form of protection to auditors against lawsuits (Younglai, 2008). 
However, this panel was were not able to reach a consensus on whether they would recommend 
limitations of liability for auditors, indicating the need for more knowledge about auditor liability 
exposure before any final decisions could be made.  In contrast, some argue that the United 
States courts have started a trend indicating a pro-defendant stance in recent securities suits; and, 
the business profession is exaggerating both the costs and the liability exposure related to Section 




This study experimental investigates the impact of Section 404 reporting on the legal 
liability exposure of auditors by examining how internal control disclosures, and the nature of 
the internal control in question, influence jury trial outcomes.  Specifically, the purpose of this 
study is to examine whether voluntary disclosure of different types of significant internal control 
deficiencies within the Section 404 report is deemed by jurors to be a sufficient red flag that a 
company could have materially misstated financial statements. Although auditors do not 
currently report significant deficiencies in their reports on internal controls, some public 
companies have begun voluntarily providing details on significant deficiencies in managements‘ 
report on internal controls (Hammersley et al., 2008). Research indicates that the market reacts to 
such disclosures, suggesting that disclosures of significant deficiencies may be valued by 
investors (Hammersley et al., 2008). Past research on disclosures within audit reports suggests 
that auditors are evaluated more favorably when they provide a red flag of potential issues within 
a company, even if the disclosure is not fully accurate in its evaluation of the likelihood or 
significance of the issue within the company (Mong and Roebuck, 2005). Results of this study 
indicate that providing such a disclosure is highly beneficial when the auditor discovers a 
deficiency in an internal control that is more auditable, such as a transaction level control. A 
voluntary disclosure of this particular type of internal control provides protection to the auditor 
from liability in 92.0% of the responses of jury eligible participants in this study, and is the only 
scenario in which the auditor is not assessed punitive damages. These results provide support for 
increased transparency in the auditor‘s Section 404 report as a way for the auditor to decrease 
their liability exposure. 
In addition, this study examines whether failure to report internal control weaknesses 




less favorable outcomes for an auditor in a jury trial. When the auditor‘s decisions are subjective, 
they must rely heavily on professional judgment, rather than tangible evidence; the auditor has a 
significant amount of discretion over their final judgments. When the auditor‘s decisions are 
more objective with tangible evidence to rely upon, more reliance is placed on the evidence with 
less reliance on professional judgment. If a decision is based on tangible evidence, the auditor 
exerts less professional judgment (i.e., less discretion).  Although jurors should take into account 
the difficulty of the auditor‘s decisions when traditional substantive audit evidence cannot be 
collected to support their conclusions, past research indicates that blame is more likely to be 
attributed to individuals who have more discretion in their decisions (Kelley and Michela, 1980). 
Therefore, when required to exert a greater amount of professional judgment, the auditor may be 
held to a higher standard regarding legal liability, as jurors may perceive that the auditor had 
more control over such decisions compared to auditors who can rely on evidence. The increased 
reliance on professional judgment required when evaluating less auditable internal controls may 
expose auditors to more blame in a trial setting. Results of this study support this line of 
reasoning , indicating that auditors are found more liable by jurors when they failed to predict 
accurately the impact of a less auditable internal control, such as the control environment.  
 This study contributes to literature on auditor legal liability by providing insight into 
jurors‘ perceptions of auditors in the post-SOX disclosure environment, specifically indicating 
how internal control disclosures impact legal liability exposure. In addition, the paper contributes 
to the previous literature regarding juror decision-making by providing insight into jurors‘ 
perceptions of Sarbanes-Oxley disclosures. Past behavioral research on auditor liability has 
consisted of scenarios in which the outcome of the financial audit and resulting audit opinion led 




litigation outcomes when the auditor fails to detect fraud or material misstatement.  In contrast, 
this paper focuses on auditor liability where the auditor not only fails to detect a misstatement 
but also fails to disclose weaknesses in internal controls that are in place to prevent fraud or 
material misstatement. This scenario is unique to this literature, as the audit opinion on internal 
controls has been argued to be more ambiguous and rely more heavily on professional judgment 
than financial audit decisions. Even when faced with a known deficiency in internal controls, the 
auditor must make a judgment on the likelihood of the deficiency to fail to prevent or detect a 
material misstatement, which is at times highly subjective in nature (Hammersley et al., 2008). 
Therefore, this study examines jurors‘ decisions in a situation when the auditor‘s relies heavily 
upon professional judgment.  
This study provides insights that are informative to auditors, lawyers, and regulators. 
Auditors can utilize the results of this study to make reporting decisions, and auditors and their 
legal counsel may consider the results of the study to make decisions to either settle or risk a jury 
trial when they are sued for negligence. In addition, specific characteristics of the participants in 
this study were examined for their impact on decisions made in a trial setting, which could be 
useful for strategic jury selection. Regulators may find the results of this study informative when 
considering the possibility of legal liability caps or other limitations on awards in jury trials 
involving auditors or other professionals. Since jurors in this study evaluated auditors less 
favorably in situations involving Section 404 report disclosures that are considered more 
ambiguous and less auditable, regulators may wish to consider providing additional protection to 
auditors for such disclosures.  
 The following sections will examine the different factors related to provisions of Section 




provide a summary of the changes in the profession following SOX implementation, as indicated 
by the wide body of accounting research. This section also will include a discussion of how the 
legal environment for accountants has changed because of such legislation, and address how jury 
trials may undermine the benefits of increased audit efforts by exposing auditors to unnecessary 
liability exposure and increasing costs to all. Hypotheses will then be developed to predict how 
Section 404 report disclosures and the subjectivity of evaluating internal control weaknesses 
impacts jurors‘ decisions in a trial scenario. Following this hypothesis development is a summary 
of the methodology that was used to examine whether new requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act provide additional legal liability exposure, and how SOX disclosures could potentially 
influence decisions of jury members. The final sections will discuss the results and overall 
implications of this study. 
Theory and Hypotheses Development 
 
Section 404 of SOX and the U.S. Legal System 
 
 SOX has been hailed as the most important legislation in the accounting profession since 
the 1930‘s (Li et al., 2008). This legislation has been praised as being ―one of the greatest 
protections in history for the public interest in the arena of the financial markets and related 
corporate behavior (Canada et al., 2007, p. 1). Although many of the changes implemented as a 
result of SOX have had a significant impact on the accounting industry, Section 404 has perhaps 
received the most attention from both practitioners and researchers.  Section 404 has extended 
auditors‘ responsibilities by requiring an integrated audit that results in a separate audit opinion 




aftermath of SOX, which highlights both positive and negative aspects of the legislation (Boyle 
and Webb, 2007).   
 Many of the positive aspects of Section 404 relate to the potential for higher quality 
audits as well as improvements in the quality of financial reporting. Research in the post-SOX 
era contains evidence of some improvements in fraud detection (Dyck et al., 2008), an increase 
in voluntary disclosures (Gordon et al., 2006), and a decrease in earnings management behavior 
(Cohen et al., 2008). In addition, researchers have found that capital markets respond differently 
to different types of internal control weakness disclosures (Hammersley et al., 2008). Therefore, 
the information contained within SOX reports appears to be informative based on the type of 
weakness identified. Other studies criticize the increased costs of Section 404, and note many 
downsides to implementing the increased internal control requirements. One of the primary 
outcomes from this line of research is the increased cost associated with implementing the 
requirements of SOX.  This has been a particularly critical issue relative to smaller companies, as 
they may not be able to withstand the burden caused by these increased costs (DeFond and 
Francis, 2005; Solomon, 2005; Arnold et al., 2007). 
Although the success or failure of Section 404 in improving the reliability of financial 
reporting is much debated, as are the costs and benefits, the reality of the matter is that regulators 
have stood their ground in requiring compliance for auditors and most corporations (Henry and 
Borrus, 2006). Section 404 required a significant increase in the level of assurance provided by 
the auditor‘s reports, by assuring not only detection of fraud, illegal acts, and misstatement of the 
financial statements, but a separate opinion assuring that adequate internal controls are in place 
for the prevention of fraud (Cunningham, 2004). This opinion on internal controls is a new 




statements for public companies. In the past, internal control evaluations were primarily used for 
audit planning purposes, so this new requirement significantly increased the importance of an 
auditor‘s evaluation of internal controls (Asare et al., 2007). Therefore, this new requirement 
expanded the attention given to internal controls during an audit and increased the auditor‘s 
responsibility by requiring a separate opinion devoted entirely to their assessment of internal 
controls. 
Since internal control evaluations are inherently subjective and complex in nature, 
auditors must often rely on professional judgment to assess materiality and may not be able to 
perform audit procedures to audit around certain controls (McConnell et al., 2003; Paul, 2005). 
In the audit opinion on internal controls, auditors ―must describe material weaknesses, their 
actual and potential effects on financial statements and related control objectives, and their 
effects on the auditor‘s financial statement audit (Cunningham, 2004). In the event of a failure of 
internal controls leading to significant losses, auditors are not only exposed to potential liability 
for negligence, but also to a more serious charge of misleading investors related to this required 
disclosure (Cunningham, 2004). SOX, in its current form, provides no additional protection to 
auditors from litigation, which leaves auditors vulnerable to a new type of lawsuits related to 
internal control reporting. Therefore, some have attributed increased audit fees and legal costs to 
companies to this lack of liability protection (Cunningham, 2004; Younglai, 2008). 
The increase in audit fees following SOX has often been attributed to a rise in liability 
exposure for the auditors. Preliminary evidence supports this assumption by indicating that the 
amount of corporate litigation attributed to internal control failures has increased significantly 
following SOX (Paul, 2005; Lamont and Etzold, 2007). Many audit firms have chosen to settle 




Accordingly, jury trials related to audit failures following SOX have been rare, as audit firms 
have argued jury trials present an exaggerated risk of significant losses in money or reputation 
due to biased jurors. Since auditors are already open to the threat of PCAOB enforcement actions 
and criminal liability under SEC regulation, their argument is that additional civil liability 
exposure is not only unfair, but unnecessarily raises costs across the board. Auditors have 
expressed concern that they are placed in the position of paying out-of-pocket for every civil suit 
brought against them to prevent a jury trial, even when they believe that they have a strong 
defense.  
Although the inclusion of an additional audit opinion on internal controls has been 
criticized for the additional costs and liability exposure associated with the new internal control 
reporting requirements, many argue that the Section 404 report provides important information 
for decision makers. Section 404 requires auditors to perform an integrated audit of internal 
controls and the financial statements, and express a separate opinion on internal controls in 
addition to their opinion on the financial statements (Asare et al., 2007). Auditors must also 
identify and evaluate any deficiencies they find in internal controls based on the likelihood and 
materiality of misstatements due to such deficiencies. Asare et al. (2007) summarize the process 
for evaluating those deficiencies, which is presented in Table 10.  If the auditor decides that the 
deficiencies in internal controls are not likely to result in material misstatement of the financials, 
then the auditor can issue an unqualified report on internal controls. The auditor is only required 
to describe any deficiencies deemed material in their report, and is not required to mention any 
control deficiencies or significant deficiencies (PCAOB, 2007). In the case of a material 
weakness in internal controls, the auditor may issue an adverse opinion on internal controls and 




opinion on the financial statements (Asare et al., 2007). Although some clarifications and 
implementation guidance have been released to assist auditors in evaluating internal control 
deficiencies, the decisions involved with Section 404 reporting are considered highly complex; 
the auditor must rely on professional judgment more so than in the past, when internal control 
evaluations were primarily used for planning decisions (Asare et al., 2007).  
Although Section 404 only applies to public companies, the AICPA currently requires 
auditors of non-public companies to perform an audit of internal controls (AICPA, 2006). One 
main difference between requirements under Section 404 and SAS 112 is that the AICPA 
requires significant deficiencies to be reported in addition to material weaknesses (AICPA, 
2006).  Therefore, audit reports compiled under SAS 112 are more detailed in nature and provide 
additional disclosures in comparison to the Section 404 report. While auditors of public 
companies are not currently required to disclose significant deficiencies (PCAOB, 2007), they 
are also not explicitly restricted from providing such disclosures. Past research indicates that 
increased disclosures within audit reports may inhibit legal liability exposure for auditors (Mong 
and Roebuck, 2005). Therefore, providing additional disclosures of significant deficiencies 
within the audit report may provide auditors with additional protection from liability. This 
additional disclosure within Section 404 reports could emerge without regulatory or standard 
changes as a voluntary disclosure by auditors, similar to how management of public companies 
have voluntarily disclosed significant deficiencies in their annual and quarterly reports on 
internal controls (Hammersley et al., 2008). Disclosure of significant deficiencies could also be 
considered as a future change in PCAOB standards that would explicitly require auditors to 
consider disclosing significant deficiencies that they deem important enough to communicate to 




report on financial statements. However, some may be opposed to this practice, suggesting that 
any additional disclosure from the auditor increases their liability exposure (Cunningham, 2004). 
Auditor‘s clients may also be opposed to any additional disclosures within the auditor‘s report on 
internal controls, which could discourage auditors from providing such disclosures. Further 
discussion of this argument is provided in the section below.  
Attribution Theory and the Auditability of Control Deficiencies 
 
 Research on juror bias has often used attribution theory to explain how jurors and judges 
construct their decisions (Arrington et al., 1985). This theory suggests that there are antecedents 
and consequences to attributions (Kelley and Michela, 1980). Antecedents are circumstances or 
specific elements that tend to influence an individuals‘ perception of another person‘s control 
over their decision, referred to as the locus of control (Kelley and Michela, 1980). An internal 
locus of control implies that the individual has control over his/her decisions and is responsible 
for any outcomes associated with the action. An external locus of control implies that the 
decision is more constrained or influenced by outside factors; therefore, external factors are more 
at fault than the individual (Kelley and Michela, 1980).  
 According to attribution theory, this judgment of internal vs. external control has an 
impact on the outcome/consequence decision within a trial setting (Kelley and Michela, 1980). 
This particular aspect of attribution theory may have significant implications when auditors are 
defendants in a court case, since the different decisions made by auditors are based on varying 
degrees of reliable evidence and guidance. Although all audit tasks require some level of 
professional judgment, some of the tasks completed by auditors allow for the collection of 




transaction). In contrast, other tasks completed by auditors may not allow for the collection of 
traditional audit evidence, and require the auditor to rely heavily on professional judgment (i.e., 
assessing management‘s integrity). Based on attribution theory, jurors may judge the auditor‘s 
responsibility for an inaccurate judgment based on how much control the auditor had over their 
final opinions. When auditors have little reliable evidence available to collect (i.e., assessing 
management‘s integrity), the auditor must rely upon their own professional judgment to make 
decisions. This type of situation would imply an internal locus of control. In contrast, when 
auditors are able to collect reliable evidence, their judgments rely on external sources (reliant on 
the evidence). Although the auditor can arguably control how much evidence they collect, their 
final decision is based on the actual evidence and professional guidance, and is not as reliant on 
their professional judgment. In this scenario, the auditor may arguably have less individual 
control over the outcome of their actual decision (external locus of control), compared to the 
decisions made by auditors in more subjective situations.   
 This distinction between auditors‘ highly subjective judgments (implied internal locus of 
control) and judgments auditors make based on sufficient evidence (implied external locus of 
control) is important to understanding how auditors will be judged in a trial setting. Jurors tend 
to place more blame on individuals when they believe decisions were made based on internal 
motivations (internal locus of control), and tend to blame external sources when they believe the 
decisions were made based on external motivations (external locus of control) (Kelley and 
Michela, 1980).  Therefore, when the auditor relies heavily on their professional judgment, they 
may take on much of the responsibility for their decision. When the auditor can cite objective 
evidence obtained during the audit as the motivation for their decision, the blame may be placed 




more in control over their judgment in question auditors are perceived more negatively than 
when jurors believe auditors are operating within constraints (Becker et al., 2007). Therefore, 
because of the highly subjective nature of the process by which an auditor reaches some of the 
conclusions related to the audit opinion on internal controls, attribution theory suggests that 
auditors may be exposed to significant liability in the event of a jury trial.   
Although all of the decisions that auditors make during an audit rely to some degree on 
professional judgment, some decision tasks are particularly subjective. Past research has shown 
that internal control deficiencies can be classified into different categories based on their 
characteristics. One classification system that captures the subjectivity of the auditor‘s decision 
task is the division between more auditable and less auditable internal controls (Hammersley et 
al., 2008; Doss, 2004). Less auditable controls are those that are not as easy to audit around by 
performing additional audit procedures, such as those related to the control environment or 
weaknesses in management‘s integrity. In contrast, controls that are more auditable can be 
audited using basic audit procedures, such as closing procedures and transaction-based controls.  
 As discussed in the sections above, attribution theory and past research indicates that 
when jurors believe the auditor‘s decisions were based significantly on professional judgment, 
auditors are perceived more negatively than when jurors believe the auditor was operating within 
constraints (Becker et al., 2007). Less auditable controls, in comparison to more auditable 
controls, are arguably more reliant on the auditor‘s professional judgment for materiality 
assessments. In a litigation setting, arguments concerning their assessment of more auditable 
controls allow the auditor to direct the juror to evidence that the auditor collected and relied upon 
to make their decision, and can often provide support that other auditors would likely make 




controls, the auditor does not have as much evidence to provide to explain their decisions, and 
some variability may exist in the types of decisions that different auditors would make in the 
same situation. Therefore, the auditor‘s decisions concerning less auditable controls will likely 
be perceived as heavily based on the auditor‘s discretion. Theory suggests that jurors will be 
more likely to attribute blame to the auditor under this condition (Kelley and Michela, 1980), and 
judge auditors harshly for failures related to these types of assessments. Therefore, the following 
is predicted: 
H1: In a litigation setting, jurors will evaluate auditors more favorably when an audit 
failure is due to a more auditable internal control weakness than when an audit failure is 
due to a less auditable internal control weakness. 
Section 404 Reporting, Disclosures of Control Deficiencies, and Signaling Theory 
 
The objections from the profession related to excessive liability exposure costs have led 
the U.S. Treasury Committee to consider placing certain limitations on how auditor liability is 
evaluated (Younglai, 2008). Currently, auditors are open to civil liability which mainly comes in 
the form of securities fraud class action suits, and are most often classified as secondary actors 
(Cunningham, 2004). In these cases, plaintiffs argue that the auditor was negligent and failed to 
perform an adequate audit to support their opinion. In most circumstances, to be found guilty of 
negligence, auditors must be shown to have breached a duty of care and the third party must 
prove that their losses are a direct result of this violation (Cunningham, 2004). Now that auditors 
are required to provide a separate opinion on internal controls, some suggest that auditors may 
become primary actors under statutory law; specifically, Section 10b-5 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1933, which exposes auditors to liability for false and misleading statements 




Many believe that the increased liability exposure for auditors is a positive side effect of 
SOX. The general argument from this perspective is that this increased litigation risk motivates 
auditors to increase quality and effort; thus, the benefits outweigh the additional costs (Krishnan 
et al., 2008). However, auditors argue that the legal system is biased. Past research examining 
juror decision-making related to auditor liability has found that jurors exhibit an outcome bias in 
favor of the plaintiff, whereby the fact that jurors are aware of an outcome impairs their ability to 
judge the auditor‘s performance on a past audit (Olgoff, 2003; Lipe, 2008). Bias has also been 
attributed to a phenomenon known as the expectation gap, which refers to the difference between 
jurors‘ expectations of the auditor and the auditor‘s perception of their responsibility (Koh and 
Woo, 1998; Lowe et al., 2002). Although Byington and Sutton (1991) argue that legal liability is 
the only way the public interest can influence a shift in the expectations gap from auditors‘ self-
regulatory position of limited expectations to the public desired higher expectations, others deem 
this additional liability exposure as excessive to the detriment of a quality audit (Cunningham, 
2004). Some have proposed ways to mitigate this bias, such as specifically addressing and 
discrediting the negative bias during the trial (Kadous, 2001), or drawing attention to the 
likelihood of an audit failure in a specific situation (Peecher and Piercey, 2008). Others suggest 
that specific actions taken by the auditor, such as disclosures within the audit report, can 
potentially decrease the auditor‘s exposure to litigation (Carcello and Palmrose, 1994; Mong and 
Roebuck, 2005). This argument is based on the idea that auditors may be able to provide signals 
to stakeholders of risks within the company without having to report an adverse audit opinion, 
and that these signals may reduce their litigation exposure. The theory guiding this argument is 




Signaling theory suggests that when information asymmetry exists, individuals with 
proprietary information can provide valuable signals to the other parties that do not have access 
to such information. This exchange of signals is important, since information provided by signals 
can be communicated to parties that are otherwise relying on an incomplete set of knowledge to 
make decisions. However, signaling theory suggests that not all information exchanged between 
parties is deemed reliable by the receiving party and that only some signals will effectively 
reduce information asymmetry. Past studies have shown that the perceived cost of providing 
information is often positively related to individuals trust in the information (Titman and 
Trueman, 1986; Bagnoli and Watts, 2005; Levine and Hughes, 2005). This finding explains why 
information that is often costly to provide, such as auditor‘s opinions, would be demanded by 
individuals who do not have direct access to adequate information for decision-making.  
Overall, signaling theory suggests that Section 404 disclosures may provide a way for 
auditors to reduce the information asymmetry that exists between a company and stakeholders 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). From the perspective of signaling theory, the costliness of Section 404 
reporting suggests that stakeholders will perceive the information provided by the auditor‘s 
report on internal controls as high quality. Since research suggests that perceptions of the quality 
of disclosures may influence how users perceive the company and impact how much influence 
the information has on their decisions (Latham and Linville, 1998), Section 404 report 
disclosures should be valuable for stakeholder decision-making. Research provides some support 
for this aspect of signaling theory, with evidence that stakeholders such as loan officers and 
investors respond to the information provided within the Section 404 report (Schneider and 




reporting is costly to the company, the information provides a useful signal to both investors and 
creditors.  
Some argue that the auditor‘s opinion on internal controls serves as assurance that the 
company has controls in place that prevent material misstatement from occurring (Cunningham, 
2004); and, in the event of an audit failure, the auditor‘s report on internal controls could be used 
against the auditor to argue that the auditor misled investors (Cunningham, 2004). However, 
research indicates that increased disclosures in financial audit reports, particularly in the form of 
an emphasis of a matter paragraph or a going concern opinion, may act as a red flag for users; 
and, such disclosures may decrease the likelihood of future litigation (Carcello and Palmrose, 
1994; Mong and Roebuck, 2005). Similarly, the Section 404 report may provide an additional 
opportunity for auditors to provide important information to stakeholders, and allow the auditors 
to signal risk within a company without having to modify their audit opinions. Although auditors 
of public companies are not currently required to report significant deficiencies discovered 
during an audit in their Section 404 report (PCAOB, 2007), current standards do not prevent 
auditors of public companies from voluntarily reporting significant deficiencies in their report.  
This study proposes that such a disclosure could be framed similarly to the emphasis of a 
matter paragraph examined in past studies (Carcello and Palmrose, 1994; Mong and Roebuck, 
2005). Such a practice would be more in line with the AICPA‘s requirements for reporting on 
internal controls for non-public companies, which are more comprehensive and require that 
auditors must identify and describe both material weaknesses and significant deficiencies 
(AICPA, 2006). Therefore, even when auditors only identify significant deficiencies (a control 
deficiency that has a more than remote likelihood of not preventing or detecting misstatement 




could include a description of these deficiencies within the unqualified report. Signaling theory 
suggests that this information may be perceived as valuable for stakeholders. This disclosure 
could be perceived as a red flag signal of potential misstatements (Mong and Roebuck, 2005), 
and may either decrease the likelihood of future litigation or provide a solid argument for 
auditors in court that they went above and beyond the necessary reporting requirements by 
voluntarily reporting control deficiencies that were not deemed material weaknesses. If jurors 
perceive voluntary disclosures of significant deficiencies to be an adequate red flag for trouble in 
the company, they may be less inclined to blame the auditor in the event of a failure related to 
internal controls. Therefore, if the auditors are sued and the case is presented before a jury, jurors 
may acknowledge the auditor‘s increased reporting efforts and be more lenient on the auditor in 
assessing responsibility for losses.  
H2: In a litigation setting, jurors will evaluate auditors who report an unqualified opinion 
on internal controls with voluntary disclosures of significant internal control deficiencies 
more favorably than auditors who report an unqualified opinion on internal controls 




A 2x2 between-subjects experiment was conducted to assess how jurors evaluate auditors 
in a trial setting, manipulating the disclosures contained within the auditor‘s unqualified opinion 
on internal controls (disclosure of significant deficiency vs. no disclosure of significant 
deficiency) and the nature of the internal control weakness that ultimately produced losses for 
stakeholders (less auditable vs. more auditable). Table 11 provides a detailed outline of this 




Experimental Materials and Task 
 
Data was collected in an online setting, which allowed the researcher to record the exact 
amount of time spent reviewing the information and reach a broader pool of participants. Since 
the case was detailed and lengthy in order to preserve a realistic setting for a trial, the case was 
presented to the participants in both text and audio format to increase attention and control for 
potential differences in reading comprehension. The case was developed based on past court 
cases, and was examined by multiple experts in accounting and law to assure that the facts 
presented in the case were externally valid. The presentation structure of the case for this study 
was based on Kadous (2001), which provided participants with opening statements and 
arguments from the plaintiff and defendant, and judge instructions to the jury.  
In the scenario described to the participants, the auditor reported a clean opinion on 
financial statements and a clean opinion on internal controls for the previous year. Then, in the 
following year, the company in question restated their income figures (downward) and disclosed 
the discovery of fraudulent activity pervasive throughout the company resulting from a material 
weakness in internal controls. This disclosure led to an immediate decrease in stock price and the 
company declared bankruptcy soon after. The facts in the case were based on past lawsuits 
against auditors, and were reviewed by four lawyers for accuracy and realism. The section below 
titled ―Pre-Testing of the Case, Questionnaire, and Online Instrument‖ provides additional 
details on the pre-testing of this case.  
Participants were told that the stockholders of the company decided to initiate litigation 
in the form of a class action suit, alleging they incurred significant losses due to auditor 
negligence and from relying on misleading statements from the auditor. The suit claims that their 




company‘s stock in the period between the release of the previous year‘s report and the 
announcements that led to the significant loss in share value. Participants were presented with a 
mock trial scenario with arguments from lawyers for the plaintiff (stockholders) and defendant 
(auditor). They were also given the option to view the auditor‘s report on internal controls, which 
was provided in PDF format. Although participants were not required to review this report, 
53.5% of the individuals in the final sample indicated that they viewed the auditor‘s report on 
internal controls. There were no significant differences in decisions made by the individuals who 
viewed the reports and those that did not view the report, suggesting that the participants were 
provided sufficient information within the case to understand the auditor‘s Section 404 reporting 
decisions without viewing the report. After reviewing the case information, participants were 
directed to make a decision if the auditor should be liable for damages, and, if liable, determine 
the legal liability judgment. Appendix C shows a copy of the four cases used in this study. 
Participants also answered a set of questions to gauge their understanding of the case, in 
order to assess whether the important details of the case (i.e., weakness type, auditor report 
content) were understood by the participants. In addition, participants were asked to provide 
answers to demographic questions and screening questions that are traditionally asked during a 
jury selection process. These questions relate to general characteristics such as gender and 
education level, and may provide insight into the participant‘s personal experiences that could 







Pre-Testing of the Case, Questionnaire, and Online Instrument 
 
The case was pre-tested in multiple phases, with edits made to the case following each 
phase based on feedback from the pre-testers. First, the case and questionnaire were examined by 
four lawyers, two business law professors, and ten individuals with expertise in accounting 
and/or auditing. Then, the experiment was pre-tested in paper format with an additional 22 
individuals who provided in-depth feedback on the understandability of the task. Finally, an 
anonymous online pre-test was conducted with a sample of 60 individuals. Forty-five were from 
a senior level auditing course, and 15 were members of the community who were eligible to 
serve as jurors. For this online pre-test phase, open-ended questions were asked concerning the 
participants‘ understanding of the case and questionnaire, which provided additional feedback on 
the communication effectiveness of the case materials.  
Minor changes were made in the online case and questionnaire based on the feedback 
received in the online pre-test round, primarily to correct technological issues and improve 
clarity. For example, the online pre-test included audio of the case with a slideshow video of the 
text for participants to read and follow along with the audio. However, many individuals 
indicated that the technology for this slideshow video did not function effectively on their 
computer, and they were not able to read or hear the case. To accommodate for potential 
technology issues with the final data collection phase, the participants were instead provided 
with the text in an embedded text box with the ability to scroll down the page and follow along 
with the audio. This format allowed participants to read the text even in the event of 
technological issues with the audio, and delivered the text in a user-friendly format. The final 




computers before beginning, with detailed instructions on how to correct potential issues with 
their technology.  
Overall, the online instrument, case, and questionnaire were greatly improved by this 
extensive pre-testing. Participants in the final data collection phase communicated few 
technological issues, and indicated that they found the task enjoyable and not overly difficult. 
They were asked if they experienced technological issues (91.2% responded no), if they read the 
text (94.0% responded yes), and if they listened to the audio (91.0% responded yes), to control 
for any differences that could emerge due to delivery format. As additional follow-up measures 
of the individuals‘ experiences with the task, they were asked to express their level of agreement 
(on a scale from one (strongly agree) to seven (strongly disagree)) with the following statements: 
‗The task was difficult‘ (mean 4.48), ‗The task was enjoyable‘ (mean 3.03), and ‗The task was 
realistic‘ (mean 2.46). The responses to this series of questions indicate that the participants on 
average did not find the task to be difficult, believed the task to be realistic, and enjoyed 
participating in the task. Follow-up questions indicated that the participants experienced issues 
with their own computers based on processing capabilities, or that they had to change settings on 
their computer to listen to the audio. However, all indicated that they were still able to either read 
and/or listen to the case. All follow-up questions described in this paragraph were entered as 
covariates in the analyses detailed in the results section to determine whether answers to the 
follow-up questions influenced the results of the study. T-tests were also performed to determine 
whether significant differences existed between conditions. Results of the covariate and t-test 
analyses indicate that no significant differences were found between conditions, and the 




Participants and Demographic Characteristics 
 
Emails with an embedded link to the online case and questionnaire were sent to 1,438 
individuals, inviting each to participate in the study. Each potential participant was randomly 
assigned into one of the four manipulated conditions examined in this study. Potential 
participants were given two weeks to respond to the study, and reminder emails were sent within 
48 hours of the closing date of the study. Overall, 242 unique entries to the survey were recorded 
(16.8% initial response rate). Seventy-three individuals dropped out of the task before answering 
any questions, and 67 individuals were excluded from the final sample for not answering the 
manipulation check questions accurately, failing to complete the questionnaire, or indicating 
non-U.S. citizenship (only U.S. citizens are eligible to serve as jurors). Nine more individuals 
were excluded for indicating that they have had experience as an auditor or attorney, which 
would most likely disqualify them from serving on a jury (Kadous 2001). After excluding these 
individuals, 93 useable responses were included in the final sample (6.5% usable response rate)
9
. 
The low response rate in this study is likely attributed to the fact that the email communicated 
that the task was time intensive (respondents spent an average of 36 minutes on the task), and 
participants were not compensated for completing the study. To test for non-response bias, the 
late respondents were examined in comparison to others, with no differences found. Therefore, 
the low response rate is not likely to result in non-response bias.  
All participants in the study were identified by offering undergraduate students enrolled 
in business courses at a university extra credit for providing the contact information of 
individuals who were interested in participating in the study. The students were asked to 
                                                 
All tests included in this study were re-performed to include each group of excluded participants in the sample. No 
significant differences were found to indicate that the excluded individuals responded differently than the 




specifically recruit people who are over 18 years of age, are not accounting students, and are 
currently registered to vote in the U.S. Respondents to the survey were also asked to provide 
email contact information for other individuals interested in participating in the study. Research 
indicates that responses from members of the community are similar to responses from 
individuals who have actually served on a jury (Bornstein, 1999), indicating that participants 
recruited would provide an appropriate sample for the purposes of the study.    
Data was also collected on individual factors such as potential biases or background 
characteristics that could influence their likelihood of being selected to a jury. Individuals were 
not excluded from the sample based on their answers to these questions, as the jury selection is a 
process that is not necessarily predicable; and, different lawyers have been known to employ 
very different strategies when arguing which individual to exclude from the jury (Hastie 1995). 
Therefore, instead of automatically excluding these individuals from the main data analysis, 
answers to each of these questions were entered as covariates in the analyses of this study. No 
significant results emerged to indicate that participants‘ responses to this series of questions 
significantly influenced the results of the study.  
Table 12, Panel A provides details on the demographics of the sample. Overall, the 
average age of the participants was 46 years, and 55.4% of the participants were female. A large 
majority of the sample were white (89.2%), 5.3% were Hispanic, 2.1% were African-American, 
and 1.0 % were Asian or Pacific Islander. Over 80% of the participants listed Florida as their 
state of residence and were registered to vote in this state; and, 68.8% of the participants had 
been called for jury duty in the past, with 29.7% of the sample having been selected to serve on 
the jury for a civil trial (10.7%) or a criminal trial (19.0%). These demographic characteristics 




serving on jury (37.4%), as reported in a recent nationwide Harris poll (Harris Interactive, 2008). 
97.0% of the individuals indicated that they are registered to vote, with 42.1% responding that 
they are registered Republican, 28.4 % registered Democrat, 26.1% registered Independent, and 
3.4% registered with other political parties, reported in Table 12, Panel B. 
Table 13 provides details on the employment and income levels of the sample. The 
majority of the participants (58.1%) indicated that they were currently employed on a full-time 
basis. Of the remaining participants, 19.4% worked part-time, 7.5% were self-employed, 7.5% 
were retired, 5.4% were full-time homemakers, and 4.3% were currently unemployed. The 
income levels of participants were high on average, with 45.5% of the sample indicating an 
annual household income of over $100K.  Table 14 provides details on education level, with all 
participants indicating that they at least finished high school. Overall, 3.2% of the participants 
only graduated high school, 4.3% attended a trade or professional school, 31.2% completed some 
college, 29.0% graduated college, 14.0% completed some graduate school, and 18.3% of the 
sample completed a graduate degree in college.   
Measurement and Manipulation of Variables 
Manipulated Independent Variable: Type of Material Weakness  
The independent variable representing the internal control weakness type, referred to as 
‗MW Type‘ in the sections below, was operationalized by manipulating the information provided 
to participants in the case scenario between groups. One condition, representing the ‗More 
Auditable‘ internal control, tells participants that the internal controls over inventory counts and 
records were deficient. The second condition, representing the ‗Less Auditable‘ internal control, 




emphasis on meeting earnings projections at the sacrifice of financial reporting accuracy. These 
two scenarios are based on examples provided in the definition of auditability from previous 
studies (Hammersley et al., 2008; Doss, 2004).  
Manipulated Independent Variable: Disclosure  
 The auditor‘s Section 404 report disclosure for the 2007 audit, referred to as ‗Disclosure‘, 
was manipulated between groups with two conditions. In the first condition, the participants 
were told that the auditor did not publicly disclose any details about the significant deficiency in 
their Section 404 report. In the second condition, the auditor voluntarily provided a disclosure of 
the significant deficiency in their report on internal controls. In all groups, the case stated that the 
auditor identified the deficiency in internal controls during their audit in 2007, but assessed it to 
be only a significant deficiency and not a material weakness. Therefore, the audit quality 
remained consistent across all groups with only the disclosure of the auditor‘s findings differing 
between groups.  
Dependent Variables: Measures of Auditor Liability 
As shown in Appendix C, auditor liability was measured by the answers to multiple 
questions. First participants were asked to make the choice whether the auditor is ‗Liable‘ or 
‗Not Liable‘ for negligent misrepresentation. Then they were asked to assess compensatory and 
punitive damages. Dependent variables for compensatory and punitive damages were measured 
by first providing a brief description of the definition of each type of damages, and then asking 
the individual to enter a number between $0 and $100,000,000 for compensatory damages and 




Participants were also asked a set of five questions, measured on a seven-point scale, 
which represent auditor liability exposure. These questions provided a more in-depth 
understanding of the participants‘ opinions of auditor liability. Specifically, they were asked to 
express their level of agreement (one indicates strongly agree and seven indicates strongly 
disagree) with the statements that the auditor ‗… is liable for negligent misrepresentation‘, ‗… 
performed their services in compliance within the standards that dictate how audits should be 
performed‘, ‗…made the appropriate disclosures in compliance within the standards that dictate 
what auditors should disclose‘, ‗… could have prevented the stockholder losses‘ and ‗… is 
responsible for stockholder losses.‘  
Results 
 
The results of the tests of the two hypotheses of this study are presented in this section. 
First, descriptive statistics are presented to summarize the participants‘ responses to the 
questionnaire by experimental condition. H1 is tested with the independent variable ‘MW Type‘, 
which represents whether the participant was told that the audit failure is due to a more auditable 
internal control weakness (‗More Auditable‘) or less auditable internal control weakness (‗Less 
Auditable‘). H2 is tested with the independent variable ‗Disclosure‘, which represents whether 
the auditor provided a disclosure (‗Disclosed‘) or did not provide a disclosure of the weakness in 
internal controls (‗Not Disclosed‘).  Although not hypothesized, the interaction of these two 
independent variables (‗MW Type‘ x ‗Disclosure‘) is also analyzed to determine whether a 
significant interaction effect exists between the two variables examined in the study.  
The dependent variable for each of the hypothesis tests is auditor liability; measured in 




performed based on how this dependent variable was measured.  First, a logistic regression is 
performed to examine the participants‘ liable/not liable decisions. Then, multiple analyses of the 
variances (MANOVAs) are performed to understand how the participants‘ compensatory and 
punitive damage awards differ between conditions. Next an ANOVA of composite factor scores 
representing the ratings of the degree of auditor liability is performed to examine whether 
participants‘ responses differed between conditions. Finally, overall conclusions from these 
analyses are discussed to review the outcome of the hypothesis tests for this study.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A of Table 15 provides a summary of the responses to the question ‗How would 
you vote‘, with the response options ‗Liable‘ or ‗Not Liable‘. A chi-square analysis of the 
differences between the four groups‘ liable/not liable judgments was significant, χ
2
 = 12.76, 
p=0.005. Overall, the participants in the ‗Disclosed/More Auditable‘ condition were the least 
likely to find the auditor liable, with 92.0% of the sample selecting ‗Not Liable‘. The individuals 
in the ‗Not Disclosed/More Auditable‘ condition were also more likely to find the auditor ‗Not 
Liable‘ (65.0%).  The majority of the individuals in the ‗Disclosed/Less Auditable‘ condition 
answered ‗Not Liable‘ (52.2%). Of the individuals in the ‗Not Disclosed/Less Auditable‘ 
condition, 48.0% responded that the auditor was ‗Not Liable‘, indicating that the majority of the 
individuals in this condition voted ‗Liable‘. 
The next measures of auditor liability examined are the participants‘ answers to the 
questions ‗What dollar amount in compensatory damages would you recommend be awarded to 
the stockholders?‘ ($0 to $100,000,000) and ‗What dollar amount in punitive damages would 




provides a summary of the responses to these questions by experimental condition. A t-test of the 
differences between the four groups‘ was significant for both compensatory damages (p=0.001) 
and punitive damages (p=0.008).  An overall comparison of the means again shows that 
individuals in the ‗Disclosed/More Auditable‘ condition responded the most favorably for the 
auditor, with a mean of $4.200 million awarded for compensatory damages and no punitive 
damages awarded by any individuals. The next lowest awarded damages were found in the ‗Not 
Disclosed/More Auditable‘ condition, with a mean of $16.000 million for compensatory 
damages and $3.525 million for punitive damages. The ‗Disclosed/Less Auditable‘ condition had 
the second highest damages awarded, with a mean of $35.657 million for compensatory damages 
and $20.283 million for punitive damages. The ‗Not Disclosed/Less Auditable‘ condition had the 
highest awarded damages across all conditions, with the mean for compensatory and punitive 
damages equaling $44.000 million and $40.400 million accordingly.   
Auditor liability exposure was also measured in a series of questions asking the 
participants to indicate their agreement (on a scale from one (strongly agree) to seven (strongly 
disagree)) with the questions relating to the auditor‘s liability, responsibility, performance 
quality, and disclosure quality. For analysis purposes, these questions were reverse coded so that 
higher numbers indicate higher liability/less favorable responses. A summary of the mean 
responses to these questions by condition is found in Panel C of Table 15. A multiple 
comparisons analysis of the mean responses by group for each of these questions indicate that 
the responses in the ‗Disclosed/More Auditable‘ condition were significantly lower for four out 
of five of the questions, compared to mean responses from participants in each of the three other 
experimental conditions (p<0.05), indicating that the auditor was again viewed the most 




were significantly lower for the ‗Disclosed/More Auditable‘ condition when responding to the 
questions asking whether the auditor ‗is liable for negligent misrepresentation. ‗… performed 
their services in compliance within the standards that dictate how audits should be performed‘, 
‗…made the appropriate disclosures in compliance within the standards that dictate what auditors 
should disclose‘, and ‗… could have prevented the stockholder losses‘.  
Panel D of Table 15 provides the results of a factor analysis of these measures, which 
indicates that all measures load effectively on one factor (all individual loadings>0.828), 
explaining 75.6% of the variance in the data. The analysis was a Principal Components Factor 
analysis with Varimax rotation. The factor analysis indicates that these five questions effectively 
provide a measure of auditor liability exposure. Factor scores were saved and used in the 
ANOVAs described in the sections below to represent auditor liability perceptions.  
H1: More Auditable vs. Less Auditable Internal Control Weaknesses  
H1 predicts that auditors will be viewed more favorably (less favorably) when they fail to 
accurately report a material weakness in a more auditable (less auditable) internal control. First, 
this hypothesis is tested using the responses to the question ‗How would you vote?‘ as the 
dependent variable (response options ‗Liable‘ or ‗Not Liable‘). Since this particular dependent 
variable measure was dichotomous, a binary logistic regression analysis was employed to predict 
the probability that a participant would find the auditor ‗Liable‘ vs. ‗Not Liable‘. This test 
provides results in the form of an odds ratio, which communicates the influence of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable. Results will also provide an estimate of the 
model‘s percentage of correct predictions of the dependent variable. The proposed model is 




only model when the Nagelkerke r-squared and percentage predictions are higher in the proposed 
model.  
Results of the model with independent variables ‗MW Type‘ (H1) and ‗Disclosure‘ (H2) 
are presented in Panel A of Table 16. Results for H1 will be discussed first, with all results for 
H2 to be discussed separately in the next section. A test of the model in comparison to the 
intercept-only model (excluding all independent variables and interactions) was statistically 
significant, χ
2
(1, N = 93) = 11.966,  p=0.003, Nagelkerke R
2
 = 0.166.  This model successfully 
predicted the ‗Not Liable‘ outcome 80.0% of the time and the ‗Liable‘ outcome 39.4% of the 
time, with an overall rate of correct predictions of 65.6%. ‗MW Type‘ is significant in this model 
(p=0.002), with the odds ratio indicating that individuals in the ‗More Auditable‘ conditions are 
0.254 times less likely to find the auditor liable in comparison to individuals in the ‗Less 
Auditable‘ conditions. Overall, results of this model support H1, which proposed that auditors 
failing to accurately assess a more auditable internal control would be evaluated more favorably 
by jury members.  
The second test of H1 examines the participants‘ responses to the questions ‗What dollar 
amount in compensatory damages would you recommend be awarded to the stockholders?‘ ($0 
to $100,000,000) and ‗What dollar amount in punitive damages would you recommend be 
awarded to the stockholders?‘ ($0 to $200,000,000). All participants were included in this 
analysis, with $0 entered as damages for individuals who voted ‗Not Liable‘. MANOVA was 
conducted with the dependent variable represented by the dollar value for compensatory and 
punitive damages. Panel B of Table 16 provides details on the outcome of this MANOVA. A 
significant effect was found overall for the independent variable ‗MW Type‘, Wilks lambda= 




means that this independent variable accounted for 15.1% of the variance in the dependent 
variable. A follow-up analysis was performed using the log of the damage awards, with very 
similar results to the above analysis. Univariate analyses of the variance (ANOVAs) were also 
performed for each of the two individual dependent variable measures to further understand the 
influence of the internal control weakness type on auditor litigation exposure as measured by 
compensatory and punitive damage awards. Panels C and D of Table 16 report the results of 
these analyses.  
Individual ANOVAs of the participants‘ compensatory and punitive damage awards 
indicate a significant main effect for the independent variable ‗MW Type‘ on the dependent 
variable measures for compensatory and punitive damages (p=0.000 and 0.003 accordingly). 
Overall, compensatory and punitive damages awarded in the ‗More Auditable‘ conditions are 
significantly lower than the compensatory and punitive damages awarded in the ‗Less Auditable‘ 
conditions. Results suggest that measuring auditor liability through compensatory and punitive 
awards provides support for H1, indicating that the auditor is evaluated more favorably when 
they fail to accurately evaluate a more auditable internal control weakness.   
The final test of H1 examines auditor liability as measured by the mean factor score (the 
sum of the standardized factor scores multiplied by the individual item factor loadings) of the 
responses to the series of five auditor liability questions detailed in the section above. An 
ANOVA was performed with the factor score of the measures of auditor liability perceptions as 
the dependent variable, resulting in a significant effect for the independent variable ‗MW Type‘, 
F(2,93) = 8.021, p=0.006. Panel E of Table 16 provides a summary of these results. Comparison 




evaluated the auditor more favorably in comparison to ‗Less Auditable‘ conditions, providing 
further support for H1. 
H2: Unqualified without Disclosure vs. Unqualified with Voluntary Disclosure  
H2 predicted that auditors providing an unqualified Section 404 report with a voluntary 
disclosure of a significant deficiency would be evaluated more favorably, compared to when they 
provide an unqualified report with no disclosure. This hypothesis is tested in the same models 
described above for H1, with results reported in Table 16. First, responses to the question ‗How 
would you vote‘ (response options ‗Liable‘ or ‗Not Liable‘) were entered as the dependent 
variable in a binary logistic regression analysis. ‗Disclosure‘ is marginally significant in this 
model (p=0.056),  with the odds ratio indicating that individuals in the conditions where the 
auditor provided voluntary disclosures of a significant deficiency in internal controls were 0.478 
times less likely to find the auditor liable in comparison to individuals in the conditions where 
the auditor did not provide a disclosure. Therefore, results of this model provide moderate 
support for H2.  
Panel B of Table 16 provides the results of a MANOVA of the dollar amount of 
compensatory and punitive damages assessed against the auditor, indicating that a significant 
effect was not found for the independent variable ‗Disclosure‘, Wilks lambda= 0.976, F(2,93) = 
1.065, p=0.175. A follow-up analysis performed using the log of the damage awards did not 
change these results. Results of this test do not support H2, indicating no significant differences 
in punitive or compensatory damages assessed against the auditor due to the level of disclosure 
within the Section 404 report. As shown in Panels C and D of Table 16, individual ANOVAs of 




effect for the independent variable ‗Disclosure‘ on the dependent variable measures for 
compensatory and punitive damages (p=0.197 and 0.204 accordingly).  
Panel E of Table 16 provides a summary of the results of an ANOVA with the factor 
score of the measures of auditor liability perceptions as the dependent variable. A significant 
effect was found for the independent variable ‗Disclosure‘, F(2,93) = 5.207, p=0.025. 
Comparison of the mean factor scores supports H2, indicating that the individuals in the 
Disclosed conditions evaluated the auditor more favorably in comparison to Not Disclosed 
conditions. 
Additional Test: Interaction between ‘MW Type’ and ‘Disclosure’ 
As an additional test of the participants‘ responses to the questionnaire, each of the tests 
described above were revisited to examine whether a significant interaction exists between the 
two independent variables in this study (‗MW Type‘ and ‗Disclosure‘). First, a logistic 
regression analysis was performed with the dependent variable represented by the participants' 
liable/not liable judgments. Independent variables in this model are ‗MW Type‘ (H1), 
‗Disclosure‘ (H2), and an interaction term ‗MW Type‘ x ‗Disclosure‘. As shown in Table 17, a 
test of the model in comparison to the intercept-only model (excluding the independent 
variables) was statistically significant, χ
2
(3, N = 93) = 14.678,  p=0.002, Nagelkerke R
2
 = 0.201. 
Interestingly, the significance of both main effects (‗MW Type‘ and ‗Disclosure‘) (p=0.128 and 
0.386 accordingly) disappear when the interaction is included; and the interaction effect (‗MW 
Type‘ x ‗Disclosure‘) is marginally significant (p=0.057). The odds ratio indicates that 
individuals in the ‗Disclosed/More Auditable‘ condition were 0.191 times less likely to find the 




comparison of this model to the two logistic regression models proposed in this study for H1 and 
H2 (Panel A of Table 16). This second model, which includes the hypothesized main effects and 
an interaction effect, is superior with a higher r-squared of 0.201 compared to the main effects 
only model r-squired of 0.166. Overall, results of this model indicate that auditors providing 
voluntary disclosures of more auditable internal control issues would be evaluated the most 
favorably by jury members, which is consistent with the descriptive statistics described in the 
sections above and presented in Panel A of Table 15. 
Table 16 Panel B provides details on the outcome of a MANOVA with the dependent 
variable measures for compensatory and punitive damages, which indicates that the interaction 
between ‗MW Type‘ and ‗Disclosure‘ was not significant, Wilks lambda= 0.984, F(2,93) = 
0.726, p=0.244. Panels C and D of Table 16 report results of individual ANOVAs of the 
participants‘ compensatory and punitive damage awards, which do not indicate a significant 
main effect for the interaction between ‗MW Type‘ and ‗Disclosure‘ (p=0.847 and 0.372 
accordingly).  
Panel E of Table 16 provides a summary of the results of an ANOVA with the factor 
scores of the measures of auditor liability perceptions as the dependent variable. The interaction 
effect for ‗MW Type‘ x ‗Disclosure‘ was also not significant in this model, F(2,93)=1.011, 
p=0.347.  Comparison of the mean factor scores, shown in Panel E of Table 16 indicates that the 
individuals in the ‗More Auditable/Disclosed‘ condition evaluated the auditor more favorably in 
comparison to the other conditions, with the ‗Not Disclosed/Less Auditable‘ condition providing 
the least favorable evaluation of the auditor. These results taken indicate that ‗MW Type‘ and 




but do not affect the amount of damages awarded or the participants‘ perceptions of the degree of 
liability. 
Summary of Results 
Table 18 provides a summary of the results of the analyses above. H1, which predicted 
that the type of internal control weakness would influence jurors‘ evaluations of auditors, was 
supported by the results of all tests. Significant effects for this independent variable were found 
in the analyses of the participants liable/not liable judgments, in the analysis of compensatory 
and punitive damages awarded, and in the analysis of the participants‘ perceptions of the 
auditor‘s liability as measured by the factor scores of a series of seven-point scaled questions.  
H2, which predicted that voluntary disclosures of significant deficiencies would favorably 
influence auditor liability, was supported when testing the participants‘ liable/not liable 
judgments, and in the analysis of responses to the series of the factor scores of seven-point scaled 
questions regarding juror‘s perceptions of auditor liability. Finally, the interaction effects for the 
variables examine in H1 and H2 examined in the additional analysis were significant for the first 
judgment, where participants were asked to respond whether the auditor should be liable/not 
liable. Implications of these results are discussed in the conclusions section below.  
Conclusions  
 
Overall, H1, which predicted that auditors would be found less liable by jurors when the 
auditor failed to accurately evaluate an internal control weakness that is more auditable, is 
supported strongly in this study. All measures for auditor liability exposure supported this 
conclusion, including measures of the participants‘ judgments of whether the auditor is liable/not 




perceptions of auditor‘s degree of liability. Specifically, the participants were less likely to find 
the auditor liable when the auditor failed to properly evaluate a material weakness in internal 
controls when the control in question was more auditable, compared to when the control in 
question is less auditable. The participants also awarded lower punitive and compensatory 
damages to auditors under this condition, and evaluated the auditor more favorably overall when 
asked a series of questions designed to gauge their perceptions of auditor liability.  
The results for H1 suggest that auditors may be exposed to more liability for their 
subjective decisions, which may imply that auditors should be conservative with their audit 
procedures and financial reporting decisions when evaluating less auditable internal controls. 
This finding supports attribution theory, in that jurors are more likely to attribute blame to an 
individual when their decisions were made based on their judgment, and less likely to attribute 
blame to an individual relying on an external source to guide their decisions (i.e., rules or 
evidence). Since auditors tend to rely more on professional judgment when assessing internal 
controls that are more subjective in nature (i.e., the control environment or management 
integrity), the results of this study suggest that auditors should be aware that they will likely be 
held responsible for this decision. This finding also suggests that when auditors are able to 
produce more solid evidence in court, jurors will be less likely to place blame on them. When the 
auditor can provide audit evidence in court, they may be able to place the blame for a failure on 
another source, such as the evidence provided by the client or the rules guiding the profession. 
Therefore, the results of this study suggest that auditors have an incentive to collect and 
document sufficient evidence if it is available to protect themselves from liability in the event of 
an audit failure. Future research in this area could extend on these findings by examining how 




findings of this study may indicate that auditors may be more exposed to liability when 
interpreting principles-based standards as a result of the subjectivity involved in auditors‘ 
principles-based judgments.   
The results for Hypothesis 2 are mixed. This hypothesis predicted that voluntarily 
disclosing the deficiency would result in the auditor being evaluated more favorably by jurors. 
Results do suggest that auditors may be able to significantly influence whether they will be 
found liable in court by a jury by providing a voluntary disclosure of a significant deficiency in 
an unqualified Section 404 report. Examining the responses to the individual measures of auditor 
liability also suggests that overall perceptions of auditors can be positively influenced by 
providing such voluntary disclosures. However, jurors‘ assessments of damages in the event of a 
liable verdict do not appear to be favorably influenced by voluntary disclosures in the Section 
404 report alone. Although this last finding does not support H2, damages would not be awarded 
at all in the event that the auditor is found not liable. Therefore, since participants‘ liable/not 
liable judgments do support H2, these results suggest that auditors can utilize the Section 404 
report to provide a signal of potential risks of internal control issues within a company, and that 
this signal will lead jurors to evaluate them more favorably in the event of a trial implicating the 
auditors.  This finding is important, particularly since study one of this dissertation did not 
support a significant difference in lawyers‘ assessments of litigation exposure for auditors who 
provided voluntary disclosures within the Section 404 report. Overall, finding that auditors are 
able to positively influence the outcome of a jury trial by providing such disclosure suggests that 
auditors should view the Section 404 report as an opportunity to protect themselves from liability 




Additional analysis of the participants‘ judgments in this study supports a significant 
interaction effect between the auditor‘s disclosures and the type of material weakness for 
participants‘ initial decision whether the auditor is liable or not liable. This result indicated that 
the auditors are significantly more likely to be found not liable when they voluntarily disclosed a 
more auditable internal control issue, in comparison to all other conditions. Examination of the 
descriptive statistics for the results of the study reveals that 92.0% of the individuals found the 
auditor not liable when the auditor voluntarily disclosed a more auditable internal control issue, 
with an average of only $4 million in compensatory damages, and no individuals awarding 
punitive damages to the shareholders. Overall, the type of internal control weakness (H1) and 
voluntary disclosures of internal control issues within the Section 404 report (H2) each seem to 
have significant effects on auditor liability exposure, but the combination of a more auditable 
control and providing a voluntary disclosure appears to provide auditors with a significant 
amount of protection from legal liability in a jury trial. Therefore, auditors may wish to consider 
each of these findings in conjunction by carefully considering how well they will be able to 
collect and document evidence on the internal controls evaluated during an audit when deciding 
how much to disclose within the Section 404 report.  
 One limitation of this study is the online setting, which can exclude certain types of 
individuals from the sample. Specifically, the technology requirements for this study would have 
prevented individuals who did not have a high speed internet connection or audio capabilities 
from participating in the study. However, this limitation would be most likely to bias the sample 
to a younger population, and since the average age of the sample for this study was 46 years old 
with almost 9% of the sample over 65 years old, the potential limitation due to technology 




also limits the ability for the researcher to control for environmental factors that could potentially 
influence the participants‘ attentiveness to the study. Another limitation of this study is the use of 
a summary of a realistic court case in the place of a real, live court case. This limitation poses a 
potential threat to external validity, but allowed the researcher to experimentally manipulate the 
variables examined in the study. Future research could expand on the results of this study by 
examining auditor liability in a live setting with a simulated trial, which would provide insight in 
to the potential for differences in juror decisions based on how the simulated case is delivered to 
participants.  
 Overall, this study provides a valuable addition to understanding auditor litigation by 
examining how Section 404 report disclosures can impact juror decisions if litigation should 
occur, particularly when the auditor fails to accurately assess the impact of different types of 
control deficiencies. Therefore, the study provides practical insights for the current debate 
regarding the liability exposure for auditors following SOX, by suggesting that auditors can 
potentially lessen their liability exposure by increasing the transparency of their Section 404 
reports. Finding that auditors are more likely to be found liable if the internal control in question 
is less auditable and more reliant on the auditor‘s professional judgment may be a concern for 
audit firms. Auditors may wish to evaluate the less auditable deficiencies more closely or report 
an adverse opinion on internal controls whenever such deficiencies are found, as voluntarily 
disclosing significant deficiencies in less auditable internal controls does not appear to decrease 
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STUDY THREE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCE OF AUDIT COMMITTEE 
MEMBER INDEPENDENCE AND EXPERTISE ON JURORS’ PERCEPTIONS OF 




The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was created with the intent to improve financial 
reporting and auditing for public companies (Jennings et al., 2006). Many of the provisions of 
SOX specifically focus on the overall improvement of auditor independence, attempting to create 
an environment in which auditors are faced with fewer conflicts of interests that could interfere 
with their ability to make independent decisions during the audit (Jennings et al., 2006; DeZoort 
et al., 2008). SOX addressed the issue of auditor independence in one way by creating higher 
standards for individuals who serve on the audit committee, specifying that audit committee 
members meet minimum levels of independence and expertise (DeZoort et al., 2008). According 
to SOX, public companies must establish that audit committee members are independent and 
publicly disclose whether at least one of the audit committee members is considered an expert in 
finance or accounting (Jennings et al., 2006).  
Many studies indicate that financial reporting and auditing improve when the audit 
committee contains members who are more independent and/or experts (DeZoort et al., 2002). 
These conclusions provide preliminary support that improving the independence and expertise of 
audit committee members influences auditor independence. The purpose of this study is to 
examine the impact of the audit committee member independence and expertise (as required by 




and auditor liability are influenced by audit committee member expertise and independence in a 
litigation setting.  
This study is important because the requirements of SOX still allow some leeway in how 
companies interpret the level of need for financial expertise and independence on an audit 
committee (DeZoort et al., 2002; Zhang et al., 2007; Chan and Li, 2008). While some companies 
remain minimally compliant with SOX with very few audit committee members qualifying as 
expert and/or independent, other companies have a larger number of experts and independent 
members on their audit committee (Zhang et al., 2007; Chan and Li, 2008).  
This increased understanding of how audit committee member expertise and 
independence may influence jurors‘ perceptions of auditor independence and liability in a 
litigation setting contributes to both academic research and practice. Past research on corporate 
governance indicates that judges are likely to evaluate auditors more favorably under conditions 
of high corporate governance (Jennings et al., 2006). This study extends prior research by 
examining how the individual characteristics of audit committee expertise and independence 
may influence jurors‘ perceptions of auditor independence. By isolating the effects of these two 
audit committee characteristics, this study provides a more in-depth understanding of how 
specific characteristics of audit committee members can impact auditor liability exposure. As 
audit firms are faced with a highly litigious environment in the U.S. and wish to maintain client 
portfolios with acceptable levels of litigation risk (Cunningham, 2004), auditors may find the 
results of this study useful in evaluating the liability risk for new clients, and further understand 
how contextual factors related to their client‘s characteristics may influence court decisions.  
In this study, an experiment was conducted to examine how audit committee member 




Participants were asked to review a case where undetected fraudulent activity resulted in the 
bankruptcy of a public company, and shareholders are suing the auditor for damages. The case 
stated that the fraud was able to occur as a result of a weakness in internal controls. The 
particular internal control issue at fault was identified by auditors in the previous year, but after 
discussing the issue with the audit committee and management, the auditors ultimately decided 
not to report the internal control issue to the public. The case also provided details about the 
members of the audit committee, which were manipulated in a 2x2 between-subjects design 
across four conditions representing high vs. low independence and high vs. low expertise. 
Participants were asked to provide their perceptions about audit committee independence, audit 
committee expertise, auditor independence, and auditor liability. They were also asked to decide 
if the auditor should be found liable for negligence, and assess punitive and compensatory 
damages in the event of a liable verdict.  
The proposed model depicted in Figure 1 was tested with components based SEM using 
partial least squares analysis to examine how jurors‘ perceptions of audit committee 
independence and audit committee expertise influence their judgments about auditor 
independence and auditor liability. Results suggest that perceptions of audit committee 
independence can positively influence perceptions of auditor independence and auditor liability. 
Additionally, higher perceptions of auditor independence were found to have a positive influence 
on jurors‘ auditor liability judgments. Results do not support a significant relationship between 
audit committee expertise and perceptions of auditor independence or auditor liability. However, 
audit committee independence and audit committee expertise interact to affect auditor liability, 
such that auditors are evaluated most favorably when audit committee members are highly expert 




committees contain high levels of expertise and low levels of independence, indicating that 
expertise in audit committee members may not always have a positive impact on auditor liability 
exposure. 
The following sections provide an overview of the increased requirements related to audit 
committees. Included in this overview is an exploration of how the related perception of auditor 
independence has the potential to impact juror decisions in a litigation setting. Then, hypotheses 
are developed based on theory and research, followed by a description of the research method 
that tests these hypotheses. Last, results and implications of this study are discussed.  
Theory and Hypothesis Development 
 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 and the Audit Committee 
 
SOX Section 301 requires that audit committee members meet minimum independence 
requirements. Independence for an audit committee member is defined as either (1) having no 
financial ties to the company other than acting as a member of the committee or board of 
directors or (2) having no affiliation with the company or its subsidiaries (Chun-Keung et al., 
2007).  SOX Section 407 requires the audit committee to disclose whether they maintain at least 
one financial expert on the committee, or why they do not have an expert on the committee 
(Zhang et al., 2007). This section states that experts must have education or experience in a role 
that would prepare the individual to understand accounting principles and financial statements, 
such as a controller or a financial officer (U.S. House of Representatives, 2002). Beyond these 
minimal requirements to disclose the presence of an expert member, audit committees tend to 
vary in composition, with some having members with more/less expertise and independence than 




Because of the perceived importance of the audit committee as a corporate governance 
mechanism, researchers have investigated the impact of audit committee composition on the 
quality of the financial reporting and audit process, with a large portion of research focusing on 
the specific characteristics of audit committee member expertise and independence (DeZoort et 
al., 2002
10
). The following sections provide a summary of the findings related to these 
characteristics, and the impact these particular audit committee traits may have on auditor 
liability in a trial setting. Then, four hypotheses are developed to propose the overall research 
model shown in Figure 1.    
 
Audit Committee Expertise and Negotiating Power: Perceptions of Auditor Independence 
 
SOX Section 407, which requires audit committees to disclose the expertise of their 
members, has inspired a large stream of research, focusing on the specific characteristics of 
expert members and their impact on the quality of the audit process and the resulting financial 
report (DeZoort et al., 2008). Past research indicates that expertise within the audit committee is 
associated with signals of higher quality auditing and financial reporting (DeZoort et al., 2002).  
Overall, the rationale behind the importance of having an expert member on the audit committee 
is that expert members have the knowledge to make more educated decisions in the event of a 
conflict between the auditor and management. This knowledge allows them to actively discuss 
issues with the auditor and management, which provides an additional source of insight and 
could lead to better decisions.  
                                                 
10
 DeZoort et al. (2002) provides a detailed synthesis and review of literature on audit committees and develops a 
taxonomy based on this literature. Audit committee composition is one large component of this taxonomy, with 




Since the auditing and financial reporting process is often highly complex (DeZoort et al., 
2002), and current audit committees are expected to be more involved in auditing and reporting 
decisions than in the past (Chan and Li, 2008), the ability to make educated decisions is crucial 
to ensuring the highest quality reporting possible. Past research supports this assumption, as 
financial expertise on an audit committee is associated with a number of indicators of high 
quality auditing and reporting. For example, higher levels of expertise on audit committees are 
associated with less restatement activity (Abbott et al., 2004) and favorable reactions from the 
market (DeFond et al., 2005). Audit committees with expert members have a greater likelihood 
of siding with the auditor in a dispute (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; DeZoort et al., 2008). 
Companies with expert members on their audit committees also engage in less earnings 
management (Xie et al., 2003; Carcello et al., 2006), and have a lower incidence of internal 
control weaknesses (Zhang et al., 2007; Bedard et al., 2007). Overall, these findings suggest that 
financial reporting improves when audit committees contain expert members.  
Research indicating that expert audit committee members are more likely to side with 
auditors in the event of a conflict (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; DeZoort et al., 2008) provides 
some evidence that the level of expertise does lead to a more independent decision-making 
environment for auditors, as intended by SOX. Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) provide insight that 
may explain why this phenomenon occurs, suggesting that audit committee effectiveness is 
perceived as a function of the types and extent of audit committee power. The concept of power 
described in the Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) article originated from various sources in academic 
research in political science and sociology, which typically define power as the ability to have 




The specific link between expertise and power can be traced back to research by French 
and Raven (1957, 1974), who developed a typology of power to explain the different 
characteristics that may influence the balance of power in a situation. Expertise was included as 
one of the sources of power in this typology, suggesting that individuals with expertise will gain 
more power. Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) explore this concept of power in the context of the 
qualifications of audit committee members, proposing that power in the form of expertise is 
highly associated with financial reporting effectiveness. Since expert members are required to 
have finance or accounting specific knowledge, they would not have to rely as heavily on the 
opinions of management and auditors to understand financial reporting or internal control issues. 
Researchers suggest that this expertise provides an additional level of power to the audit 
committee; and, in the event of a dispute with the auditor, management will likely have less 
control over the outcome (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993).  
This concept of negotiation power is highly important from an audit perspective, as the 
audit process is often characterized as a constant negotiation process between auditors and their 
clients (Gibbins et al., 2001; DeZoort et al., 2008). Negotiation power can significantly influence 
the auditor‘s ability to perform high quality audits by impacting the way that the auditor interacts 
with their clients to resolve conflicts over financial reporting. Unfortunately, research indicates 
that management often has a significant amount of power over the audit process. Since 
management is often more knowledgeable about their business and industry, their expert 
knowledge can be viewed as a source of power in these interactions (French and Raven, 1957; 
Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993). Other sources of power identified by French and Raven‘s (1957; 
1974) typology are power over resources and power over information. Management arguably has 




additionally contributes to managements‘ increased power over the audit process. The more 
power management has over audit decisions, the less independent the auditor becomes in their 
decision-making (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993).  Auditor independence is generally perceived as a 
significant factor in determining financial reporting quality, and is a necessary component of a 
successful audit and financial reporting process (Jennings et al., 2006; Brandon and Mueller, 
2006; 2008). Therefore, auditor negotiation power, and the resulting impact on auditor 
independence, has been a focus of researchers and regulators seeking to improve the quality of 
financial reporting. 
One major solution that has emerged to combat the lack of auditor negotiation power has 
been the expansion of the role of audit committees. Audit committees now act as an intermediary 
between auditors and management in the event of a dispute, which has not always been the case 
(DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; DeZoort et al., 2008). In the past, direct negotiations between 
management and auditors were more common when an auditor and management disagreed on an 
accounting issue (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; DeZoort et al., 2008). This finding suggests that 
auditors have more negotiation power when audit committees play a role in the negotiation 
process. Therefore, the role of the audit committee as an intermediary between auditors and 
management is directly related to auditor independence (Jennings et al., 2006). The addition of 
another neutral party participating in the audit process decreases the amount of direct influence 
that management has over audit decisions, thus creating a more independent auditor (Kalbers and 
Fogarty, 1993). The overall quality of the financial reporting process is improved when auditors 
are independent, as the auditors are less likely to allow management to control their audit 




In addition to finding that expert members on the audit committee improve auditor 
independence in fact, research indicates that general perceptions about the audit committee can 
influence perceptions of auditor independence (Brandon and Mueller, 2008). Prior research 
indicates that when auditor independence is influenced in fact, individuals‘ perceptions of 
auditor independence tend to be influenced in a similar manner (Brandon and Mueller, 2008). 
These findings support the link between auditor independence in fact, which is measured with 
indicators of higher quality decision-making and reporting, and auditor independence in 
appearance, which is measured by individuals‘ perceptions of auditor independence. Much of the 
research in this area has a practical basis for examining the factors that will influence perceptions 
of independence, and tends to focus on the factors that should logically decrease independence. 
One example of this research finds that auditor tenure, a much debated issue that has been 
identified as a contributing factor to independence in fact, negatively influences jurors‘ 
perceptions of auditor independence (Brandon and Mueller, 2008).  Another study examined 
how judges perceive auditors, finding that when auditors perceive the audit committee to be 
strong, versus minimally compliant, they evaluate the auditor to be more independent (Jennings 
et al., 2006). These two studies were motivated by research supporting factors that influence 
auditor independence in fact, and found that individuals‘ perceptions follow a similar logical 
pattern.  
 Overall, the expertise of audit committee members has been shown to positively 
influence auditing and financial reporting in practice, with some researchers suggesting that this 
positive effect is because of improved auditor independence (DeZoort et al., 2008). Research 
indicates that in the post-SOX environment, audit committees are becoming more involved in the 




the auditor and management in the event of a disagreement (DeZoort et al., 2008). The expertise 
of audit committee members has been shown to influence these negotiations, as audit committees 
with expert members are more likely to side with the auditor in the event of a disagreement 
between management and the auditor (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001;DeZoort et al., 2008). This 
implies that having an expert member on the audit committee may influence the balance of 
power in the auditor-client relationship by shifting power over audit and financial reporting 
outcomes away from management as the sole influence over the auditor‘s decisions (Kalbers and 
Fogarty, 1993). When this power is shifted away from management, the auditor‘s decisions are 
likely to become more independent (Kalbers and Fogarty 1993).  This research suggests a 
positive relationship between audit committee member expertise and auditor independence as 
auditors are pressured less by management in the decision process (DeZoort and Salterio 2001; 
DeZoort et al., 2008). Based on prior research on auditor independence, the improvement of 
auditor independence in fact is likely to indicate that perceptions of auditor independence will be 
influenced in a similar manner (Brandon and Mueller, 2008). This phenomenon likely occurs due 
to the perception of audit committee expertise as a source of power over the financial reporting 
process (Kalbers and Fogarty 1993), allowing audit committee members and auditors to perform 
their duties independently of management‘s influence. Therefore, in the event of an audit failure, 
the audit committee that has members with high levels of expertise may create a signal to jurors 
that the auditor was able to make more independent decisions based on their professional 
judgment, as opposed to reacting to pressures and motivations to retain the client. Based on this 





H1: Jurors will perceive auditors as more independent when they perceive that the client‘s 
audit committee contains higher levels of expertise than when they perceive that the 
client‘s audit committee contains lower levels of expertise.  
 
Audit Committee Independence and Negotiating Power: Perceptions of Auditor Independence 
 
Overall, most research indicates that higher levels of independence on an audit committee 
generate higher quality financial reporting and more independent audits. Higher levels of 
independence on an audit committee are associated with lower cost of debt (Anderson et al., 
2004), lower likelihood of fraud (Beasley et al., 2000; Beasley 1996), and less earnings 
management (Klein, 2002). There are also indications that less independent audit committees 
tend to side with management over the auditor (Carcello and Neal, 2000).  
Although SOX requires that members be independent, the interpretation of this 
requirement has varied in practice, ranging from individuals who are retired executives of the 
company, individuals with less than 20% ownership of stock, to fully independent outside 
members who do not own stock in the company. Although all audit committee members may be 
independent by SOX standards, individuals with stock ownership or past ties to the company 
may be perceived as less independent than members who have no stock ownership or past ties to 
the company.  
Similar to the arguments presented above related to audit committee expertise, 
perceptions of audit committee independence are important to consider within a trial setting 
because of the potential impact on perceptions of auditor independence. Research generally 
supports that higher levels of audit committee member independence are positively related to 
indicators of higher quality financial reporting and auditing (DeZoort et al., 2002). Some of this 




members are independent, and that these members of the committee are more likely to side with 
the auditor in disputes with management (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993; Carcello and Neal, 2000). 
The rationale behind these findings is that when audit committee members are not directly linked 
to the company (i.e., no large ownership of stock or direct employment), they are able to provide 
a more objective opinion on disputes that may arise between the auditor and management (Klein, 
2002). In contrast, if audit committee members have a direct relationship with the company, they 
may be more likely to make decisions about the audit based on their own self-interest as opposed 
to the public interest (Klein, 2002).  
To further explain how audit committee independence influences the decisions made by 
the committee members, the concept of power once again emerges as an important theoretical 
element. One of the components of power identified in social theory is the need for a will to take 
action (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993). Without the will to act, the individual may not follow 
through and exert their power over a situation. Although audit committees are given the 
legitimate power of oversight over the financial reporting and audit processes, a lack of will to 
exert this power may compromise their decisions (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993). Specifically, 
when audit committees have a direct financial stake in the company, they may not have the will 
to exert their power over management in the event of a disagreement between management and 
the auditor, particularly when doing so would have a negative financial impact on the committee 
member. 
The findings of Carcello and Neal (2000) support this theory, indicating that the 
independence of the audit committee members does influence their decision-making. 
Furthermore, the findings of Carcello and Neal (2000) suggest that auditors may be subjected to 




independent audit committee. This finding suggests that more independent audit committee 
members have the will to exert their power over negotiations between management and the 
auditor, thus providing an independent intermediary in the event of a disagreement during an 
audit. When auditors are able to distance their decisions from management‘s pressure, they are 
more likely to make more independent decisions (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993). Since research 
suggests that auditor independence is influenced by audit committee member independence, 
perceptions of auditor independence are likely to be influenced in a similar way. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H2: Jurors will perceive auditors as more independent when they perceive that the 
client‘s audit committee exhibits a higher level of independence than when they perceive 
that the client‘s audit committee exhibits a lower level of independence.  
 
Audit Committee Expertise, Audit Committee Independence, and Auditor Independence 
 
Research indicates that companies who have expert audit committee members are likely 
to have less earnings management (Carcello et al., 2006).  However, committees with expert 
members who are also independent are even less likely to allow earnings management (Carcello 
et al., 2006), indicating that an interaction between the two qualities should produce higher 
quality financial reporting. Further supporting this claim that both independence and expertise of 
audit committee members are joint indicators of higher quality financial reporting is the finding 
that firms with audit committees containing members who are identified as executives from 
outside companies, arguably characterized as both highly expert and independent, are valued 
higher (Chan and Li, 2008). In addition, higher levels of audit committee independence and 




(Krishnan, 2005), and increased audit committee effort and involvement in audits (Raghunandan 
et al., 2001).  
Overall, the research discussed above is aligned with theory of social power. Some 
researchers suggest that individuals need both power and the will to exert their power in order to 
effectively influence a social situation (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993). The Raghunandan et al. 
(2001) finding indicating that audit committees are more involved in audits when members 
exhibit higher levels of expertise and independence supports this theory. Specifically, theory 
suggests that expertise of the audit committee members provides the source of power (French 
and Raven, 1957), and the independence of the audit committee members lessens the potential 
for conflicts of interest that could inhibit the will to exert their power. Therefore, an audit 
committee with high levels of expertise and independence should be expected to become more 
involved in audits and fulfill the important role of an independent intermediary between 
management and the auditor in the event of a dispute.   
Overall, past research and social theory suggests that audit committees with both high 
levels of expertise and independence may be the most beneficial from an auditor independence 
perspective.  The expertise of audit committee members provides a source of power for the 
committee members in a situation where management is likely to attempt to exert influence over 
their decisions, which would allow committee members to influence reporting decisions. 
However, a lack of audit committee independence could decrease the audit committee members‘ 
will to exert their power over the audit. Therefore, without the will to act, any other sources of 
power (i.e., expertise) will likely be irrelevant (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993), suggesting that both 
expertise and independence are necessary to promote effective audit committee involvement in 




audit process shifts the balance of power in an audit away from management (Kalbers and 
Fogarty, 1993). In this particular situation, auditors would be more able to make decisions based 
on their professional judgment, not based on pressures from management (Kalbers and Fogarty, 
1993). These findings, indicating that audit committee members with expertise and independence 
are more involved in audits, support the potential for improvements in auditor independence (in 
fact) when audit committees contain both independent and expert members. Based on prior 
research that suggests perceptions of auditor independence are similarly impacted by factors that 
impact auditor independence, the following is proposed:  
 
H3: Jurors will perceive auditors as more independent when they perceive that the client‘s 
audit committee exhibits both a high level of independence and expertise.  
 
Auditor Independence and Auditor Liability 
 
Although auditors may be independent in fact, in a trial setting the appearance of 
independence is more important and would be more likely to influence the juror or judge‘s 
perception of the auditor‘s independence (Jennings et al., 2006; Brandon and Mueller, 2006; 
2008). Perceptions of auditor independence are important to auditors in a litigation setting 
because of the potential that jurors or judges will perceive them as more blameworthy when 
working under conditions of low independence (Jennings et al., 2006; Brandon and Mueller, 
2006; 2008). A common argument from the plaintiff in trials concerning auditor liability is that 
the auditor is motivated by the money they receive from performing the audit and make 
decisions that please the client (Brandon and Mueller, 2006; 2008). Attribution theory suggests 




whether blame should be placed on the individual for their actions (Brandon and Mueller, 2006). 
When individuals are perceived to have intentionally acted in response to a motive that increases 
their personal gain, they are attributed with more blame (Alicke et al., 1990). Prior research 
indicates that if auditors are perceived as operating under conditions of low independence, jurors 
tend to perceive that they acted with intent motivated by their desire to please the client, and 
blame is more likely to be attributed to the auditor (Brandon and Mueller, 2006). 
The perception of independence discussed above is crucial to the outcome of a trial, as 
attribution theory and past research suggests that jurors are more likely to find the auditor liable 
for negligence and award damages when they are perceived as being less independent (Jennings 
et al., 2006; Brandon and Mueller, 2006, 2008). This increased perception of auditor 
independence would most likely lead to a more favorable outcome for the auditor in a trial 
setting (Jennings et al., 2006; Brandon and Mueller, 2006, 2008). Therefore, the following 
hypothesis proposes: 
 
H4: Jurors will evaluate auditors as more liable when they perceive the auditor to be less 




 Figure 2 provides the research model used in this study, based on the hypotheses (H1-H4) 
outlined in the sections above. The study utilized a 2x2 between subjects design, manipulating 
the level of audit committee independence (low/high) and audit committee expertise (low/high). 
Table 19 depicts this design in a table showing how audit committee independence and expertise 
were manipulated across four conditions. After reading a case containing the manipulated 




perceptions of each construct presented in the model shown in Figure 2 (audit committee 
independence, audit committee expertise, auditor independence, and auditor liability). This 
model is tested using Partial Least Squares (PLS), which allows the researcher to model paths 
with latent variables. A follow-up analysis is also conducted to examine the influence of the 
manipulated variables on the individual perceptions included in the proposed model.  
Experimental Task and Procedures 
 
The experiment was conducted in an online environment using Survey Monkey software 
(www.surveymonkey.com), allowing participants to complete the task on their own time and at a 
computer of their choice. Participants were randomly assigned into one of the four manipulated 
conditions in this study and were sent an email with an embedded link to access the 
corresponding online case materials and survey. Once accessed, the participants were prompted 
to read a summary of their rights and responsibilities as participants and provide their consent to 
participate by checking a box and continuing to the next screen to begin the study. The first 
phase of the study asks participants to review a case study from the perspective of a jury 
member. This case study was presented to them in written text format accompanied by an audio 
recording of the text. Participants were directed to listen to the audio recording and follow along 
by reading the text. This method has been utilized in previous studies to encourage attentiveness 
and improve reading comprehension when the information is complex and time consuming to 
read (Kadous 2000; 2001).   
The case study provided to participants described a scenario where auditors failed to 
disclose a client‘s internal control weaknesses that resulted in fraudulent actions, and were being 




discovered and raised concerns over the particular control deficiency that allowed fraud to occur, 
notifying both management and the audit committee. Management disagreed with the auditor‘s 
concerns, and expressed this opinion to the audit committee. The audit committee sided with 
management and deemed that the deficiency was not likely to be material, and did not 
recommend that the auditor perform additional procedures. In the end, the auditor decided not to 
expand their audit procedures or disclose anything about the control deficiency in their audit 
reports. Participants were provided with details related to the audit committee‘s level of expertise 
and independence as part of the case, which were manipulated between groups in a 2x2 factorial 
design resulting in four different scenario combinations, as detailed in Table 19.  
 The scenario for low expertise indicated that there were no expert members on the 
committee. The company properly disclosed that they were not able to find an individual 
meeting their specifications as an expert, but that they feel the collective knowledge of the audit 
committee covers the necessary knowledge needed to fulfill their roles. This would qualify as 
compliant with SOX, but would not create a strong indication of expertise on the committee that 
would be provided with at least one expert member. The high expertise scenario communicated 
that the audit committee contained an individual that is a CPA and former CFO of a mid-sized 
public company, and is considered an expert in both finance and accounting. This particular 
designation would meet and exceed the requirements that the committee contain an expert 
member. 
 The scenario for low audit committee member independence communicated that all 
members met the minimum requirements of SOX (i.e., were not compensated for other services 
other than the board, no material relationship with company, owning less than 10% of shares in 




of the board owned an average of 8% of the outstanding shares of the company. The high 
independence scenario stated that all members were 100% independent, owning no shares of 
stock in the company.  
Each scenario also contained a statement concerning ratings received by independent 
companies that track and evaluate the characteristics of audit committees. These ratings were 
either high (in the high expertise and high independence scenarios) or low (in the low expertise 
and low independence scenarios). These ratings were combined to create four separate groups, 
with each group receiving one combination of relevant facts related to the expertise and 
independence of the audit committee (high expertise/high independence, high expertise/low 
independence, low expertise/high independence, or low expertise/low independence).  This 
information is commonly available to the public on various independent reporting websites, and 
was useful in the case to explain to the participants how the company‘s audit committee 
characteristics compare to generally accepted quality measures. See Appendix D for a copy of 
the scenarios described above.   
After evaluating the circumstances of the case, the participants began the online survey 
questionnaire. First, they were asked to decide if the auditor is liable/not liable for negligence for 
their audit of the company. If the participant chose liable, they were asked to provide a number 
for suggested damages to be awarded to the plaintiff. After providing the initial assessment of 
liable/not liable and assessing damages, participants answered a series of questions designed to 
measure their overall perceptions of the four main constructs in the proposed model of the study: 
auditor liability, auditor independence, audit committee independence, and audit committee 
expertise. This series of questions provided multiple measures of the constructs included in the 




questions asked participants to provide their perceptions about the liability of the auditor. Then, 
participants were asked to rate their perceptions of the independence of the auditor. Finally, they 
were asked to rate their perceptions of audit committee member expertise and independence. 
After completing this series of questions, participants were asked to provide demographic 
information and answer questions about their personal experiences that are commonly asked 
during the jury selection process. See Appendix D for a copy of this questionnaire. 
Pre-Testing of Case and Questionnaire 
 
The case study and questionnaire described above were edited based on feedback from 
multiple rounds of pre-testing before the final data was collected. First, the four versions of the 
case and questionnaire were examined by four lawyers, two business law professors, and ten 
individuals with expertise in accounting and/or auditing. After this round, edits were made to 
improve external validity (i.e., corrected legal terminology). Then, 22 individuals completed the 
entire task in paper format and provided direct feedback to the researcher concerning the 
understandability and overall impressions of the task. The edits made following this round 
primarily enhanced the clarity and added more focus on the manipulated facts in the case. 
Finally, an anonymous online pre-test was conducted with a sample of 52 individuals (11 jury 
eligible members of the community and 41 students in an undergraduate auditing course). These 
online pre-testers provided feedback about the technology and understandability of the case.  
Based on the feedback from the final round of pre-testing, two significant improvements 
were made in the delivery format of the case.  First, some pre-testers indicated that the audio 
levels on their computer were not functioning correctly, so the final online instrument provided 




audio levels of the participants‘ computer. The pre-test version of the case also provided a 
slideshow video of the text with audio, and participants were asked to read and listen to the case. 
However, some pre-testers experienced technology difficulties and indicated that they were not 
able to view the slideshow of the text. To reduce the likelihood of this particular technology 
issue occurring in the final data collection, the final online instrument provided the case within a 
text box on the page that allowed the participant to scroll down the page and read the text of the 
case while they listened to the audio recording.  
The extensive pre-testing resulted in a low incidence of technological issues in the final 
data collection. 95.1% of the participants in the final sample responded that they had no issues 
with technology, with 97.1% indicating that they read the text, 89.2% indicating that they 
listened to the audio, and 86.4% of the participants indicating that they both read the text and 
listened to the audio. Individuals in the final sample also indicated that they enjoyed the task and 
found the task realistic and not overly difficult, reflected by their responses to questions that 
asked them to express their level of agreement (on a scale from one ‗strongly agree‘ to seven 
‗strongly disagree‘ with the statements ‗The task was difficult‘ (mean 4.322), ‗The task was 
enjoyable‘ (mean 2.831), and ‗The task was realistic‘ (mean 1.947).  
Participants and Final Data Collection 
 
 The participants for this study represented jury eligible individuals. Potential participants 
were recruited by offering extra credit to undergraduate students for identifying jury-eligible 
individuals. These undergraduate students were given extra credit for providing contact 
information for up to five individuals (non-students) who agreed to volunteer to participate in the 




who were over 18 years of age, were not accounting students, and were currently registered to 
vote in the U.S. Respondents to the survey were also asked to provide email contact information 
for other individuals interested in participating in the study. This data collection method allowed 
for a final sample of participants that was more likely to be representative of a potential jury 
pool, since members of the community that are jury eligible tend to make similar decisions to 
individuals who have actually served on a jury (Bornstein 1999).  
Emails were sent to 1,487 jury eligible individuals inviting them to participate in the 
study. This email contained a direct link to the study and provided general details about the task 
they would be completing. The individuals were provided a period of two weeks to complete the 
task, and a follow-up email was sent to these individuals in the last week to remind them of the 
approaching end of the study period. A total of 247 unique entries to the online study were 
recorded resulting in a 17.9% overall response rate. Of these responses, 64 were not included in 
the final sample for failing to complete the entire task, and 43 were excluded for failing to 
correctly answer at least one of the manipulation check questions concerning the experience and 
stock ownership of the audit committee members.  Finally, 24 individuals were excluded from 
the sample based on demographic characteristics or personal experiences that would be highly 
likely to disqualify them from serving on a jury in this type of trial (i.e., not a U.S. citizen, 
experience as an attorney, experience as an auditor, and experience as an audit committee 
member)
11
. Overall, 116 responses were included in the final sample (7.8% usable response 
rate). The low overall response rate in this study was most likely due to the demanding nature of 
the task, which took participants an average of 33 minutes to complete, and the fact that 
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participants did not receive compensation. To test for non-response bias, the mean responses 
from participants who completed the task in the second week of the study period (following the 
reminder email) were examined in comparison to others, with no differences found. Therefore, 
the low response rate is not likely to result in non-response bias. 
All participants in the final sample provided answers to the demographic and jury 
selection questions shown in Appendix D. Responses were analyzed to determine if the results of 
the study would be influenced by personal characteristics by entering each as covariates in the 
analyses conducted in the study. Based on the results of this analysis, no significant demographic 
factors or individual characteristics emerged as having an influence on the variables measured in 
this study.  
Table 20 provides details on the general demographics of the final sample. As shown in 
Panel A of Table 20, participants average age was 49 years old, and over 56% of the participants 
were female. Panel A of Table 20 also shows that 73.3% of the sample indicated that they have 
been called for jury duty (compared to national average of 65.0%). A total of 20.7% of the 
participants indicated that they have served on a jury (9.5% on a civil trial and 11.2% on a 
criminal trial), compared to national average of 37.4%. Panel B of Table 26 shows that 50.5% 
responded that they are registered Republicans, 33.0% are registered Democrats, 14.7% are 
registered Independent, and 1.8% are registered with other political parties. Panel C of Table 20 
provides details on the employment of the participants. The majority of the participants indicated 
that they were currently employed on a full-time basis (51.7%), with 11.2% responding that they 
worked part-time, 7.8% were currently self-employed, 14.7% retired, 12.9% described 
themselves as a full-time homemaker, and 1.7% were currently unemployed. As shown in Panel 




indicating an annual household income of over $100K.  The participants also provided 
information about their highest education level, shown in Table 20 Panel E, with 6.1% only 
graduating high school, 3.5% attended a trade or professional school, 27.8% completed some 
college, 39.1% graduated college, 12.2% completed some graduate school, and 11.3% of the 
sample completed a graduate degree in college. 85.0% of the participants were white, 7.1% were 
Hispanic, 5.3% were African-American, and 1.8% were Asian or Pacific Islander. Over 85% of 
the participants listed Florida as their state of residence and all participants indicated that they 
are registered to vote. 
Measurement, Scale Validation, and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The proposed model for this study is tested using multiple measures of the participants‘ 
perceptions of the four constructs shown in Figure 2. The audit committee characteristics of 
expertise and independence were manipulated in a 2x2 between subjects design as represented in 
Table 19, and participants were asked to respond to a series of questions intended to measure the 
perceptions of each of the constructs in the model—audit committee independence, audit 
committee expertise, auditor independence, and auditor liability. These measures are used to test 
the proposed model. A follow-up analysis is conducted to test the between-subjects manipulation 
of these audit committee independence and audit committee expertise on both auditor 
independence and liability.  
Because there were no pre-validated measures of every construct, questions were 
developed specifically for this study, and subjected to an extensive series of revisions before 
finalizing the questionnaire. Kadous (2000, 2001), Brandon and Mueller (2006, 2008), and 




Additional questions were also developed to provide multiple measures of each construct. After 
developing a preliminary draft of the questionnaire, the questions were reviewed by four 
lawyers, two business law professors, and ten individuals with expertise in accounting and/or 
auditing. Feedback was then used to improve external validity and reflect the correct legal 
terminology. The questionnaire was then tested with 22 individuals who provided detailed 
comments to the researcher concerning the understandability of the questions. Last, a pre-test of 
the questionnaire was conducted with 52 jury eligible individuals. The final draft of the 
questionnaire consisted of six questions to measure audit committee expertise, five questions to 
measure audit committee independence, five questions to measure auditor independence, and 
eight questions to measure auditor liability. Each of these questions is described in detail in the 
sections below.  
Audit Committee Expertise Measurement and Validation 
To measure perceptions of audit committee expertise, the participants were asked to 
express their agreement, on a scale from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree), with 
six statements concerning the audit committee members‘ qualifications and level of expertise 
during the audit in question. These measures were developed by the researcher based on the 
experience requirements of SOX, and were subjected to multiple rounds of pre-testing as 
described in the section above. Table 21 Panel A provides a summary of the mean responses to 
these questions for the low and high audit committee experience conditions. The mean responses 
to the statement that ‗The audit committee had the relevant expertise for their job‘ were 2.509 for 
the ‗Low AC Expertise‘ condition and 5.746 for the ‗High AC Expertise‘ condition. The mean 




Expertise‘ condition was 2.018 and the mean for the ‗High AC Expertise‘ condition was 5.763. 
For the statement that ‗the audit committee had expertise in accounting‘, the mean response for 
the ‗Low AC Expertise‘ condition was 1.965 and the mean for the ‗High AC Expertise‘ 
condition was 5.695. The participants‘ mean response to the statement that ‗the audit committee 
was able to comprehend the issues that arose during the audit‘ was 3.930 for the ‗Low AC 
Expertise‘ condition, and 6.051 for the ‗High AC Expertise‘ condition. The mean responses to 
the statement that ‗the audit committee's level of expertise allowed them to make informed 
decisions about issues that arose during the audit‘ were 2.965 for the ‗Low AC Expertise‘ 
condition and 5.847 for the ‗High AC Expertise‘ condition. Finally, the mean responses for the 
statement that ‗the audit committee's experience influenced the quality of the decisions made 
during the audit‘ were 4.807 for the ‗Low AC Expertise‘ condition and 5.847 for the ‗High AC 
Expertise‘ condition. An ANOVA of the mean responses to this series of questions indicates a 
significant difference between the responses from participants in the ‗Low AC Expertise‘ 
conditions and the ‗High AC Expertise‘ conditions for all questions (p=0.001). Overall, 
participants in the ‗Low AC Expertise‘ conditions rated audit committee expertise significantly 
lower than the participants in the ‗High AC Expertise‘ condition for each of these questions, 
indicating that the manipulation of audit committee expertise was successful in this study.  
A principal components factor analysis was performed to test whether the individual 
measures of audit committee expertise described in the paragraph above loaded effectively on 
one factor. Results of the factor analysis are presented in Panel B of Table 21. All items loaded 
effectively on one factor (individual loadings were above 0.820), and 86.9% of the variance in 




Audit Committee Independence Measurement and Validation 
Perceptions of audit committee independence were measured based on the participants‘ 
agreement (on a scale from one (strongly agree) to seven (strongly disagree)) with five 
statements concerning the audit committee members‘ level of independence during the audit in 
question. These questions were developed based on measures of independence perceptions 
utilized in past research on auditor liability (Jennings et al., 2006; Brandon and Mueller, 2008). 
Table 22 Panel A provides a list of these questions, along with the mean response from 
participants in the low and high audit committee independence conditions. The participants‘ 
mean response to the statement that ‗the audit committee members objective during the 2007 
audit of Clovitech, Inc.‘ was 2.431 for the ‗Low AC Independence‘ condition, and 4.524 for the 
‗High AC Independence‘ condition. The mean responses to the statement that ‗the audit 
committee's decisions were biased during the 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc.‘ were 2.155 for the 
‗Low AC Independence‘ condition and 4.121 for the ‗High AC Independence‘ condition. 
Participants also responded to the statement that ‗management exerted pressure on the audit 
committee NOT to recommend disclosing a deficiency in the internal controls established by top 
management‘, with a mean response for the ‗Low AC Independence‘ condition of 2.121 and 
2.672 for the ‗High AC Independence‘ condition. The mean responses to the statement that ‗the 
audit committee‘s decisions during the audit were influenced by the managers of Clovitech, Inc.‘ 
were 1.914 for the ‗Low AC Independence‘ condition and 3.448 for the ‗High AC Independence‘ 
condition. Finally, mean responses for the statement that ‗the audit committee members were 
protecting their own interests by not warning stockholders of the client's deficiencies in the 
internal controls established by top management‘ were 2.121 for the ‗Low AC Independence‘ 




responses to these questions indicates that participants‘ responses to each question in the ‗Low 
AC Independence‘ conditions were significantly different compared to participants‘ responses in 
the ‗High AC Independence‘ conditions (p<0.001). Overall, a comparison of the mean responses 
to each question shows that participants the ‗Low AC Independence‘ conditions consistently 
rated audit committee expertise significantly lower than the participants in the ‗High AC 
Independence‘ condition, indicating that the manipulation of audit committee independence was 
successful in this study. 
A principal components factor analysis was performed on these five items to determine 
whether all load effectively on one factor to represent audit committee independence.  The first 
factor analysis indicated that one item, responses to the statement that ‗management exerted 
pressure on the audit committee NOT to recommend disclosing a deficiency in the internal 
controls established by top management‘, exhibited low loading on the factor (0.350) and was 
eliminated from the scale. The final analysis indicated that all of the remaining four items loaded 
effectively on one factor with individual loadings above 0.825, explaining 75.1% of the variance 
in the data.  Results of this factor analysis are presented in Panel B of Table 22.  
Auditor Independence Measurement and Validation 
Perceptions of auditor independence were measured based on the participants‘ agreement 
(on a scale from one= strongly agree to seven= strongly disagree) with five statements that  
‗ABC CPA Firm was objective during the 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc‘, ‗ABC CPA Firm‘s 
decisions were biased during the 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc.‘,  ‗management exerted pressure 
on ABC CPA Firm NOT to disclose a deficiency in the internal controls established by top 




Clovitech, Inc.‘ and ‗ABC CPA Firm was protecting their own interests by not warning 
stockholders of the client's deficiencies in the internal controls established by top management‘. 
These questions were developed based on measures utilized in past research on perceptions of 
auditor independence and auditor liability (Jennings et al., 2006; Brandon and Mueller, 2008), 
with additional questions developed by the researcher. A summary of the mean responses to 
these questions by experimental condition can be found in Table 23, Panel A. An ANOVA of the 
mean responses to each question indicates significant differences between groups for each of the 
individual measures of auditor independence (p<0.05) except for the question stating 
‗management exerted pressure on ABC CPA Firm NOT to disclose a deficiency in the internal 
controls established by top management.‘   
A principal components factor analysis was performed on responses to the questions 
described above, with results reported in Panel B of Table 23. The first factor analysis indicated 
that one item, responses to the statement that ‗management exerted pressure on ABC CPA Firm 
NOT to disclose a deficiency in the internal controls established by top management‘ did not 
load effectively on the factor (individual loading was 0.550), so this item was dropped from the 
final analysis. The final analysis indicated that the four of the remaining items loaded effectively 
on one factor (all individual loadings were above 0.733). This factor explained 67.6% of the 
variance in the data.  This factor analysis was used to construct a single measure of auditor 
independence, which is further examined in the additional analysis section of the study.   
Auditor Liability Measurement and Validation 
As a measure of auditor liability perceptions, participants were asked to respond to a 




The responses to these five questions represent measures of the auditor liability construct tested 
in the main model of this study. These questions were developed based on past research on 
jurors‘ assessments of auditor liability (Kadous 2000, 2001;  Brandon and Mueller 2006, 2008), 
with additional questions added by the researcher to provide multiple measures of auditor 
liability. A summary of the mean responses to these questions by experimental condition can be 
found in Panel A of Table 24. Participants were asked to express their level of agreement (from 
one (strongly agree) to seven (strongly disagree) with the statements that the auditor ‗… is liable 
for negligent misrepresentation‘, ‗… performed their services in compliance within the standards 
that dictate how audits should be performed‘, ‗… made the appropriate disclosures in compliance 
within the standards that dictate what auditors should disclose‘, ‗… could have prevented the 
stockholder losses‘ and ‗… is responsible for stockholder losses.‘ Results of an ANOVA indicate 
significant differences between the means of all groups for the questions asking whether the 
auditor is liable for negligent misrepresentation, whether the auditor made appropriate 
disclosures, and whether the auditor could have prevented shareholder losses (p<0.05). Further 
analysis of the mean responses per condition indicates that the auditor in the Low 
Independence/High Expertise condition is rated the least favorable compared to the other 
conditions. 
 Panel B of Table 24 reports the results of a principal components factor analysis with 
responses to the questions described above.  Results of the factor analysis indicate that all items 
load effectively on one factor, with individual loadings all above 0.773. This factor explained 
67.9% of the variance in the data.   
Participants were also asked to decide whether the auditor is ‗Liable‘ or ‗Not Liable‘ for 




liability (Kadous 2001; Brandon and Mueller 2006, 2008), Since this measure is dichotomous, 
the responses to this question are tested in the additional analysis section of the study, and the 
measure is not included in the main model. Panel C of Table 24 provides a summary of the 
responses to this question by experimental condition. Overall, 50.9% of the participants 
responded ‗Liable‘. Further examination of the differences between groups indicates that the 
mean response from participants in both conditions reflecting a low independence level for the 
audit committee was ‗Liable‘, compared to the participants in the high independence conditions 
reporting ‗Not Liable‘ on average (p=0.041). However, no significant differences between the 
mean responses exist between the conditions based on audit committee expertise (p=0.997).   
 Participants were also asked to assess separately compensatory and punitive damages. 
These questions were developed based on past research on auditor liability (Brandon and 
Mueller 2006, 2008). Compensatory and punitive damages were measured by first providing a 
brief description of the definition of each type of damages, and then asking the individual to 
enter a number between $0 and $100,000,000 for compensatory damages and between $0 and 
$200,000,000 for punitive damages. The responses to these two questions are tested in the 
additional analysis section of the study, and are not included in the main model. Panel B of Table 
24 provides a summary of the responses to this question by experimental condition (in millions). 
For this analysis of the mean responses, participants who responded that the auditor was ‗Not 
Liable‘ were entered as $0 for compensatory and punitive damages, since a no liable judgment 
would indicate zero damages assessed against the auditor. Examination of the differences 
between groups indicates that the mean response from participants for punitive damages is 
significantly different between the high expertise/low independence group and all other groups 




compared to all other groups. The low expertise/low independence group reported the second 
highest compensatory damages ($3.435 million), followed by the low expertise/high 
independence group ($2.643), and the high expertise/high independence group ($2.420 million). 
Examination of the differences between groups also indicates that the mean response from 
participants for punitive damages is significantly different between all conditions (p<0.02). On 
average, the high expertise/high independence group reported the lowest punitive damage awards 
($1.503 million), and the high expertise/low independence group reported the highest punitive 
damages ($5.610 million). The low expertise/low independence group reported the second 
highest punitive damages ($2.628 million), followed by the low expertise/high independence 




PLS Model Results 
The proposed model was tested using PLS latent variable modeling with a bootstrap re-
sampling of 1000 (Ringle et al., 2005; Chin 2010). Table 25, Panel A provides a summary of the 
factor loadings for each item. One item for each of the Audit Committee Independence and 
Auditor Independence factors exhibited a loading of less than 0.70, both of which related to 
whether the audit committee/auditor was pressured by management
12
. These two items were also 
noted as having low loadings in the factor analysis presented above. Based on the low loadings, 
these two items were dropped from the PLS analysis. All other factor loadings in the final model 
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were above 0.700, within the range of 0.736-0.968, which provides support for convergent 
validity (Chin, 2010). Discriminant validity, which establishes that each variable in the model is 
different, is also evidenced by the fact that the average variance extracted for each latent variable 
is greater than the squared inter-construct correlations. Further, the inter-construct correlations 
are all below 0.850, as shown in Table 25, Panels B and C. Panel D of Table 25 shows the item 
loadings and cross-loadings for all latent variable measures, and indicates that no items load 
higher on other constructs compared to the intended construct. Overall, the convergent and 
discriminant validity of the constructs is supported by these results (Chin, 2010). 
The overall model results are shown in Figure 3, along with the standardized coefficients, 
t-values, and r-squared values for each construct. The r-squared values indicate that the model 
has strong explanatory power, as 40.7% of the variance in auditor independence perceptions is 
explained by perceptions of audit committee expertise and independence, and 54.7% of the 
variance in auditor liability is explained by perceptions of auditor independence. H1, which 
predicted a positive relationship between perceptions of audit committee expertise and auditor 
independence was not supported (beta=-0.075, t-value=0.477, p=0.513). However, H2, which 
predicted a positive relationship between perceptions of audit committee independence and 
auditor independence was supported (beta=0.507, t-value=2.709, p<0.001). H3, which predicted 
that jurors would perceive the auditor as more independent when they perceive the audit 
committee to be more independent and expert, was not supported (beta=0.144, t-value=0.600, 
p=0.549). Finally, H4, which predicted that lower (higher) perceptions of auditor independence 





Additional Model Tests and Results 
 Since the results of this study do not appear to support H1 or H3, indicating that audit 
committee expertise and the interaction between audit committee expertise and audit committee 
independence do not significantly influence perceptions of auditor independence, a follow-up 
analysis was performed to examine whether these variables directly influence auditor liability. 
This second model included all paths in the first model, with direct paths to Auditor Liability 
added from Audit Committee Independence, Audit Committee Expertise, and Audit Committee 
Expertise x Audit Committee Independence. Figure 4 reports the overall results of the PLS 
analysis of this model.  All significant paths in the first model remained significant in this model, 
and all r-squared values were comparable to the first model, maintaining support for H2 and H4. 
The additional path tested between the interaction of Audit Committee Expertise and Audit 
Committee Independence is also significant and negative, supporting a direct relationship 
between audit committee characteristics and auditor liability exposure.  This result supports the 
descriptive findings shown in Panel A of Table 24, which shows that the mean responses for 
participants‘ ratings of auditor liability are lower for the High Expertise/High Independence 
condition for three of the questions. Overall, the results of this model suggest that auditor 
liability may be directly influenced by the interaction of audit committee independence and 
expertise, and indirectly influenced by audit committee independence (through auditor 
independence). Further discussion of the implications of these results continues in the conclusion 
section.  
Additional Analyses: H1-H4 and Follow-Up Analyses 
 The following sections provide additional analyses of H1-H4. First, H1-H3 are tested to 




independence and audit committee expertise) influenced perceptions of auditor liability. Then, 
H4 is tested with auditor liability measured as participants‘ liable/not liable judgments and 
assessments of compensatory and punitive damages, which were not designed to be tested in the 
overall model. Overall, the analyses below provide support for the results presented in the PLS 
models, with some additional insights.  
H1-H3: Audit Committee Expertise, Audit Committee Independence, and Auditor Independence 
H1 predicted that auditors will be perceived as more independent when the audit 
committee members have higher levels of expertise. H2 predicted that when audit committee 
members are more independent, auditors will be perceived as more independent. H3 predicted 
that audit committees with high levels of both expertise and independence will result higher 
auditor independence perceptions compared to all other conditions. In the first additional test of 
these hypotheses, an analysis of the variance (ANOVA) is conducted with the independent 
variables Audit Committee Expertise (H1), Audit Committee Independence (H2), and Audit 
Committee Independence x Audit Committee Expertise (H3). Results of this analysis are 
reported in Table 26 Panel A. Audit Committee Expertise and Audit Committee Independence 
for this first analysis are each represented by the manipulation of these variables. The dependent 
variable in this analysis was Auditor Independence represented by the factor score of 
participants‘ responses to the series of questions on auditor independence that were included in 
the tests of the overall model. Results are significant overall, F(3,116) = 6.275, p=0.001, and 
indicate that Audit Committee Independence significantly influenced perceptions of auditor 
independence (p=0.001). However, Audit Committee Expertise and the interaction between 




(p=0.443 and 0.267 accordingly). Examination of the mean factor scores for auditor 
independence in Table 26 Panel B indicates that the participants in the high audit committee 
independence experimental conditions perceived auditors to be more independent compared to 
participants in the low audit committee independence conditions, which supports H2. Results of 
this test do not support H1 (influence of audit committee expertise on auditor independence) and 
H3 (influence of audit committee expertise x audit committee independence on auditor 
independence).  
Overall, the results of these additional tests provide support for H2 by suggesting that 
jurors perceive auditors as more independent when audit committee independence is high.  
However, the results do not support H1 or H3, suggesting that perceptions of auditor 
independence may not be influenced by audit committee expertise or the interaction between 
audit committee expertise and independence. These results are consistent with the findings in the 
tests of the proposed model for this study. 
H4: Perceptions of Auditor Independence and Auditor Liability 
 Hypothesis 4 predicted an inverse relationship between perceptions of auditor 
independence and auditor liability, such that higher perceptions of auditor independence would 
be associated with lower auditor liability. This hypothesis is further tested in three separate 
analyses, based on three different measures of the dependent variable Auditor Liability.  The first 
analysis examines the ‗liable‘ vs. ‗not liable‘ decision reached by the participant in a logistic 
regression model. Then, participants‘ assessments of compensatory and punitive damages are 
tested in two regression models. The independent variable in all analyses is represented by the 




A logistic regression analysis was performed first to examine the influence of perceptions 
of auditor independence, represented by factor scores, on auditor liability measured as a 
dichotomous variable representing participants‘ liable/not liable judgments. Results reported for 
logistic regression include an odds ratio and a percentage estimate of how often the model 
successfully predicts the dependent variable. The proposed model is accepted when it is 
significant and provides an improvement over the intercept-only model, specifically when the 
Nagelkerke r-squared and percentage predictions are higher in the proposed model. As shown in 
Panel A of Table 27, a test of the proposed model in comparison to the intercept-only model 
(excluding the independent variable) was statistically significant, χ2(1, N = 116) = 43.141,  
p=0.001, Nagelkerke R
2
 = 0.446. Overall, this model predicted the outcome of ‗Not Liable‘ 
76.4% of the time and the outcome of ‗Liable‘ 75.5% of the time, with an overall successful 
prediction rate of 76.4%. The independent variable Auditor Independence was significant in the 
model (p=0.001), indicating that individuals with higher perceptions of auditor independence 
were less likely to find the auditor liable. This result supports H4, which proposed that jurors will 
evaluate auditors more favorably when they perceive the auditor to be independent.   
The next analysis to test H4 was performed by examining the measures for compensatory 
and punitive damages in separate regression models.  This analysis was performed only on the 
individuals who reported that the auditor is ‗Liable‘, which would be the most realistic 
representation of a jury decision since only those cases finding the auditor liable would decide on 
damages. This sub-sample consists of 59 participants (50.9% of the total sample). The dependent 
variable in each model is measured by the dollar amount of damages (in millions), and the 
independent variable is represented by the factor score for auditor independence perceptions.  As 




perceptions of auditor independence are inversely related to the dollar amount of damages 
against the auditor for both compensatory and punitive damages. These results provide additional 
support for H4, indicating that higher perceptions of auditor independence are associated with 
lower damage awards (more favorable for the auditor).  
In conclusion, additional analyses indicate that H4 is supported for all measures of 
auditor liability, including the participants‘ liable/not liable decision, the award of punitive and 
compensatory damages, and perceptions of auditor liability. Overall, these results indicate that 
auditor independence can favorably influence the outcome of a trial by decreasing the likelihood 
of a liable verdict, lowering the exposure to monetary losses, and favorably influencing the 
overall perceptions of the auditor‘s liability for losses.   
Summary of Additional Analyses 
To summarize the results from the additional analysis, all tests provide support for the 
findings in the PLS analysis. H1, which predicted that audit committee expertise directly 
influences perceptions of auditor independence, was not supported in any of the analyses in this 
study. All tests in the study support H2, including the PLS model, tests of the auditor‘s liable/not 
liable judgments, and tests of participants‘ assessment of punitive and compensatory damages. 
Therefore, H2, which predicted that audit committee independence directly influences 
perceptions of auditor independence, is strongly supported in this study. The interaction effect 
between audit committee independence and audit committee expertise on auditor liability (H3) 
was not supported in any of the tests. H4 was consistently supported for all tests, indicating that 
perceptions of auditor independence significantly influences auditor liability measured by 




damages, and responses to a series of questions measuring their perceptions of auditor liability.  
The overall implications of these findings are discussed in the conclusions section below.  
Conclusion  
Overall, the test of the proposed model and follow-up analyses of the individual 
hypotheses proposed in this study provide support for significant links between audit committee 
independence and auditor independence (H2), and between auditor independence and auditor 
liability (H4). These results suggest that perceptions of audit committee independence can have a 
significant influence on perceptions of auditor independence, such that when the audit committee 
is deemed more/less independent the auditor is similarly perceived. More importantly, 
perceptions of auditor independence significantly influence jurors‘ auditor liability judgments. 
When auditors were perceived as less independent, they were more likely to be assessed 
negatively by jurors evaluating whether the auditor should be held liable, assessing 
compensatory and punitive damages, and evaluating the degree of responsibility of the auditor 
for shareholder losses.  
Although results do not suggest that perceptions of audit committee expertise influence 
perceptions of auditor independence (H1), an alternative model indicates that the interaction 
between audit committee expertise and audit committee independence have a significant direct 
influence on auditor liability exposure. Overall, auditors are evaluated most favorably when audit 
committees contain members with higher levels of both expertise and independence. However, 
further examination of the descriptive statistics for the mean responses to participants‘ evaluation 
of auditor liability reveals that auditors are evaluated the least favorable overall when audit 




compared to committees with low levels of both expertise and independence. This finding 
indicates that audit committee expertise can directly influence auditor liability exposure, but that 
this influence is only favorable for the auditor when the audit committee members are also 
independent.  The implications of this particular finding are important, as the addition of an 
expert member on a client‘s audit committee may not be positive for auditors if this member also 
has a financial stake in the company. Auditors may experience the most favorable liability 
exposure conditions if the expert audit committee members are restricted from direct stock 
ownership in the company. Future research in this area could examine audit committee liability 
exposure given these factors to determine whether there is an additional incentive to creating 
audit committees with high levels of independence and expertise.  
Results of this study are limited by many factors that are common to survey research. 
First, the participants reviewed a case that was not real or in a realistic setting (i.e., a courtroom), 
which decreases the external validity of the task. In addition, participants completed the task in 
an online setting, which did not allow the researcher to observe the participant completing the 
task. Therefore, measurements of time spent on the task may not be accurate, as the participants 
may have been interrupted or completing other tasks while the case was open. The results of this 
study are also limited by the potential for measurement error, which increases the risk that the 
results are not fully reflective of the participants‘ perceptions about auditor liability.  This 
potential for measurement error was addressed in this study by asking multiple questions to 
measure each construct, but some error is likely to remain in the measurements included in this 
study. The survey was also limited in length due to the demanding nature of the task and the fact 
that responses were voluntary; and, although the researcher collected demographic and 




influence the results of the study. Finally, although the participants were representative of jury 
eligible individuals, they were not participants in an actual court case, and did not undergo the 
jury selection process that would normally occur before a trial. Future research in this area could 
accommodate for these weaknesses by collecting data in person, simulating a trial live using 
actors, and asking lawyers with expertise in this area to participate in a simulated jury selection 
process, all of which would increase external validity of the results.  
This study provides insight into how specific characteristics of audit committee members, 
independence and expertise, influence jurors‘ perceptions of auditor independence and 
judgments of liability following an audit failure. Corporate governance has been shown to impact 
judges‘ perceptions of auditors, but past research only examined the overall quality of corporate 
governance and did not examine the influence of audit committee expertise and independence on 
perceptions of auditors (Jennings et al., 2006). These individual audit committee characteristics 
are important to understand in the current environment, as audit committees remain somewhat 
varied in the level of expertise and independence of their members. Since auditor liability 
exposure can be influenced by the perceptions of the conditions under which they conducted the 
audit, these characteristics can prove to be important for understanding auditor liability exposure 
in a Post-SOX audit environment.  Auditors will be able to use the results from this study to 
make informed decisions about which clients expose them to the least amount of liability in the 
event of an audit failure, which could prove useful for audit firms who are currently facing an 
increased threat of litigation. Overall, this study suggests that ownership of stock in the company 
by audit committee members can increase auditor liability exposure, particularly when the audit 




close attention to the expertise and stock ownership of audit committee members when 
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The three studies presented in this dissertation examined how different factors related to 
provisions of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) impact the litigation and legal liability 
exposure of auditors. Study one examined whether SOX Section 404 disclosures on internal 
controls influence the likelihood that the auditor will be sued for negligence. Study two extended 
the first study by assuming a company‘s auditor has been sued for negligence following the 
company‘s bankruptcy, and examined jurors‘ perceptions of the auditor‘s liability in a trial 
setting. Study three further investigated juror‘s perceptions of auditors in a trial setting, 
specifically examining how the characteristics of the client‘s audit committee influence jurors‘ 
perceptions of auditor independence and liability. Results from each of these studies provide 
unique contributions to theory and practice, discussed in more detail in the paragraphs below.    
Results from study one provide important insights into how the auditor‘s Section 404 
reporting decisions influence the likelihood of being sued when a client declares bankruptcy. 
Results indicate that auditors may be able to decrease their litigation exposure by reporting an 
adverse opinion on internal controls when they discover internal control issues within a 
company. These results suggest that an adverse Section 404 report may be able to provide signals 
of the potential risks of material misstatements in the financial statements, even when the auditor 
still reports an unqualified opinion on the financial statements. However, results did not support 
the use of voluntary disclosures of a significant deficiency in internal controls within an 
unqualified Section 404 report as a significant influencing factor on litigation exposure. 
Therefore, the stronger signal of an adverse opinion on internal controls may provide a signal of 




However, although auditors reporting an adverse opinion on internal controls are exposed to 
lower likelihood of litigation when compared to auditors reporting an unqualified opinion on 
internal controls, auditors were still exposed to a high likelihood of being sued overall. This 
result suggests that the auditor‘s Section 404 report may not be able to reduce the likelihood that 
the auditor will be sued when a client declares bankruptcy. 
 Study one results also provide interesting insights about audit committee and 
management litigation exposure under different Section 404 reporting conditions. Management 
appears to be exposed to the most liability in all circumstances, which indicates that management 
is perceived as having the primary responsibility for accurate financial reporting. However, the 
audit committee‘s litigation exposure differs by the content of the auditor‘s Section 404 report, 
such that the committee is exposed to the greatest likelihood of litigation when the auditor 
reports an unqualified opinion on internal controls with a voluntary disclosure of a significant 
deficiency. This result could suggest that litigators believe that the auditor should have reported 
an adverse Section 404 opinion after uncovering the issues in internal controls within the 
company, and that these litigators are placing blame on the audit committee for this lack of 
oversight.  
Results of study two suggest that auditors are most favorably evaluated by jurors in a trial 
setting when the circumstances of the case suggest that the auditor mistakenly evaluated a more 
auditable internal control, and provided a voluntary disclosure of the risks related to this control. 
Finding that the auditability of the internal control in question significantly influences the 
liability exposure of auditors is important, since auditors are often faced with significant 
variances in the amount of evidence they can collect to evaluate certain internal controls. The 




provide disclosures of their findings, they will be evaluated the most favorably in a trial setting. 
In contrast, when auditors are not able to show significant evidence supporting a highly 
subjective judgment, such as when they evaluate management‘s integrity, jurors evaluate them 
less favorably in a trial setting. Therefore, the study provides practical insights for the current 
debate regarding the liability exposure for auditors following SOX by suggesting that auditors 
can potentially lessen their liability exposure by increasing the transparency of their Section 404 
reports. Since voluntarily disclosing significant deficiencies in less auditable internal controls 
does not appear to decrease their liability exposure to the same extent as disclosing more 
auditable deficiencies, auditors may wish to evaluate the less auditable deficiencies more closely 
or report an adverse opinion on internal controls whenever such deficiencies are found.  
 Study three provides support for the auditor‘s consideration of the characteristics of a 
client‘s audit committee when assessing the engagement risk of an audit. Results of this study 
suggest that audit committee independence and expertise significantly influence the liability 
exposure of auditors in a trial setting. Specifically, audit committee independence influences 
jurors‘ perceptions of auditor independence, which in turn influences how auditors are evaluated 
in the trial.  This finding suggests that auditors should evaluate the level of independence of audit 
committee members for each client, since this factor may significantly influence how they are 
perceived in the event of litigation. In addition, the results show that audit committee expertise 
and independence may interact to directly influence auditor liability exposure, such that audit 
committees with high levels of independence and expertise result in the most favorable liability 
conditions for the auditor. Interestingly, when audit committees contain members with high 
levels of expertise and low levels of independence, the auditor is evaluated the least favorable 




independence levels of audit committees, since the wrong combination of these two 
characteristics may produce unfavorable conditions in the event of a trial implicating the auditor. 
In summary, the results of all three studies indicate that auditors may be able to reduce 
their litigation and liability risks by providing adequate signals to stakeholders of risks, paying 
close attention to the amount of evidence they rely upon when making decisions, and carefully 
considering the characteristics of their client‘s audit committee. These important factors may be 
considered at different phases in the liability/litigation assessment process. First, auditors 
perform an evaluation of liability risks associated with their new and ongoing clients at the 
planning phase of every audit. Auditors may utilize the results of this study in developing proper 
assessments of risks based on the characteristics of the audit committee. They may also decide to 
carefully plan procedures for their audit of internal controls based on the potential legal liability 
risks associated with the different types of internal controls to be evaluated. Then, at the end of 
the audit, the auditor may be able to utilize the results of this study when determining the content 
of their Section 404 report on internal controls. Finally, should the auditor be involved with a 
client that declares bankruptcy or experiences a significant downturn in the market, results of this 
study could provide insights to assist with the assessment of the likelihood that they will be 
found liable in a trial setting, which could be considered important when deciding on settlement 
values or trial strategies. These implications are broad and could be highly useful to auditors in 
practice.  
Overall, auditors‘ continued exposure to legal liability provides an opportunity for 
researchers to provide valuable contributions to practice. Future research could expand on the 
findings of these three studies by examining how judges perceived auditors in similar contexts, 




a bench trial. Future research could also be conducted by staging a live simulated trial, which 
would provide a more realistic setting and increase external validity. Results could also be 
expanded by allowing jurors to deliberate in groups to determine the verdict. Extending this line 
of research could assist auditors in improving their ability to assess audit risk at the planning 











Created based on the PCAOB standards and implementation guidance in AS-5 (PCAOB, 2007) 
 





Figure 2: Proposed Research Model of Jurors’ Perceptions of Audit Committee Expertise, 







*Path is significant at p<0.001 
 





*Path is significant at p<0.05 
 




Table 1: Overview of Research Methodology Examining the Effect of the Auditor’s Report 
on Internal Controls on Potential Litigators’ Evaluation of Auditor Liability  
 
The Auditor’s Report on Internal Controls (3 x 1 Design)* 
Unqualified Opinion 
on Internal Controls 




Unqualified Opinion on 
Internal Controls with 




Adverse Opinion on 
Internal Controls with 





H1: Auditors reporting an unqualified opinion on internal controls containing voluntary disclosures of control 
deficiencies will be evaluated more favorably than auditors reporting an unqualified opinion on internal controls 
with no additional disclosures. [(Cell 1 compared to Cell 2] 
H2: Auditors reporting an adverse opinion on internal controls will be evaluated more favorably by potential 
litigators than auditors reporting an unqualified opinion on internal controls containing voluntary disclosures of 
control deficiencies or an unqualified opinion on internal controls with no additional disclosures [(Cells 1 and 2 
compared to Cell 3)]   




Table 2: Demographic Information 
 
 





1 33 55 0.0% 12.1% 69.7% 18.2% 90.6% 9.4% 100.0% 15.2%
2 30 54 0.0% 20.7% 69.0% 10.3% 93.1% 6.9% 100.0% 27.6%
3 37 52 0.0% 24.3% 62.2% 13.5% 91.7% 8.3% 100.0% 24.3%




*404 Reporting Condition groups are as follows: 1=Unqualified opinion with no disclosure, 2=Unqualified opinion 




Table 3: Participant Experience and Specialization Characteristics 
 
Panel 1: Specialization 











1 47.1% 3.3% 63.8% 6.1% 78.8% 30.3% 15.2% 84.8% 15.2% 9.1%
2 53.8% 7.3% 56.7% 0.0% 69.0% 34.5% 27.6% 82.8% 27.6% 20.7%
3 51.0% 0.9% 63.1% 8.1% 78.4% 32.4% 16.2% 78.4% 16.2% 13.5%
Overall 50.6% 3.7% 61.6% 5.1% 75.8% 32.3% 19.2% 81.8% 19.2% 14.1%
*Note: All participants in the study selected at least one study-related specialty
Percentage of Individuals with Study-Related Specialty *
Percentage Time Spent on 
Legal Matters (Means)
 
Panel 2: Experience 
Group* Any Experience Defense Team Plaintiff Team Other CPA Auditor Manager Audit Committee
1 5.909             4.688            54.5% 24.2% 33.3% 3.0% 3.0% 0.0% 3.0% 12.1%
2 5.862             4.862            51.7% 27.6% 27.6% 13.8% 3.4% 3.4% 10.3% 3.4%
3 5.595             4.919            54.1% 18.9% 24.3% 13.5% 0.0% 0.0% 16.2% 2.7%
Overall 5.778             4.827            53.5% 23.2% 28.3% 10.1% 2.0% 1.0% 10.1% 6.1%
*404 Reporting Condition groups are as follows: 1=Unqualified opinion with no disclosure, 2=Unqualified opinion with disclosure, 3=Adverse opinion
**Measured on a scale from 1-7, with 7 indicating the highest level of knowledge and experience
Percent of Individuals with Experience on Auditor Liability Case












Table 4: Measurement of Auditor Litigation Exposure Dependent Variable 
 
       
Question Text Mean SD < 50 50-69 70-89 90 - 99 100
1 84.848 26.025 12.1% 6.1% 9.1% 18.2% 54.5%
2 88.167 14.884 0.0% 6.7% 23.3% 26.7% 43.3%
3 74.054 29.810 16.2% 13.5% 21.6% 16.2% 32.4%





















1 5.636 1.475 0.0% 6.1% 6.1% 9.1% 6.1% 42.4% 30.3%
2 5.333 1.626 0.0% 10.0% 10.0% 0.0% 23.3% 30.0% 26.7%
3 4.703 1.596 2.7% 5.4% 21.6% 8.1% 24.3% 27.0% 10.8%





















1 6.091 1.331 0.0% 3.0% 0.0% 15.2% 6.1% 18.2% 57.6%
2 6.100 1.447 0.0% 3.3% 10.0% 0.0% 3.3% 26.7% 56.7%
3 5.000 1.929 5.4% 13.5% 2.7% 8.1% 24.3% 16.2% 29.7%
Overall 5.690 1.680 2.0% 7.0% 4.0% 8.0% 12.0% 20.0% 47.0%
*404 Reporting Condition groups are as follows: 1=Unqualified opinion with no disclosure, 2=Unqualified opinion with disclosure, 3=Adverse opinion
I would advise stockholders to file a 
lawsuit against the auditors.
Percentage of Individuals Per Condition Responding Within 
Specified Range404 Report 
Condition*
What is the likelihood (from 0 to 100%) 
that a lawsuit will be filed against the 
auditor?
Percentage of Individuals Per Condition Responding to Corresponding Answers Below
Percentage of Individuals Per Condition Responding to Corresponding Answers Below
Please indicate your opinions about the 








Table 5: Analysis of Auditor Litigation Exposure Dependent Variable 
 








404 Report 0.941 1.244 0.151 0.059
Dependent Variable = Three Measures of Auditor Litigation Exposure (likelihood of 
being sued, strength of case against auditor, auditor lawsuit recommended)  
 
Panel 1B: Separate ANOVAs of Auditor Litigation Exposure Measures for H1 








Likelihood of Lawsuit against Auditor 84.8 88.2 0.376 0.271
Strength of Case against Auditor 5.636 5.333 0.602 0.221
















404 Report 0.868 2.319 0.035 0.068
Dependent Variable = Three Measures of Auditor Litigation Exposure (likelihood of 
being sued, strength of case against auditor, auditor lawsuit recommended)  
 










Likelihood of Lawsuit against Auditor 84.8 * 88.2 * 74.1 * 3.021 0.053
Strength of Case against Auditor 5.636 ** 5.333 ** 4.702 ** 3.253 0.043
Auditor Lawsuit Recommended 6.090 *** 6.100 *** 5.000 *** 5.394 0.006
* Group 3 differs from Group 1 (p =0.073) and Group 2 (p =0.023)
** Group 3 differs from Group 1 (p =0.015) and Group 2 (p =0.100)
*** Group 3 differs from Group 1 (p =0.006) and Group 2 (p =0.007)








Table 6: Measurement of Top Management Litigation Exposure 
 
Question Text Mean SD < 50 50-69 70-89 90 - 99 100
1 83.1 23.518 6.1% 9.1% 27.3% 15.2% 42.4%
2 92.3 13.547 0.0% 6.7% 10.0% 26.7% 56.7%
3 84.1 24.881 8.1% 5.4% 18.9% 24.3% 43.2%





















1 5.667 1.429 0.0% 3.0% 3.0% 21.2% 9.1% 24.2% 39.4%
2 6.267 0.868 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.7% 6.7% 40.0% 46.7%
3 5.892 1.410 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 0.0% 18.9% 32.4% 40.5%





















1 6.152 1.121 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 15.2% 9.1% 21.2% 54.5%
2 6.400 0.932 0.0% 0.0% 3.3% 0.0% 10.0% 26.7% 60.0%
3 5.973 1.590 5.4% 0.0% 2.7% 5.4% 10.8% 21.6% 54.1%
Overall 6.160 1.269 2.0% 0.0% 2.0% 7.0% 10.0% 23.0% 56.0%
*404 Reporting Condition groups are as follows: 1=Unqualified opinion with no disclosure, 2=Unqualified opinion with disclosure, 3=Adverse opinion
I would advise stockholders to file a 
lawsuit against the top 
managers/executives.
Percentage of Individuals Per Condition Responding Within 
Specified Range
Percentage of Individuals Per Condition Responding to Corresponding Answers Below
Percentage of Individuals Per Condition Responding to Corresponding Answers Below
404 Report 
Condition*
What is the likelihood (from 0 to 100%) 
that a lawsuit will be filed against the 
managers/executives?
Please indicate your opinions about the 





Table 7: Measurement of Audit Committee Litigation Exposure 
 
Question Text Mean SD < 50 50-69 70-89 90 - 99 100
1 70.0 30.927 21.2% 21.2% 12.1% 15.2% 30.3%
2 87.2 15.794 0.0% 13.3% 16.7% 30.0% 40.0%
3 81.3 23.538 5.4% 16.2% 21.6% 21.6% 35.1%





















1 5.344 1.619 3.0% 6.1% 3.0% 30.3% 15.2% 24.2% 18.2%
2 6.200 1.186 0.0% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 26.7% 40.0% 23.3%
3 5.351 1.798 2.7% 2.7% 13.5% 8.1% 18.9% 37.8% 16.2%





















1 4.969 1.596 0.0% 6.3% 6.3% 21.9% 15.6% 12.5% 37.5%
2 5.667 1.184 0.0% 3.3% 3.3% 0.0% 6.7% 36.7% 50.0%
3 5.162 1.537 8.1% 2.7% 2.7% 8.1% 21.6% 24.3% 32.4%
Overall 5.253 1.473 3.0% 4.0% 4.0% 10.1% 15.2% 24.2% 39.4%
*404 Reporting Condition groups are as follows: 1=Unqualified opinion with no disclosure, 2=Unqualified opinion with disclosure, 3=Adverse opinion
Percentage of Individuals Per Condition Responding Within 
Specified Range
Percentage of Individuals Per Condition Responding to Corresponding Answers Below
Percentage of Individuals Per Condition Responding to Corresponding Answers Below
Please indicate your opinions about the 
strength of a potential case against the 
audit committee.
I would advise stockholders to file a 
lawsuit against the audit committee.
404 Report 
Condition*
What is the likelihood (from 0 to 100%) 






Table 8: Analysis of Top Management Litigation Exposure 
 








404 Report 0.917 1.395 0.218 0.042
Dependent Variable = Management Litigation Exposure (all measures)  
 







Likelihood of Lawsuit against Top Management 83.090 92.300 84.108 1.710 0.186
Strength of Case against Top Management 5.666 6.266 5.892 1.754 0.178








Table 9: Analysis of Audit Committee Litigation Exposure 
 








404 Report 0.879 2.093 0.056 0.063
Dependent Variable = Audit Committee Litigation Exposure (all measures)  
 
 






Likelihood of Lawsuit against Audit Committee 70.000 * 87.166 * 81.324 * 4.032 0.021
Strength of Case against Audit Committee 4.968 5.666 5.162 1.882 0.158
Audit Committee Lawsuit Recommended 5.343 ** 6.200 ** 5.351 ** 3.057 0.052
* Group 1 differs from Group 2 (p =0.007) and Group 3 (p =0.057)









Table 10: Evaluation of Internal Control Deficiencies 
 
 Impact is Inconsequential Impact is More than 
Inconsequential 
Impact is Material 
Remote Chance of 
Misstatement 
Control Deficiency 
(Unqualified 404 opinion, 
No Disclosure Required) 
Control Deficiency 
(Unqualified 404 opinion, 
No Disclosure Required) 
Control Deficiency 
(Unqualified 404 opinion, 
No Disclosure Required) 
More than Remote 
Chance of Misstatement 
Control Deficiency 
(Unqualified 404 opinion, 
No Disclosure Required) 
Significant Deficiency 
(Unqualified 404 opinion, 
No Disclosure Required 
under AS5/404, required 
under SAS 112) 
Material Weakness 
(Adverse 404 opinion, 
Disclosure Required) 
 





Table 11: Overview of Research Methodology Examining the Effect of Auditors’ Internal 
Control Disclosures and the Nature of Internal Control Deficiencies on Jurors’ Evaluation 
of Auditor Liability  
 
 Disclosure of Significant Deficiencies, 




Independent Variable = ‗MW 
Type‘ 
(Less/More Auditable) 
Significant Deficiencies Not 
Disclosed; Less Auditable Deficiency 
(Cell 1) 
N=25 
Significant Deficiencies Disclosed;  
Less Auditable Deficiency (Cell 2) 
N=23 
Significant Deficiencies Not 
Disclosed; More Auditable 
Deficiency (Cell 3) 
N=20 
Significant Deficiencies Disclosed; 
More Auditable Deficiency (Cell 4)  
N=25 
 
H1: In a litigation setting, jurors will evaluate auditors more favorably when an audit failure is due to a more 
auditable internal control weakness than when an audit failure is due to a less auditable internal control weakness. 
[(Cells 1 and 2) compared to (Cells 3 and 4)] 
 
H2: In a litigation setting, jurors will evaluate auditors who report an unqualified opinion on internal controls with 
voluntary disclosures of significant internal control deficiencies more favorably than auditors who report an 
unqualified opinion on internal controls without voluntary disclosures of significant internal control deficiencies. 





Table 12: Demographic Information 
 
Panel A: General Demographic Characteristics 
Condition N No Yes No Civil Trial Criminal Trial Mean Under 25 25-44 45-64 65+ Male Female
Not Disclosed / Less Auditable 25 36.0% 64.0% 64.0% 12.0% 24.0% 49 12.0% 4.0% 72.0% 12.0% 54.2% 45.8%
Not Disclosed / More Auditable 20 30.0% 70.0% 75.0% 10.0% 15.0% 46 5.0% 30.0% 55.0% 10.0% 50.0% 50.0%
Disclosed / Less Auditable 23 30.4% 69.6% 78.3% 8.7% 13.0% 46 4.5% 31.8% 54.5% 9.1% 30.4% 69.6%
Disclosed / More Auditable 25 28.0% 72.0% 64.0% 12.0% 24.0% 48 8.3% 25.0% 62.5% 4.2% 44.0% 56.0%
Overall 93 31.2% 68.8% 70.3% 10.7% 19.0% 47 7.5% 22.7% 61.0% 8.8% 44.6% 55.4%
*National Average 35.0% 65.0% 62.6% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 46.0% 53.0%
*Represents responses to a recent poll concerning the average amount of individuals who have been called for jury duty or served on a jury (Harris 
Interactive, 2008).
37.4%  (all types)  
Called for Jury Duty Served on Jury Age Gender
 
 
Panel B: Political Party Affiliation 
Condition N Republican Democrat Independent Other
Not Disclosed / Less Auditable 25 52.0% 16.0% 28.0% 4.0%
Not Disclosed / More Auditable 20 40.0% 45.0% 15.0% 0.0%
Disclosed / Less Auditable 23 36.8% 31.6% 26.3% 5.3%
Disclosed / More Auditable 25 37.5% 25.0% 33.3% 4.2%






Table 13: Additional Demographic Characteristics 
Panel A: Employment Status 
Condition N
Not Disclosed / Less Auditable 25
Not Disclosed / More Auditable 20
Disclosed / Less Auditable 23





































Panel B: Annual Household Income 
 
Condition N <$10 K $10-24 K $25-39 K $40-54 K $50-69 K $70-84 K $85-99 K $100-199 K >$200 K
Not Disclosed / Less Auditable 25 0.0% 4.0% 8.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 8.0% 40.0% 28.0%
Not Disclosed / More Auditable 20 0.0% 16.7% 11.1% 0.0% 11.1% 11.1% 0.0% 38.9% 11.1%
Disclosed / Less Auditable 23 9.1% 9.1% 13.6% 9.1% 0.0% 9.1% 27.3% 18.2% 4.5%
Disclosed / More Auditable 25 0.0% 4.0% 12.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 20.0% 36.0% 4.0%







Table 14: Education of Participants 
 
       
Condition N
Not Disclosed / Less Auditable 25
Not Disclosed / More Auditable 20
Disclosed / Less Auditable 23
Disclosed / More Auditable 25
Overall 93
*All participants finished high school
18.3%
8.7%
3.2% 4.3% 31.2% 29.0% 14.0%
4.0% 4.0% 36.0% 40.0% 12.0% 4.0%
21.7% 39.1% 17.4% 8.7%
5.0% 0.0% 25.0% 25.0% 10.0%
4.3%
Highest Level of Education*
35.0%
0.0% 4.0% 40.0% 12.0% 16.0% 28.0%






Table 15: Summary of Responses to All Measurements of Auditor Liability 
 






Not Disclosed / Less Auditable 12 (48.0%) 13 (52.0%)
Not Disclosed / More Auditable 13 (65.0%) 7 (35.0%)
Disclosed / Less Auditable 12 (52.2%) 11 (47.8%)
Disclosed / More Auditable 23 (92.0%) 2 (8.0%)
Overall:  All Groups 60 (62.5%) 33 (35.5%)
Chi-square = 12.76 p =0.005  
 
Panel B: Summary of Compensatory and Punitive Damages Assessed against the Auditor 
 
Condition Mean SD Mean SD
Not Disclosed/Less Auditable 44.400 48.225 40.400 67.483
Not Disclosed/More Auditable 16.000 32.509 3.525 11.814
Disclosed/Less Auditable 35.657 44.086 20.283 53.590
Disclosed/More Auditable 4.200 19.983 0.000 0.000
Overall Mean: 25.324 40.738 16.634 46.615
*Overall means were significantly different between all groups (p =0.001)












Panel C: Summary of Responses to Auditor Liability Perceptions      
Dependent Variable (Higher rating = less favorable) Not Disclosed Disclosed
ABC CPA Firm is liable for negligent misrepresentation Less Auditable 4.480 4.000
More Auditable 3.000 2.160 *
Less Auditable 3.560 2.913
More Auditable 2.950 1.520 *
Less Auditable 3.880 3.391
More Auditable 3.500 1.680 *
ABC CPA Firm could have prevented the stockholder losses Less Auditable 4.600 4.174
More Auditable 4.250 2.960 *
ABC CPA Firm is responsible for stockholder losses Less Auditable 3.720 3.435
More Auditable 3.100 2.520
Numbers in table represent mean responses measured on a scale from 1-7.  Answers were re-coded so that a higher number 
indicate less favorable view of the auditor
Condition
ABC CPA Firm made the appropriate disclosures in compliance within 
the standards that dictate what auditors should disclose
ABC CPA Firm performed their services in compliance within the 
standards that dictate how audits should be performed
*Results of multiple comparisons of the means indicate that the Disclosed/More Auditable group responses are significantly 
different compared to all other groups (p< 0.05)  
 
 
Panel D: Factor Analysis Results of Auditor Liability Perceptions 
 
Auditor Liability Measure Factor Loading
ABC CPA Firm is liable for negligent misrepresentation 0.912
ABC CPA Firm performed their services in compliance within the 
standards that dictate how audits should be performed
0.851
ABC CPA Firm made the appropriate disclosures in compliance within the 
standards that dictate what auditors should disclose
0.885
ABC CPA Firm could have prevented the stockholder losses 0.828
ABC CPA Firm is responsible for stockholder losses 0.872




Table 16: Tests of the Impact of Material Weakness Type (H1) and Disclosure (H2) on Auditor Liability 
 
Panel A: Logistic Regression Analysis of Liable/Not Liable Judgments 
 
 
Predictor β Wald χ
2
p Odds ratio Overall Model Statistics
Constant 0.353 0.922 0.169 1.424 χ2 11.966 80.0%
MW Type -1.370 8.218 0.002 0.254 p 0.003 39.4%
Disclosure -0.738 2.526 0.056 0.478 Nagelkerke R
2 0.166 65.6%
Dependent Variable = Liable/Not Liable Judgment (0=Not Liable, 1=Liable)
Independent Variables= MW Type (0=Less Auditable, 1=More Auditable) and Disclosure (0=Not Disclosed, 1=Disclosed)
*Communicates how successful the model is at predicting the DV 
Model Predictions*
% Correct "Not Liable"
% Correct "Liable" 
Overall
 
Panel B: MANOVA of Compensatory and Punitive Damages 
 
 
Variable Wilks' Lambda F-Statistic P-Value Partial Eta Squared
MW Type 0.849 7.835 0.001 0.151
Disclosure 0.976 1.065 0.175 0.024
Disclosure x MW Type 0.984 0.726 0.244 0.016
Dependent Variable = Damages (measured by Compensatory and Punitive Damages)
Independent Variables= MW Type (0=Less Auditable, 1=More Auditable) and Disclosure 









MW Type 14.333 0.000
Disclosure 1.688 0.197




Dependent Variable = Damages (measured by Compensatory Damages)
Independent Variable= MW Type (0=Less Auditable, 1=More 





More Auditable 16.000 4.200
Mean Compensatory Damages (In Millions)
 
 




MW Type 9.571 0.003
Disclosure 1.637 0.204




Dependent Variable = Damages (measured by Punitive Damages)
Independent Variable= MW Type (0=Less Auditable, 1=More 
Auditable) and Disclosure (0=Not Disclosed, 1=Disclosed)  
 
Not Disclosed Disclosed
Less Auditable 40.400 20.283
More Auditable 3.525 .000






Panel E: ANOVA of Auditor Liability Perception Factor Scores 
Variable F-Statistic P-Value
MW Type 8.021 0.006
Disclosure 5.207 0.025
Disclosure x MW Type 1.011 0.347
Independent Variables= MW Type (0=Less Auditable, 1=More Auditable) and 
Disclosure (0=Not Disclosed, 1=Disclosed)
*Lower scores mean more favorable/lower liability evaluations




Less Auditable .407 .158
More Auditable .050 -.593
*lower scores mean more favorable/lower liability evaluations





Table 17: Logistic Regression Analysis of Liable/Not Liable Judgments for the Interaction between Material Weakness 
Type and Disclosure 
 
 
Predictor β Wald χ
2
p Odds ratio Overall Model Statistics
Constant 0.080 0.040 0.421 1.083 χ2 14.678 80.0%
MW Type x Disclosure -1.656 2.499 0.057 0.191 p 0.002 39.4%
MW Type -0.699 1.286 0.128 0.497 Nagelkerke R
2 0.201 65.6%
Disclosure -0.167 0.083 0.386 0.846
Dependent Variable = Liable/Not Liable Judgment (0=Not Liable, 1=Liable)
Independent Variables= MW Type (0=Less Auditable, 1=More Auditable) and Disclosure (0=Not Disclosed, 1=Disclosed)
*Communicates how successful the model is at predicting the DV 
Model Predictions*
% Correct "Not Liable"









Table 18: Summary of Results 
 
 












H1: MW Type Supported* Supported Supported Supported 






Additional Analysis:  Interaction 









* The main effects for MW Type and Disclosure were significant in the main effects only model, but not significant 




Table 19: Overview of Research Methodology Examining the Effect of Audit Committee 
Member Independence and Audit Committee Member Expertise on Jurors’ Evaluation of 
Auditor Liability  
 
 Audit Committee Member Expertise 
 (Low/High) 
Audit Committee Member 
Independence 
 (Low/High) 
 Low Expertise / Low Independence 
(Cell 1) 
N=29 




Low Expertise / High Independence 
 (Cell 3) 
N=28 








Table 20: Sample Demographics 
 
Panel A: Comparisons to National Average 
No Service Civil Trial Criminal Trial Mean Under 25 25-44 45-64 65+ Male Female
Count 85 92 11 13 8 19 80 9 51 65
Percentage 73.3% 79.3% 9.5% 11.2% 49 6.9% 16.5% 68.7% 7.8% 43.9% 56.1%
*National Average 65.0% 62.6% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 56.0% 53.0%
*Represents responses to a recent poll concerning the average amount of individuals who have been called for jury duty or served on a 
jury (Harris Interactive, 2008).
37.4%  (all types)  
Served on Jury Age GenderCalled for Jury 
Duty
 
Panel B: Political Party Affiliation 
Republican Democrat Independent Other
Count 59 38 17 2









60 913 17 215






Panel D: Household Income 
Count
Percentage
$100-199 K >$199 K
Annual Household Income






5 0 15 9 1416
 
 




High School Trade School Some College
7 4 32
Undergrad. Degree Some Post Grad. Grad. Degree
Highest Level of Education





Table 21: Audit Committee Expertise Measurement, Scale Validation, and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Mean Perceptions of Audit Committee Expertise 
Question (Higher Numbers = Higher Expertise) Low High
The audit committee had the relevant expertise for their job* 2.509 5.746
The audit committee had expertise in finance* 2.018 5.763
The audit committee had expertise in accounting* 1.965 5.695
The audit committee was able to comprehend the issues that arose during the audit* 3.930 6.051
The audit committee's level of expertise allowed them to make informed decisions about issues that arose during the audit* 2.965 5.847
The audit committee's experience influenced the quality of the decisions made during the audit* 4.807 5.847
*Notes a significant difference between groups (p<0.001)
Expertise Manipulation




Panel B: Factor Analysis of Audit Committee Expertise Measures 
 
Question Factor Loading
The audit committee had the relevant expertise for their job. 0.942
The audit committee had expertise in finance. 0.947
The audit committee had expertise in accounting. 0.945
The audit committee was able to comprehend the issues that arose during the audit. 0.821
The audit committee's level of expertise allowed them to make informed decisions about issues that arose during the audit. 0.966
The audit committee's experience influenced the quality of the decisions made during the audit. 0.965




Table 22: Audit Committee Independence Measurement, Scale Validation, and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Mean Perceptions of Audit Committee Independence 
 
Question (Higher Numbers=Higher Independence) Low High
The audit committee members were objective during the 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc. (reverse coded)* 2.431 4.524
The audit committee's decisions were biased during the 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc.* 2.155 4.129
Management exerted pressure on the audit committee NOT to recommend disclosing a deficiency in the 
internal controls established by top management*
2.121 2.670
The audit committee’s decisions during the audit were influenced by the managers of Clovitech, Inc.* 1.914 3.448
The audit committee members were protecting their own interests by not warning stockholders of the 
client's deficiencies in the internal controls established by top management*
2.121 4.045
All numbers in table represent mean responses measured on a scale from 1="strongly agree" to 7="strongly disagree"
Independence Manipulation





Panel B: Factor Analysis of Audit Committee Independence Measures 
 
Question Factor Loading
The audit committee members were objective during the 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc. 0.839
The audit committee's decisions were biased during the 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc. 0.906
Management exerted pressure on the audit committee NOT to recommend disclosing a deficiency in 
the internal controls established by top management (dropped)
0.350
The audit committee’s decisions during the audit were influenced by the managers of Clovitech, Inc. 0.825
The audit committee members were protecting their own interests by not warning stockholders of the 
client's deficiencies in the internal controls established by top management.
0.894




Table 23: Auditor Independence Measurement, Scale Validation, and Descriptive Statistics:  
 
Panel A: Mean Perceptions of Auditor Independence 
 
Question (Higher Numbers=Higher Independence) Low Expertise High Expertise
Low Independence 4.621 4.379
High Independence 5.179 5.600
Low Independence 3.448 3.034
High Independence 4.643 4.367
Low Independence 2.448 2.103
High Independence 2.607 2.667
Low Independence 2.448 2.138
High Independence 3.429 3.400
Low Independence 3.552 2.724
High Independence 4.143 4.033
Means By Condition
Numbers in table represent mean responses measured on a scale from 1="strongly agree" to 7="strongly disagree".
*Means were significantly different between groups (p <0.05)
ABC CPA Firm was objective during their 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc. (reverse coded)*
ABC CPA Firm's decisions were biased during the 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc.*
Management exerted pressure on ABC CPA Firm NOT to disclose a deficiency in the 
internal controls established by top management
ABC CPA Firm's decisions during the audit were influenced by the managers of 
Clovitech, Inc.*
ABC CPA Firm was protecting its own interest by not warning stockholders of the 














Total variance explained 67.6%
ABC CPA Firm was protecting its own interest by not warning stockholders of the 
client's deficiencies in the internal controls established by top management
ABC CPA Firm was objective during their 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc.
ABC CPA Firm's decisions were biased during the 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc.
ABC CPA Firm's decisions during the audit were influenced by the managers of 
Clovitech, Inc.
Management exerted pressure on ABC CPA Firm NOT to disclose a deficiency in the 







Table 24: Auditor Liability Measurement, Scale Validation, and Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel A: Mean Perceptions of Auditor Liability  
 
Auditor Liability Measure (Higher Numbers = More Liable/Less Favorable) Low Expertise High Expertise
ABC CPA Firm is liable for negligent misrepresentation (reverse coded)* Low Independence 4.379 5.138
High Independence 4.536 3.433
Low Independence 3.552 3.517
High Independence 3.250 2.533
Low Independence 3.724 4.414
High Independence 3.571 2.467
ABC CPA Firm could have prevented the stockholder losses (reverse coded)* Low Independence 4.793 4.828
High Independence 4.393 3.633
ABC CPA Firm is responsible for stockholder losses (reverse coded) Low Independence 3.828 4.276
High Independence 3.679 3.167
*Means were significantly different between conditions (p <0.05)
ABC CPA Firm made the appropriate disclosures in compliance within the standards that 
dictate what auditors should disclose*
ABC CPA Firm performed their services in compliance within the standards that dictate 
how audits should be performed
All items were measured on a scale from 1="strongly agree" to 7="strongly disagree".  Answers were reverse coded so that a higher number 







Panel B: Factor Analysis of Auditor Liability Perception Measures 
 
Auditor Liability Measure Factor Loading
ABC CPA Firm is liable for negligent misrepresentation 0.905
ABC CPA Firm performed their services in compliance within the standards that dictate 
how audits should be performed
0.759
ABC CPA Firm made the appropriate disclosures in compliance within the standards 
that dictate what auditors should disclose
0.774
ABC CPA Firm could have prevented the stockholder losses 0.773
ABC CPA Firm is responsible for stockholder losses 0.897
Total variance explained 67.9%  
 







Low Independence/Low Expertise 16 (52.2%) 13 (44.8%)
Low Independence/High Expertise 19 (65.5%) 10 (34.5%)
High Independence/High Expertise 11 (36.7%) 19 (63.3%)
High Independence/Low Expertise 13 (46.4%) 15 (53.6%)
Overall:  All Groups 59 (50.9%) 57 (49.1%)
*Means for Low Independence groups are significantly different than the means for High 






Panel D: Mean Damages Awarded per Group 
 
Auditor Liability Measure Low Expertise High Expertise
Compensatory Damages (in millions) Low Independence 3.435 3.745
High Independence 2.643 2.420
Punitive Damages (in millions)* Low Independence 2.628 5.610
High Independence 2.329 1.503







Table 25: PLS Results  
 
Panel A: Tests of Convergent Validity 







Audit Committee Expertise  0.883 0.746 
The audit committee had the relevant expertise for their job. 0.810   
The audit committee had expertise in finance. 0.802   
The audit committee had expertise in accounting. 0.799   
The audit committee was able to comprehend the issues that arose during the audit. 0.968   
The audit committee's level of expertise allowed them to make informed decisions about 
issues that arose during the audit. 
0.891   
The audit committee's experience influenced the quality of the decisions made during the 
audit. 
0.899   
    
Audit Committee Independence  0.921 0.745 
The audit committee members were objective during the 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc.  0.833   
The audit committee's decisions were biased during the 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc. 0.903   
Management exerted pressure on the audit committee NOT to recommend disclosing a 
deficiency in the internal controls established by top management (Dropped). 
0.606   
The audit committee‘s decisions during the audit were influenced by the managers of 
Clovitech, Inc. 
0.819   
The audit committee members were protecting their own interests by not warning 
stockholders of the client's deficiencies in the internal controls established by top 
management. 
0.894   
    
Auditor Independence  0.890 0.671 
ABC CPA Firm was objective during their 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc. 0.763   
ABC CPA Firm's decisions were biased during the 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc. 0.852   
Management exerted pressure on ABC CPA Firm NOT to disclose a deficiency in the 
internal controls established by top management (Dropped). 
0.524   
ABC CPA Firm's decisions during the audit were influenced by the managers of Clovitech, 
Inc. 
0.751   
ABC CPA Firm was protecting its own interest by not warning stockholders of the client's 
deficiencies in the internal controls established by top management. 
0.901   











Auditor Liability  0.913 0.679 
ABC CPA Firm is liable for negligent misrepresentation. 0.910   
 ABC CPA Firm performed their services in compliance within the standards that dictate 
how audits should be performed. 
0.753   
ABC CPA Firm made the appropriate disclosures in compliance within the standards that 
dictate what auditors should disclose. 
0.736   
ABC CPA Firm could have prevented the stockholder losses. 0.795   













Independence * Audit 







Audit Committee Independence * Audit 
Committee Expertise 0.286 0.125 0.678 1.000
Auditor Liability




















Independence * Audit 







Audit Committee Independence * Audit 
Committee Expertise 0.535 0.353 0.823 1.000
Auditor Liability






















The audit committee had the relevant expertise for their job. 0.810 0.032 -0.009 -0.152
The audit committee had expertise in finance. 0.802 0.029 -0.027 -0.053
The audit committee had expertise in accounting. 0.799 0.047 -0.004 -0.062
The audit committee was able to comprehend the issues that arose during the audit. 0.968 -0.222 -0.132 -0.084
The audit committee's level of expertise allowed them to make informed decisions 
about issues that arose during the audit.
0.891 -0.001 0.016 0.148
The audit committee's experience influenced the quality of the decisions made during 
the audit.
0.899 -0.006 -0.018 -0.143
The audit committee members were objective during the 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc. 
-0.022 0.833 0.537 -0.418
The audit committee's decisions were biased during the 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc. -0.187 0.903 0.559 -0.395
Management exerted pressure on the audit committee NOT to recommend 
disclosing a deficiency in the internal controls established by top management 
(dropped).
-0.168 0.606 0.361 -0.269
The audit committee‘s decisions during the audit were influenced by the managers of 
Clovitech, Inc.
-0.114 0.819 0.482 -0.266
The audit committee members were protecting their own interests by not warning 
stockholders of the client's deficiencies in the internal controls established by top 
management. -0.176 0.894 0.609 -0.437
ABC CPA Firm was objective during their 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc. 0.123 0.359 0.763 -0.587
ABC CPA Firm's decisions were biased during the 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc. -0.068 0.487 0.852 -0.682
Management exerted pressure on ABC CPA Firm NOT to disclose a deficiency in 
the internal controls established by top management (dropped).
-0.139 0.362 0.524 -0.316
ABC CPA Firm's decisions during the audit were influenced by the managers of 
Clovitech, Inc. -0.154 0.644 0.751 -0.469
ABC CPA Firm was protecting its own interest by not warning stockholders of the 




ABC CPA Firm is liable for negligent misrepresentation. -0.088 -0.380 -0.690 0.910
ABC CPA Firm made the appropriate disclosures in compliance within the standards 
that dictate what auditors should disclose. -0.070 -0.411 -0.509 0.753
ABC CPA Firm performed their services in compliance within the standards that 
dictate how audits should be performed. -0.200 -0.350 -0.499 0.736
ABC CPA Firm could have prevented the stockholder losses. -0.044 -0.383 -0.644 0.795




Table 26: Results of Additional Analysis of H1-H3  
 




Audit Committee Expertise (H1) 0.592 0.443
Audit Committee Independence (H2) 16.315 0.001





Independent Variables = Experimental Condition for Audit Committee Independence (0=Low, 1=High) 
and Audit Committee Expertise (0=Low, 1=High)




Panel B: Mean Factor Scores for Auditor Independence Organized by Experimental 
Condition 
Low Expertise High Expertise
Low Independence -.196 -.539
High Independence .334 .397
Lower scores mean lower independence evaluations.






Table 27: Results of Additional Analyses of H4 
 
Panel A: Logistic Regression of Liable/Not Liable Judgments 
 
Predictor β Wald χ
2
p Odds ratio Overall Model Statistics
Constant 0.056 0.053 0.817 1.058 χ2 43.141 77.4%
Auditor Independence -1.651 26.683 0.001 0.192 p 0.001 75.5%
Nagelkerke R
2 0.446 76.4%
*Communicates how successful the model is at predicting the DV 
Dependent Variable = Liable/Not Liable Judgment (0=Not Liable, 1=Liable)
Independent Variables = Auditor Independence Factor Scores
Model Predictions*
% Correct "Not Liable"




Panel B: Regression of Compensatory Damages 
Independent Variables β p











Panel C: Regression of Punitive Damages 
 
Independent Variables β p

















Overview of Study 
 
The following section provides a summary of the events leading up to the bankruptcy of a public 
company. In this scenario, assume that stockholders lost significant amounts of money when the 
company declared bankruptcy, and are exploring the option of filing a lawsuit against those 
responsible for their losses. After you review the scenario, you will be asked for your opinions 
about the situation to gain your perspective on the options available for stockholders to recover 
their losses. Specifically, you will be asked to provide your opinions about the likelihood that the 
executives/management, independent auditor, and/or audit committee of the public company 
would be sued in this particular situation.  
 
**NOTE: The task does not ask if YOU would take on the case personally, but asks you to 
provide your perceptions about the potential case from a legal standpoint, and the 
likelihood that specific parties would be sued by stockholders to recover their losses**  
 
Please click on the following link to view details on the potential case. PDF file will open in a 
new window for you to either print or view on your computer screen. Once you have finished 
reviewing the materials, please return to this screen and click "Next‖ View Case Materials 
 
Case Materials for Unqualified/No Disclosure Condition:  
 
Background on Clovitech, Inc. 
 
Clovitech, Inc. is a mid-sized public company that manufactures computer accessories in the 
U.S. In 2007, the company reported sales revenues of $400 million, and reported an overall 
profit of $200 million for the year. The independent auditor for Clovitech, Inc. reported a ―clean‖ 
opinion on the financial statements and internal controls over financial reporting for 2007. 
Clovitech, Inc. recently announced a restatement of their 2007 financial statements, decreasing 
sales revenues by over $200 million and resulting in an overall loss for the year of $10 million. 
They disclosed that a material weakness in internal controls in the company was the leading 
cause of the significant inaccuracies in the 2007 financial statements. This weakness in internal 
controls allowed employees to falsely inflate revenue figures and conceal significant declines in 
demand for products. Less than two weeks after this restatement announcement, Clovitech, Inc. 
declared bankruptcy.  
 
The following section details a timeline of the events leading up to the bankruptcy of Clovitech, 
Inc. The stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. are alleging that they relied on misleading disclosures 
made concerning the 2007 financial statements when they purchased stock in the period between 
the release of the 2007 financial statements and the restatement announcement in 2009. This 
group of shareholders is seeking to recover their losses from the managers, the audit committee, 
and/or the independent auditors. On the day the restatement was announced, Clovitech, Inc. 
stock dropped 50% in value from $28 to $14. Following the bankruptcy announcement, the stock 
was considered worthless, with total losses for this group of shareholders estimated at $100 




be sued to recover stockholder losses. Similar cases in the past have resulted in class action 
stockholder lawsuits against one or more parties, such as the company executives, the 
independent auditor, and the audit committee, alleging a range of offenses such as negligence, 
negligent misrepresentation, and fraud.   
 
Events Surrounding Clovitech, Inc. Bankruptcy 
 
January to March, 2008: 
The independent auditor of Clovitech, Inc., a large international accounting firm that has 
performed independent audits for Clovitech, Inc. for 3 years, performs the audit of the 2007 
financial statements and internal controls.  
 
This audit is conducted under the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which 
requires independent auditors to conduct an evaluation of internal controls and release a report 
that communicates their findings. The Act also holds managers of public companies responsible 
for establishing and maintaining effective internal controls over financial reporting, and requires 
that an audit committee, consisting of members of the Board of Directors, oversee the audit 
process and resolve any issues that arise during the audit. 
 
The independent auditor identifies a significant deficiency in internal controls over inventory 
indicating that the internal controls established by the top-level managers within the company 
may not be sufficient to prevent or detect material misstatements in the financial statements. 
Auditors are concerned that company policy over-emphasized meeting short-term profit goals at 
the sacrifice of internal control at the sales division level. 
 
The auditor discloses their identification of a significant deficiency to the Audit Committee. 
The deficiency is discussed in a meeting between the auditor, audit committee, and management 
to assess the likelihood that a material misstatement in the financial statements would not be 
prevented or detected because of the deficiency in internal controls. 
Clovitech‘s managers argue that the deficiency in internal controls is not serious enough to 
question the reliability of the current financial statement figures, and that there is not a 
reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the company‘s financial statements will not 
be prevented or detected on a timely basis because of this deficiency. Management does NOT 
intend to disclose any details about the significant deficiency within their report on internal 
controls, and intend to communicate that they have maintained effective internal controls over 
financial reporting.   
 
The Audit Committee of Clovitech, Inc. supports management‘s decision and communicates 
their opinion to the auditor.  
 
The independent auditor agrees with management and the audit committee that the deficiency in 
internal controls is not serious enough to question the reliability of the current financial statement 
figures. The auditor decides NOT to modify their opinion on the 2007 financial statements, 





The independent auditor also agrees with management and the audit committee that there is not a 
reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the company‘s financial statements will not 
be prevented or detected on a timely basis because of this deficiency. The auditor decides NOT 
to disclose any details about the significant deficiency within their report on internal controls, 
and decides to communicate that Clovitech, Inc. has maintained effective internal controls 
over financial reporting.   
 
March 13, 2008: 
Clovitech, Inc. reports 2007 annual sales revenues of $400 million and an overall profit of $200 
million for the year.  
 
Management‘s report on internal controls over financial reporting states that Clovitech, Inc. 
maintained effective internal control over financial reporting in 2007. This report contains no 
disclosure of any significant deficiencies in internal controls over inventory.   
 
The auditor reports a “clean” opinion on internal controls, stating that Clovitech, Inc. 
maintained effective internal control over financial reporting in 2007. This report contains no 
disclosure of any significant deficiencies in internal controls over inventory.   
 
The independent auditor for Clovitech, Inc., reports a “clean” opinion on the financial 
statements for 2007, stating that the financial statements are fairly stated.  
 
 
March 13, 2008 to February 11, 2009: 
After the release of the 2007 Annual Report, and prior to the restatement announcement, 
stockholders purchase a total of $100 million in stock in Clovitech, Inc.  
 
February 11, 2009: 
Clovitech, Inc. announces a restatement of their 2007 financial statements, decreasing sales 
revenues by over $200 million and resulting in an overall loss for the year of $10 million. 
Clovitech, Inc. discloses that the misstatement in their previous 2007 financial statements 
occurred primarily due to a material weakness in internal controls over inventory, stating that the 
internal controls established by the top- level managers within the company were ineffective. 
Specifically, company policy over-emphasized meeting short-term profit goals at the sacrifice of 
internal control at the sales division level. This particular internal control issue was identified 
as a significant deficiency during the audit of the 2007 financial statements and internal 
controls, but was NOT disclosed publicly.    
 
Individual sales representatives in multiple regional offices have admitted to inflating revenues 
to meet projections and concealing significant declines in demand for their products for the past 
18 months.  The activity had been occurring since the beginning of 2007. Because of the 
material weakness in internal controls over inventory, employees were able to falsely inflate 
sales revenues without being detected, resulting in a significant overstatement of sales 





Clovitech, Inc. stock drops 50% in value from $28 to $14 per share.  
 
February 20, 2009:  
 
Clovitech, Inc. files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection.  
 
Clovitech, Inc. stock is considered worthless. The stockholders who purchased stock since the 
release of the 2007 financial statements are seeking advice about whether they have a case 
against the managers, independent auditor, and/or audit committee of Clovitech, Inc. to recover 
their estimated losses of $100 million. They believe that since they relied on misleading 
information in the 2007 financial statements and accompanying reports when purchasing the 
stock, they should be able to recover their losses. 
 
You have now concluded the case portion of this task. 
Please return to the survey and click “Next” to continue to the next screen. 
 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Stockholders of Clovitech, Inc.: 
 
We have audited Clovitech, Inc. and subsidiaries‘ (the ‗‗Company‘s‘‘) internal control over 
financial reporting as of December 31, 2007 based on criteria established in Internal Control— 
Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission. The Company‘s management is responsible for maintaining effective internal 
control over financial reporting and for its assessment of the effectiveness of internal control 
over financial reporting, included in the accompanying Management‘s Report on Internal 
Control over Financial Reporting. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the Company‘s 
internal control over financial reporting based on our audit. 
 
We conducted our audit in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (United States). Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 
obtain reasonable assurance about whether effective internal control over financial reporting was 
maintained in all material respects. Our audit included obtaining an understanding of internal 
control over financial reporting, assessing the risk that a material weakness exists, testing and 
evaluating the design and operating effectiveness of internal control based on that risk, and 
performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe 
that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. 
 
A company‘s internal control over financial reporting is a process designed by, or under the 
supervision of, the company‘s principal executive and principal financial officers, or persons 
performing similar functions, and effected by the company‘s board of directors, management, 
and other personnel to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial 
reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with 




includes those policies and procedures that (1) pertain to the maintenance of records that, in 
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of 
the company; (2) provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to 
permit preparation of financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles, and that receipts and expenditures of the company are being made only in accordance 
with authorizations of management and directors of the company; and (3) provide reasonable 
assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use, or 
disposition of the company‘s assets that could have a material effect on the consolidated 
financial statements.  
 
Because of the inherent limitations of internal control over financial reporting, including the 
possibility of collusion or improper management override of controls, material misstatements 
due to error or fraud may not be prevented or detected on a timely basis. Also, projections of any 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the internal control over financial reporting to future periods 
are subject to the risk that the controls may become inadequate because of changes in conditions, 
or that the degree of compliance with the policies or procedures may deteriorate. 
 
 
A material weakness is a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal control over 
financial reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the 
company‘s consolidated annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected 
on a timely basis. 
 
We did not identify any deficiencies in internal control that we consider to be material 
weaknesses, as defined above. 
 
In our opinion the Company has maintained effective internal control over financial reporting as 
of December 31, 2007, based on the criteria established in Internal Control— Integrated 
Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. 
 
We have also audited, in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (United States), the financial statements as of and for the year ended December 
31, 2007, of the Company and our report dated March 19, 2008 expressed an unqualified opinion 
on those financial statements.  
 
Managing Partner 








MANAGEMENT’S REPORT ON INTERNAL CONTROLS OVER FINANCIAL 
REPORTING  
 
The management of Clovitech, Inc. is responsible for establishing and maintaining adequate 
internal control over financial reporting as defined in Rules 13a – 15(f) and 15d – 15(f) under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Clovitech, Inc.‘s internal control system is designed to provide 
reasonable assurance to Clovitech‘s management and board of directors regarding the reliability 
of financial reporting and the preparation and fair presentation of published financial statements. 
 
All internal control systems, no matter how well designed, have inherent limitations. Therefore, 
even those systems determined to be effective can provide only reasonable assurance with 
respect to financial statement preparation and presentation. 
 
A control deficiency exists when the design or operation of a control does not allow management 
or employees, in the normal course of performing their assigned functions, to prevent or detect 
misstatements on a timely basis. A significant deficiency is a control deficiency, or combination 
of control deficiencies, that adversely affects Clovitech, Inc.‘s ability to initiate, authorize, 
record, process, or report financial data reliably in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles such that there is more than a remote likelihood that a misstatement of 
Clovitech, Inc.‘s financial statements that is more than inconsequential will not be prevented or 
detected by the Clovitech Inc.‘s internal control. An internal control material weakness is a 
significant deficiency, or combination of them, that results in more than a remote likelihood that 
a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or 
detected. 
 
The management of Clovitech, Inc. assessed the effectiveness of the company‘s internal control 
over financial reporting as of December 31, 2007, and this assessment identified no material 
weaknesses in internal controls over financial reporting 
 
The management of Clovitech Inc.‘s assessed the effectiveness of Clovitech, Inc.‘s internal 
control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2007. In making this assessment, it used the 
criteria set forth by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO) in Internal Control—Integrated Framework. Based on our assessment and those criteria, 
management believes that Clovitech, Inc. maintained effective internal control over financial 
reporting as of December 31, 2007. 
 
Clovitech, Inc.‘s independent registered public accounting firm has issued an audit report on its 





CEO of Clovitech, Inc.  
 




Case materials for Unqualified/Disclosure Condition: 
 
Background on Clovitech, Inc. 
 
Clovitech, Inc. is a mid-sized public company that manufactures computer accessories in the 
U.S. In 2007, the company reported sales revenues of $400 million, and reported an overall 
profit of $200 million for the year. The independent auditor for Clovitech, Inc. reported a ―clean‖ 
opinion on the financial statements and internal controls over financial reporting for 2007.  
 
Clovitech, Inc. recently announced a restatement of their 2007 financial statements, decreasing 
sales revenues by over $200 million and resulting in an overall loss for the year of $10 million. 
They disclosed that a material weakness in internal controls in the company was the leading 
cause of the significant inaccuracies in the 2007 financial statements. This weakness in internal 
controls allowed employees to falsely inflate revenue figures and conceal significant declines in 
demand for products. Less than two weeks after this restatement announcement, Clovitech, Inc. 
declared bankruptcy.  
 
The following section details a timeline of the events leading up to the bankruptcy of Clovitech, 
Inc. The stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. are alleging that they relied on misleading disclosures 
made concerning the 2007 financial statements when they purchased stock in the period between 
the release of the 2007 financial statements and the restatement announcement in 2009. This 
group of shareholders is seeking to recover their losses from the managers, the audit committee, 
and/or the independent auditors. On the day the restatement was announced, Clovitech, Inc. 
stock dropped 50% in value from $28 to $14. Following the bankruptcy announcement, the stock 
was considered worthless, with total losses for this group of shareholders estimated at $100 
million. Please examine the events leading up to this bankruptcy to decide which parties should 
be sued to recover stockholder losses. Similar cases in the past have resulted in class action 
stockholder lawsuits against one or more parties, such as the company executives, the 
independent auditor, and the audit committee, alleging a range of offenses such as negligence, 
negligent misrepresentation, and fraud.   
 
Events Surrounding Clovitech, Inc. Bankruptcy 
 
January to March, 2008: 
The independent auditor of Clovitech, Inc., a large international accounting firm that has 
performed independent audits for Clovitech, Inc. for 3 years, performs the audit of the 2007 
financial statements and internal controls.  
 
This audit is conducted under the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which 
requires independent auditors to conduct an evaluation of internal controls and release a report 
that communicates their findings. The Act also holds managers of public companies responsible 
for establishing and maintaining effective internal controls over financial reporting, and requires 
that an audit committee, consisting of members of the Board of Directors, oversee the audit 





The independent auditor identifies a significant deficiency in internal controls over inventory 
indicating that the internal controls established by the top-level managers within the company 
may not be sufficient to prevent or detect material misstatements in the financial statements. 
Auditors are concerned that company policy over-emphasized meeting short-term profit goals at 
the sacrifice of internal control at the sales division level. 
 
The auditor discloses their identification of a significant deficiency to the Audit Committee. 
The deficiency is discussed in a meeting between the auditor, audit committee, and management 
to assess the likelihood that a material misstatement in the financial statements would not be 
prevented or detected because of the deficiency in internal controls. 
Clovitech‘s managers argue that the deficiency in internal controls is not serious enough to 
question the reliability of the current financial statement figures, and that there is not a 
reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the company‘s financial statements will not 
be prevented or detected on a timely basis because of this deficiency. Management decides to 
disclose information about the significant deficiency within their report on internal controls, 
but intend to communicate that they have maintained effective internal controls over financial 
reporting.   
 
The Audit Committee of Clovitech, Inc. supports management‘s decision and communicates 
their opinion to the auditor.  
 
The independent auditor agrees with management and the audit committee that the deficiency in 
internal controls is not serious enough to question the reliability of the current financial statement 
figures. The auditor decides NOT to modify their opinion on the 2007 financial statements, 
and to report that the 2007 financial statements are fairly stated. 
 
The independent auditor also agrees with management and the audit committee that there is not a 
reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the company‘s financial statements will not 
be prevented or detected on a timely basis because of this deficiency. The auditor decides to 
disclose details about the significant deficiency within their report on internal controls, but 
decides to communicate that Clovitech, Inc. has maintained effective internal controls over 
financial reporting.   
 
March 13, 2008: 
Clovitech, Inc. reports 2007 annual sales revenues of $400 million and an overall profit of $200 
million for the year.  
 
Management‘s report on internal controls over financial reporting states that Clovitech, Inc. 
maintained effective internal control over financial reporting in 2007. This report also 
contains a disclosure of a significant deficiency in internal controls over inventory.   
 
The auditor reports a “clean” opinion on internal controls, stating that Clovitech, Inc. 
maintained effective internal control over financial reporting in 2007. This report also 





The independent auditor for Clovitech, Inc., reports a “clean” opinion on the financial 
statements for 2007, stating that the financial statements are fairly stated.  
 
 
March 13, 2008 to February 11, 2009: 
After the release of the 2007 Annual Report, and prior to the restatement announcement, 
stockholders purchase a total of $100 million in stock in Clovitech, Inc.  
 
February 11, 2009: 
Clovitech, Inc. announces a restatement of their 2007 financial statements, decreasing sales 
revenues by over $200 million and resulting in an overall loss for the year of $10 million. 
 
Clovitech, Inc. discloses that the misstatement in their previous 2007 financial statements 
occurred primarily due to a material weakness in internal controls over inventory, stating that the 
internal controls established by the top- level managers within the company were ineffective. 
Specifically, company policy over-emphasized meeting short-term profit goals at the sacrifice of 
internal control at the sales division level. This particular internal control issue was identified 
as a significant deficiency during the audit of the 2007 financial statements and internal 
controls, and was disclosed publicly within management’s report on internal controls and the 
auditor’s report on internal controls.    
 
Individual sales representatives in multiple regional offices have admitted to inflating revenues 
to meet projections and concealing significant declines in demand for their products for the past 
18 months.  The activity had been occurring since the beginning of 2007. Because of the 
material weakness in internal controls over inventory, employees were able to falsely inflate 
sales revenues without being detected, resulting in a significant overstatement of sales 
revenues and profits in the financial statements of Clovitech, Inc. for 2007.  
 
Clovitech, Inc. stock drops 50% in value from $28 to $14 per share.  
 
February 20, 2009:  
Clovitech, Inc. files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection.  
 
Clovitech, Inc. stock is considered worthless. The stockholders who purchased stock since the 
release of the 2007 financial statements are seeking advice about whether they have a case 
against the managers, independent auditor, and/or audit committee of Clovitech, Inc. to recover 
their estimated losses of $100 million. They believe that since they relied on misleading 
information in the 2007 financial statements and accompanying reports when purchasing the 
stock, they should be able to recover their losses. 
 
You have now concluded the case portion of this task. 
 





REPORT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Stockholders of Clovitech, Inc.: 
 
We have audited Clovitech, Inc. and subsidiaries‘ (the ‗‗Company‘s‘‘) internal control over 
financial reporting as of December 31, 2007 based on criteria established in Internal Control— 
Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission. The Company‘s management is responsible for maintaining effective internal 
control over financial reporting and for its assessment of the effectiveness of internal control 
over financial reporting, included in the accompanying Management‘s Report on Internal 
Control over Financial Reporting. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the Company‘s 
internal control over financial reporting based on our audit. 
 
We conducted our audit in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (United States). Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 
obtain reasonable assurance about whether effective internal control over financial reporting was 
maintained in all material respects. Our audit included obtaining an understanding of internal 
control over financial reporting, assessing the risk that a material weakness exists, testing and 
evaluating the design and operating effectiveness of internal control based on that risk, and 
performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe 
that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. 
 
A company‘s internal control over financial reporting is a process designed by, or under the 
supervision of, the company‘s principal executive and principal financial officers, or persons 
performing similar functions, and effected by the company‘s board of directors, management, 
and other personnel to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial 
reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles. A company‘s internal control over financial reporting 
includes those policies and procedures that (1) pertain to the maintenance of records that, in 
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of 
the company; (2) provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to 
permit preparation of financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles, and that receipts and expenditures of the company are being made only in accordance 
with authorizations of management and directors of the company; and (3) provide reasonable 
assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use, or 
disposition of the company‘s assets that could have a material effect on the consolidated 
financial statements.  
 
Because of the inherent limitations of internal control over financial reporting, including the 
possibility of collusion or improper management override of controls, material misstatements 
due to error or fraud may not be prevented or detected on a timely basis. Also, projections of any 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the internal control over financial reporting to future periods 
are subject to the risk that the controls may become inadequate because of changes in conditions, 






A material weakness is a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal control over 
financial reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the 
company‘s consolidated annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected 
on a timely basis. 
 
We did not identify any deficiencies in internal control that we consider to be material 
weaknesses, as defined above. However, we identified the following deficiency in internal 
control that we consider to be a significant deficiency:  
 
The Company has a significant deficiency in the internal controls established by top 
management. Specifically, management are deficient in the following: (i) a documented risk 
assessment process that adequately addresses COSO objectives, including strategic plans, 
budgets and clearly defined and communicated goals and objectives aligned with the assessment 
(ii) sufficient anti-fraud controls, such as the whistleblower program, communications, and 
training employees and the Board regarding fraud, (iii) adequate monitoring of existing controls 
over financial reporting and individual and corporate performance against expectations, and 
iv) appropriate human resource policies, such as background investigations and consistent 
performance reviews for key personnel  
 
As a result of this deficiency, there is a more than remote likelihood that internal controls over 
financial reporting may not have prevented or detected errors from occurring that could have 
been more than inconsequential, either individually or in the aggregate.  
 
This significant deficiency was considered in determining the nature, timing, and extent of audit 
tests applied in our audit of the financial statements as of and for the year ended December 31, 
2007, of the Company and this report does not affect our report on such financial statements. 
 
In our opinion, in spite of the effect of the significant deficiency identified above on the 
achievement of the objectives of the control criteria, the Company has maintained effective 
internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2007, based on the criteria 
established in Internal Control— Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission. 
 
We have also audited, in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (United States), the financial statements as of and for the year ended December 
31, 2007, of the Company and our report dated March 19, 2008 expressed an unqualified opinion 
on those financial statements.  
 
Managing Partner 





MANAGEMENT’S REPORT ON INTERNAL CONTROLS OVER FINANCIAL 
REPORTING  
 
The management of Clovitech, Inc. is responsible for establishing and maintaining adequate 
internal control over financial reporting as defined in Rules 13a – 15(f) and 15d – 15(f) under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Clovitech, Inc.‘s internal control system is designed to provide 
reasonable assurance to Clovitech‘s management and board of directors regarding the reliability 
of financial reporting and the preparation and fair presentation of published financial statements. 
 
All internal control systems, no matter how well designed, have inherent limitations. Therefore, 
even those systems determined to be effective can provide only reasonable assurance with 
respect to financial statement preparation and presentation. 
 
A control deficiency exists when the design or operation of a control does not allow management 
or employees, in the normal course of performing their assigned functions, to prevent or detect 
misstatements on a timely basis. A significant deficiency is a control deficiency, or combination 
of control deficiencies, that adversely affects Clovitech, Inc.‘s ability to initiate, authorize, 
record, process, or report financial data reliably in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles such that there is more than a remote likelihood that a misstatement of 
Clovitech, Inc.‘s financial statements that is more than inconsequential will not be prevented or 
detected by the Clovitech Inc.‘s internal control. An internal control material weakness is a 
significant deficiency, or combination of them, that results in more than a remote likelihood that 
a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or 
detected. This assessment identified no material weaknesses in internal controls over financial 
reporting. However, we considered the deficiency described in the paragraph below to be a 
significant deficiency in internal control over financial reporting. 
 
The management of Clovitech, Inc. assessed the effectiveness of the company‘s internal control 
over financial reporting as of December 31, 2007, and this assessment identified the following 
significant deficiency in the company‘s internal control over financial reporting: 
 
Management‘s policies are deficient in the following: (i) a documented risk assessment process 
that adequately addresses COSO objectives, including strategic plans, budgets and clearly 
defined and communicated goals and objectives aligned with the assessment (ii) sufficient anti-
fraud controls, such as the whistleblower program, communications, and training employees and 
the Board regarding fraud, (iii) adequate monitoring of existing controls over financial reporting 
and individual and corporate performance against expectations, and iv) appropriate human 
resource policies, such as background investigations and consistent performance reviews for key 
personnel  
 
The management of Clovitech Inc.‘s assessed the effectiveness of Clovitech, Inc.‘s internal 
control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2007. In making this assessment, it used the 
criteria set forth by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 




management believes that Clovitech, Inc. maintained effective internal control over financial 
reporting as of December 31, 2007.  
 
Clovitech, Inc.‘s independent registered public accounting firm has issued an audit report on its 





CEO of Clovitech, Inc.  
 
CFO of Clovitech, Inc. 
 
Case Materials for Adverse Condition: 
 
Background on Clovitech, Inc. 
Clovitech, Inc. is a mid-sized public company that manufactures computer accessories in the 
U.S. In 2007, the company reported sales revenues of $400 million, and reported an overall 
profit of $200 million for the year. The independent auditor for Clovitech, Inc. reported a ―clean‖ 
opinion on the financial statements and an adverse opinion on internal controls over financial 
reporting for 2007. Clovitech, Inc. recently announced a restatement of their 2007 financial 
statements, decreasing sales revenues by over $200 million and resulting in an overall loss for 
the year of $10 million. They disclosed that a material weakness in internal controls in the 
company was the leading cause of the significant inaccuracies in the 2007 financial statements. 
This weakness in internal controls allowed employees to falsely inflate revenue figures and 
conceal significant declines in demand for products. Less than two weeks after this restatement 
announcement, Clovitech, Inc. declared bankruptcy.  
 
The following section details a timeline of the events leading up to the bankruptcy of Clovitech, 
Inc. The stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. are alleging that they relied on misleading disclosures 
made concerning the 2007 financial statements when they purchased stock in the period between 
the release of the 2007 financial statements and the restatement announcement in 2009. This 
group of shareholders is seeking to recover their losses from the managers, the audit committee, 
and/or the independent auditors. On the day the restatement was announced, Clovitech, Inc. 
stock dropped 50% in value from $28 to $14. Following the bankruptcy announcement, the stock 
was considered worthless, with total losses for this group of shareholders estimated at $100 
million. Please examine the events leading up to this bankruptcy to decide which parties should 
be sued to recover stockholder losses. Similar cases in the past have resulted in class action 
stockholder lawsuits against one or more parties, such as the company executives, the 
independent auditor, and the audit committee, alleging a range of offenses such as negligence, 





Events Surrounding Clovitech, Inc. Bankruptcy 
January to March, 2008: 
The independent auditor of Clovitech, Inc., a large international accounting firm that has 
performed independent audits for Clovitech, Inc. for 3 years, performs the audit of the 2007 
financial statements and internal controls.  
 
This audit is conducted under the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which 
requires independent auditors to conduct an evaluation of internal controls and release a report 
that communicates their findings. The Act also holds managers of public companies responsible 
for establishing and maintaining effective internal controls over financial reporting, and requires 
that an audit committee, consisting of members of the Board of Directors, oversee the audit 
process and resolve any issues that arise during the audit. 
 
The independent auditor identifies a significant deficiency in internal controls over inventory 
indicating that the internal controls established by the top-level managers within the company 
may not be sufficient to prevent or detect material misstatements in the financial statements. 
Auditors are concerned that company policy over-emphasized meeting short-term profit goals at 
the sacrifice of internal control at the sales division level. 
 
The auditor discloses their identification of a significant deficiency to the Audit Committee. 
The deficiency is discussed in a meeting between the auditor, audit committee, and management 
to assess the likelihood that a material misstatement in the financial statements would not be 
prevented or detected because of the deficiency in internal controls. 
 
Clovitech‘s managers argue that the deficiency in internal controls is not serious enough to 
question the reliability of the current financial statement figures, but agree that there is 
reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the company‘s financial statements will not 
be prevented or detected on a timely basis because of this deficiency. Management decides to 
disclose a material weakness in internal controls within their report on internal controls, and 
to communicate that they have not maintained effective internal controls over financial 
reporting.   
 
The Audit Committee of Clovitech, Inc. supports management‘s decision and communicates 
their opinion to the auditor.  
 
The independent auditor agrees with management and the audit committee that the deficiency in 
internal controls is not serious enough to question the reliability of the current financial statement 
figures. The auditor decides NOT to modify their opinion on the 2007 financial statements, 
and to report that the 2007 financial statements are fairly stated. 
 
The independent auditor also agrees with management and the audit committee that there is a 
reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the company‘s financial statements will not 
be prevented or detected on a timely basis because of the deficiency in internal controls over 




report on internal controls, and to communicate that Clovitech, Inc. has not maintained 
effective internal controls over financial reporting.   
 
March 13, 2008: 
Clovitech, Inc. reports 2007 annual sales revenues of $400 million and an overall profit of $200 
million for the year.  
 
Management‘s report on internal controls over financial reporting states that Clovitech, Inc. did 
not maintain effective internal control over financial reporting in 2007. This report contains a 
disclosure of a material weakness in internal controls over inventory.   
 
The auditor reports an “adverse” opinion on internal controls, stating that Clovitech, Inc. did 
not maintain effective internal control over financial reporting in 2007. This report contains a 
disclosure of a material weakness in internal controls over inventory.   
 
The independent auditor for Clovitech, Inc., reports a “clean” opinion on the financial 
statements for 2007, stating that the financial statements are fairly stated.  
 
March 13, 2008 to February 11, 2009: 
After the release of the 2007 Annual Report, and prior to the restatement announcement, 
stockholders purchase a total of $100 million in stock in Clovitech, Inc.  
 
February 11, 2009: 
Clovitech, Inc. announces a restatement of their 2007 financial statements, decreasing sales 
revenues by over $200 million and resulting in an overall loss for the year of $10 million. 
 
Clovitech, Inc. discloses that the misstatement in their previous 2007 financial statements 
occurred primarily due to a material weakness in internal controls over inventory, stating that 
the internal controls established by the top- level managers within the company were ineffective. 
Specifically, company policy over-emphasized meeting short-term profit goals at the sacrifice of 
internal control at the sales division level. This particular internal control issue was identified 
as a material weakness during the audit of the 2007 financial statements and internal controls, 
and was disclosed publicly within management’s report on internal controls and the auditor’s 
report on internal controls.    
 
Individual sales representatives in multiple regional offices have admitted to inflating revenues 
to meet projections and concealing significant declines in demand for their products for the past 
18 months.  The activity had been occurring since the beginning of 2007. Because of the 
material weakness in internal controls over inventory, employees were able to falsely inflate 
sales revenues without being detected, resulting in a significant overstatement of sales 
revenues and profits in the financial statements of Clovitech, Inc. for 2007.  
 





February 20, 2009:  
Clovitech, Inc. files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection.  
 
Clovitech, Inc. stock is considered worthless. The stockholders who purchased stock since the 
release of the 2007 financial statements are seeking advice about whether they have a case 
against the managers, independent auditor, and/or audit committee of Clovitech, Inc. to recover 
their estimated losses of $100 million. They believe that since they relied on misleading 
information in the 2007 financial statements and accompanying reports when purchasing the 
stock, they should be able to recover their losses. 
 
You have now concluded the case portion of this task. 
 
Please return to the survey and click “Next” to continue to the next screen. 
 
 
REPORT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM 
 
To the Board of Directors and Stockholders of Clovitech, Inc.: 
 
We have audited Clovitech, Inc. and subsidiaries‘ (the ‗‗Company‘s‘‘) internal control over 
financial reporting as of December 31, 2007 based on criteria established in Internal Control— 
Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission. The Company‘s management is responsible for maintaining effective internal 
control over financial reporting and for its assessment of the effectiveness of internal control 
over financial reporting, included in the accompanying Management‘s Report on Internal 
Control over Financial Reporting. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the Company‘s 
internal control over financial reporting based on our audit. 
 
We conducted our audit in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (United States). Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 
obtain reasonable assurance about whether effective internal control over financial reporting was 
maintained in all material respects. Our audit included obtaining an understanding of internal 
control over financial reporting, assessing the risk that a material weakness exists, testing and 
evaluating the design and operating effectiveness of internal control based on that risk, and 
performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe 
that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. 
 
A company‘s internal control over financial reporting is a process designed by, or under the 
supervision of, the company‘s principal executive and principal financial officers, or persons 
performing similar functions, and effected by the company‘s board of directors, management, 
and other personnel to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial 
reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles. A company‘s internal control over financial reporting 
includes those policies and procedures that (1) pertain to the maintenance of records that, in 




the company; (2) provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to 
permit preparation of financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles, and that receipts and expenditures of the company are being made only in accordance 
with authorizations of management and directors of the company; and (3) provide reasonable 
assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use, or 
disposition of the company‘s assets that could have a material effect on the consolidated 
financial statements.  
 
Because of the inherent limitations of internal control over financial reporting, including the 
possibility of collusion or improper management override of controls, material misstatements 
due to error or fraud may not be prevented or detected on a timely basis. Also, projections of any 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the internal control over financial reporting to future periods 
are subject to the risk that the controls may become inadequate because of changes in conditions, 
or that the degree of compliance with the policies or procedures may deteriorate. 
 
 
A material weakness is a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal control over 
financial reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the 
company‘s consolidated annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected 
on a timely basis. 
 
The following material weakness has been identified and included in management‘s assessment:  
 
The Company has not maintained an effective internal controls established by top management. 
Specifically, they have not maintained: (i) a documented risk assessment process that adequately 
addresses COSO objectives, including strategic plans, budgets and clearly defined and 
communicated goals and objectives aligned with the assessment (ii) sufficient anti-fraud 
controls, such as the whistleblower program, communications, and training employees and the 
Board regarding fraud, (iii) adequate monitoring of existing controls over financial reporting and 
individual and corporate performance against expectations, and iv) appropriate human resource 
policies, such as background investigations and consistent performance reviews for key 
personnel  
 
As a result of this deficiency, it is reasonably possible that internal controls over financial 
reporting may not have prevented or detected errors from occurring that could have been 
material, either individually or in the aggregate.  
 
This material weakness was considered in determining the nature, timing, and extent of audit 
tests applied in our audit of the financial statements as of and for the year ended December 31, 
2007, of the Company and this report does not affect our report on such financial statements. 
 
In our opinion, because of the effect of the material weakness identified above on the 
achievement of the objectives of the control criteria, the Company has not maintained effective 




established in Internal Control— Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission. 
 
We have also audited, in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (United States), the financial statements as of and for the year ended December 
31, 2007, of the Company and our report dated March 19, 2008 expressed an unqualified opinion 
on those financial statements.  
 
Managing Partner 




MANAGEMENT’S REPORT ON INTERNAL CONTROLS OVER FINANCIAL 
REPORTING  
 
The management of Clovitech, Inc. is responsible for establishing and maintaining adequate 
internal control over financial reporting as defined in Rules 13a – 15(f) and 15d – 15(f) under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Clovitech, Inc.‘s internal control system is designed to provide 
reasonable assurance to Clovitech‘s management and board of directors regarding the reliability 
of financial reporting and the preparation and fair presentation of published financial statements. 
 
All internal control systems, no matter how well designed, have inherent limitations. Therefore, 
even those systems determined to be effective can provide only reasonable assurance with 
respect to financial statement preparation and presentation. 
 
A control deficiency exists when the design or operation of a control does not allow management 
or employees, in the normal course of performing their assigned functions, to prevent or detect 
misstatements on a timely basis. A significant deficiency is a control deficiency, or combination 
of control deficiencies, that adversely affects Clovitech, Inc.‘s ability to initiate, authorize, 
record, process, or report financial data reliably in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles such that there is more than a remote likelihood that a misstatement of 
Clovitech, Inc.‘s financial statements that is more than inconsequential will not be prevented or 
detected by the Clovitech Inc.‘s internal control. An internal control material weakness is a 
significant deficiency, or combination of them, that results in more than a remote likelihood that 
a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or 
detected. We considered the deficiency described in the paragraph below to be a material 
weakness in internal control over financial reporting.} 
 
The management of Clovitech, Inc. assessed the effectiveness of the company‘s internal control 
over financial reporting as of December 31, 2007, and this assessment identified the following 
material weakness in the company‘s internal control over financial reporting: 
 
Clovitech, Inc. has not maintained an effective internal controls established by top management. 
Specifically, they have not maintained: (i) a documented risk assessment process that adequately 
addresses COSO objectives, including strategic plans, budgets and clearly defined and 
communicated goals and objectives aligned with the assessment (ii) sufficient anti-fraud 
controls, such as the whistleblower program, communications, and training employees and the 
Board regarding fraud, (iii) adequate monitoring of existing controls over financial reporting and 
individual and corporate performance against expectations, and iv) appropriate human resource 
policies, such as background investigations and consistent performance reviews for key 
personnel 
 
The management of Clovitech Inc.‘s assessed the effectiveness of Clovitech, Inc.‘s internal 
control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2007. In making this assessment, it used the 
criteria set forth by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 




described in the preceding paragraph, management believes that, as of December 31, 2007, the 
company‘s internal control over financial reporting was not effective based on those criteria. 
 
Clovitech, Inc.‘s independent registered public accounting firm has issued an audit report on its 





CEO of Clovitech, Inc.  
 




Questionnaire (Common across all conditions) 
 
Please answer the following questions based on your perspective of the materials you reviewed. 
 
Please indicate the likelihood (from 0-100%) that a lawsuit would be filed on behalf of the 
stockholders to recover damages from the following parties: 
 
Note: Please enter a number for each between 0-100 with no decimals, and answer each question 
independently. 
The managers/executives of the bankrupt company.  
The independent auditor of the bankrupt company  





Please answer the following questions based on your perspective of the materials you reviewed.  
 
























The managers/executives of 
the bankrupt company. 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
The independent auditor of 
the bankrupt company. 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
The audit committee of the 
bankrupt company. 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
Please answer the following questions based on your perspective of the materials you reviewed. 
Assume that the stockholders are asking for advice about options to recover their losses.  
 
*NOTE: These questions are not asking if YOU would take on this case, and are asking if you 
would recommend that the stockholders file a lawsuit and seek damages recover their losses. 
 


























I would advise stockholders 
to file a lawsuit against the 
managers/executives of the 
bankrupt company to 
reclaim stockholder losses. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
I would advise stockholders 
to file a lawsuit against the 
independent auditor to 
reclaim stockholder losses. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
I would advise stockholders 
to file a lawsuit against the 
audit committee to reclaim 
stockholder losses. 





Please indicate your agreement with the following statement. I would advise stockholders to file 

























Ordinary negligence, under 
common law. 
 




ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
Fraud, under common law. ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 





The following questions are asked to gain your perspectives on the strength of the stockholder‘s 
case against the auditors assuming that the stockholders decided to sue the auditor. Please 
indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements.  
 
























The audit firm would most 
likely settle out of court 
before proceeding to trial. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
If the case went to a jury 
trial, the auditors would be 
found liable by the jury. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
If auditors were found liable 
in a jury trial, the auditors 
would be instructed to 
compensate stockholders for 
their losses. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
If auditors were found liable 
in a jury trial, the auditors 
would be instructed to pay 
punitive damages. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
If the case went to a bench 
trial, the auditors would be 
found liable by the judge. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
If auditors were found liable 
in a bench trial, the auditors 
would be instructed to 
compensate stockholders for 
their losses. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
If auditors were found liable 
in a bench trial, the auditors 
would be instructed to pay 
punitive damages. 






Would your answers to the above questions change if the auditor had been sued for Securities 

































The audit firm would most 
likely settle out of court 
before proceeding to trial. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
If the case went to a jury 
trial, the auditors would be 
found liable by the jury. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
If auditors were found liable 
in a jury trial, the auditors 
would be instructed to 
compensate stockholders for 
their losses. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
If auditors were found liable 
in a jury trial, the auditors 
would be instructed to pay 
punitive damages. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
If the case went to a bench 
trial, the auditors would be 
found liable by the judge. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
If auditors were found liable 
in a bench trial, the auditors 
would be instructed to 
compensate stockholders for 
their losses. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
If auditors were found liable 
in a bench trial, the auditors 
would be instructed to pay 
punitive damages. 





The following question is designed to gauge your understanding of the information provided to 
you. Please answer the following to the best of your ability:  
 
What did the independent auditors of Clovitech, Inc. conclude in their report on internal controls 
for the 2007 financial statements?  
 
The independent auditors concluded that internal controls were ineffective. 
The independent auditors concluded that internal controls were effective overall, but 
voluntarily disclosed one deficiency in internal controls that could become an issue. 
The independent auditors concluded that internal controls were effective, and did not 
disclose any deficiencies related to internal controls. 
 
























In your review of the case, did you click on the link to view the auditor‘s report on internal 
controls, and view the information in the report?  
No Yes 
 






















In your review of the case, did you click on the link to view management‘s report on internal 
controls, and view the information in the report?  
No Yes 
 

























The following questions are asked to allow the researchers to further understand the 
demographics of the individuals responding to this study. The answers are entirely voluntary, but 
are very important to the research.  
 
What is your age?  
 
What is your gender? 
Male Female 
 
What is your current state of residence?  
 
Have you ever received a college degree with a major or minor in business?  
No Yes 
If yes, please specify what degree: 
 
Which of the following apply to the level of post-undergraduate education that you have 
completed: (Please check ALL that apply) 
Juris Doctor Degree (JD) 
JD/MA Joint Degree 
Master‘s Degree in Law 
(LLM) 
MBA 
Master‘s Degree in 
Accounting 
Master‘s Degree in Tax 
JD/MBA Joint Degree 
Other (Please specify in the 
text box below) 
If other, please specify: 
 









































Are you a practicing attorney?  
No, I have never been a practicing attorney. 
Yes. 
No, I am retired or no longer in practice. 
No, I am not currently practicing but am in process of looking for a job. 




In what state(s) have you been a practicing attorney?  
 
How many years‘ experience do you have as a practicing attorney?  
 
Please estimate the percentage of time you have spent in your career on the following types of 
cases (Please enter a number from 0-100 in each box. The total of all three should equal 100%):  
Civil Actions % ______ 
Criminal Actions % ______ 
Other Legal Matters % ______ 
 
Have you ever been professionally involved in a lawsuit where the auditor of a company was 
sued? (*NOTE: Please check ALL that apply) 
No______ 
Yes, working for the defense team (auditor) ______  
Yes, working for the plaintiff team ______ 
If other, please specify ______ 
 




Tort Litigation ______ 
Securities Law______ 
Class Actions______ 
Professional Liability ______ 
If other, please specify ______ 
 
Are you currently or have you ever been:  
A member of the National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees?   
A member of the American Bar Association?   
A Certified Public Accountant (CPA)?   
An Auditor?   
A Manager in a business where a financial audit was conducted?   
A Certified Financial Analyst (CFA)   
A Professional Investor (provided investment advice or made investments for others as your 
main source of employment)?  
A Member of an Audit Committee or Board of Directors for a Public Company?   
 










Entry Page to Study 
Researchers at the University of Central Florida (UCF) study many topics. To do this we 
need the help of people who agree to take part in a research study. You are being invited to 
participate in a research project conducted by Jillian Phillips, CPA and Vicky Arnold, PhD, 
of the University of Central Florida‘s Dixon School of Accounting. You can ask questions 
about the research. You can read this form and agree to take part right now, or return to this 
page and complete the study at a later time. You will be told if any new information is 
learned which may affect your willingness to continue taking part in this study.  
You have been asked to take part in this research study because you represent the qualities 
of a person who could be selected to be jury member. You must be 18 years of age or older 
to be included in the research study and continue past this screen. You will be asked to 
answer questions that will take about 20-30 minutes of your time. There are no expected 
risks for taking part in this study. You do not have to answer every question or complete 
every task. You may skip any questions or tasks. You do not have to answer any questions 
that make you feel uncomfortable. 
 
A student at the University of Central Florida provided your email address as part of an 
extra credit assignment in their course, indicating that you would be interested in 
participating in the study. There is no additional compensation, payment or extra credit for 
taking part in this study. Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary, and you do 
not need to take any further actions for the student to receive their extra credit. The student 
who provided your contact information to us has already received extra credit just for 
helping recruit qualified participants for the study, and by obtaining permission to provide 
us with your contact information so that we could invite you to participate in the study. The 
student‘s help in the recruiting process was of great value to the study, as this study is being 
conducted as a part of my dissertation to graduate with my PhD from the University of 
Central Florida. 
 
The overall purpose of this study is to understand how individuals make decisions when 
they are chosen to be jury members in a court case. Specifically, I am looking at court cases 
involving class action shareholder lawsuits against auditors. You are being invited to 
participate because you represent individuals who could be chosen to be a jury member, and 
your opinions are important to gaining understanding how jurors make decisions. You will 
be provided with information about a court case scenario and will be asked to provide your 
opinions from the viewpoint of a jury member. You do not need to have any prior 
knowledge about the task to complete the survey. This questionnaire includes a description 
of a scenario that a member on a jury may encounter. After reading the scenario, you will be 
asked several questions regarding what you would do if you were a jury on the trial as well 
as your opinions about different factors related to the trial.  
Please note that this is an academic study conducted at a university to gain insight into 
attitudes about auditor liability. As the results of this study could be helpful to policymakers 




manner. You may benefit from participating in this study by gaining a further understanding 
of how court cases are tried, and the laws that govern auditor liability in the U.S.  
 
This study is anonymous. That means that no one, not even members of the research team, 
will know that the information you gave came from you. Your name will not be collected or 
associated in any way with your responses, and only aggregated data will be included in any 
resulting publication or presentations. The study is conducted entirely online using a 
dependable and secure online survey website.  
 
You must be at least 18 years of age to participate in this study. You should take part in this 
study only because you want to. There is no penalty for not taking part. You have the right 
to stop at any time by closing the window on your computer screen. You will be told if any 
new information is learned which may affect your willingness to continue taking part in this 
study. This study does not include any audio or video taping. If you have any questions 
regarding this project, you may contact Jillian Phillips at (407)-435-0493 or by email at 
jphillips@bus.ucf.edu, or Dr. Arnold at (407) 823-3192 or by email at varnold@bus.ucf.edu. 
Questions or concerns about research participants' rights may be directed to the UCFIRB 
office, University of Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 12201 









Not Disclosed/Less Auditable Condition:  
Introduction to Study 
The following section provides an overview of a realistic court case that emerged following 
the bankruptcy of a public company. A large group of individuals who own stock in the 
company filed a class action suit against the auditors for negligent misrepresentation, and 
are seeking damages to recover losses in stock value. The circumstances of the case will be 
argued from the perspectives of both the plaintiff and defendant.  
While reviewing the information presented to you, we ask that you evaluate the information 
as if you were a jury member assigned to the trial. After you review the information, you 
will be asked to conclude whether the independent auditor, ABC CPA Firm, is liable for 
negligent misrepresentation, and provide your opinions about the circumstances presented 
in the case. 
Stockholders of Clovitech, Inc.  v. ABC CPA Firm  
Complaint: The plaintiffs, the stockholders of Clovitech, Inc., allege that the defendant, 
ABC CPA Firm, made false statements without exercising reasonable care of competence 
in obtaining and communicating information for the audit of the 2007 financial statements 
and internal controls of Clovitech, Inc. They are suing ABC CPA Firm, a large international 
accounting firm, for $100 million in damages for their actual losses in stock value, and are 
asking for additional punitive damages to punish ABC CPA Firm for their negligent 
actions. 
Response: The defendant, ABC CPA Firm, responds that it fully complied with auditing 
standards and that it was not negligent in obtaining or communicating information related 
to the audit of the 2007 financial statements of Clovitech, Inc. 
 _____________ 
END OF INTRODUCTION 









This case is about auditor negligence. You are about to find out what can happen when 
auditors do not do their jobs properly, and stockholders lose millions of dollars as a result. 
Auditors are hired by companies to determine whether the financial statements of the 
company are accurate. Auditors also investigate whether the company has proper internal 
control policies in place, which are policies within a company that are established to either 
prevent or detect significant inaccuracies in the financial statements (for example: 
restricting access to bookkeeping functions and computer systems or requiring managers to 
approve large transactions). 
In this case, ABC CPA Firm, the auditors of Clovitech, Inc. for the past three years, 
discovered an issue in the internal controls established by the top level managers within 
the company during their audit of Clovitech Inc. for the 2007 financial statements. However, 
ABC CPA Firm decided that the issue wasn‘t important, and concluded that the internal 
controls within Clovitech, Inc. were effective (otherwise known as a ―clean‖ opinion on 
internal controls).  
Their ―clean‖ opinion on internal controls was misleading, and did not contain any 
disclosure of the deficiency in internal controls that the auditors discovered during their 
audit. In fact, this particular internal control deficiency, a lack of sufficient internal 
controls established by the top level managers within the company was the leading cause 
of the company’s bankruptcy in 2009.  
Because of ABC CPA Firm‘s failure to properly investigate the impact of the deficiency in 
internal controls, and their failure to communicate the potential issue in Clovitech’s 
internal controls to the public, stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. lost $100 million when the 
company‘s stock became worthless after the bankruptcy. The stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. 
are suing the auditor, ABC CPA Firm, for $100 million in damages for their actual losses, 
and are asking for additional punitive damages to punish ABC CPA Firm for their 
negligent actions.  
Although auditors are hired and paid by the companies whose financial statements they 
examine, an auditor's primary duty is to the general public. Investors and creditors often 
rely on the auditor‘s opinion on the financial statements and internal controls when deciding 
if they can trust the financial information released by the company, which can greatly 
influence their investment/lending decisions. In this case, the stockholders of Clovitech, 
Inc. relied on ABC CPA Firm’s reports when deciding to purchase stock in the company.  
Clovitech, Inc. is a large public company that manufactures computer accessories and 
distributes them to large retailers across the U.S. The 2007 financial statements of the 
company disclosed sales revenues of $400 million, and reported an overall profit of $200 
million for the year. ABC CPA Firm reported that the 2007 financial statements of 




controls within the company were sufficient to assure reliance on their financial figures. 
Relying on this information provided by Clovitech, Inc. and ABC CPA Firm, stockholders 
purchased and retained stock in the company totaling $100 million.  
In February 2009, almost a year after ABC CPA Firm released these reports, a news article 
surfaced indicating that Clovitech, Inc. filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy due to a sudden 
significant decrease in orders from stores selling their products. Details on an inventory 
fraud scheme had emerged, and it became evident that employees had been inflating sales 
revenues to meet projections and conceal significant declines in demand for their products 
for the past year.  
Specifically, individual sales teams were distributing excess inventory to retailers near the 
end of each quarter to meet short-term revenue projections. The sales teams were able to 
convince retailers to over-stock Clovitech, Inc. products by providing incentives (for 
example: highly favorable credit terms of 6 months or more with no interest). The sales 
were then recorded as income for Clovitech, Inc. The scheme was uncovered when demand 
for the product declined. Retailers were no longer able to sell the product in their stores and 
stopped ordering more stock from the sales representatives. This scheme is considered 
fraudulent, since the employees are receiving excess compensation based on intentionally 
manipulated sales revenue figures.    
The discovery that this significant overstatement of sales revenue figures had been occurring 
since the beginning of 2007 prompted the company to decrease their 2007 reported sales 
revenues by over $200 million, resulting in an overall loss of $10 million for the year.  
The restatement was also accompanied by management‘s disclosure of a serious flaw in 
internal controls, stating that the internal controls established by the top level managers 
within the company were ineffective. Company policy over-emphasized meeting short term 
profit goals at the sacrifice of internal control at the sales division level. This weakness in 
internal control contributed to the fact that the employees were able to falsely inflate sales 
revenue figures without being detected.  
On the day the restatement was announced, Clovitech, Inc. stock dropped 50% in value 
from $28 to $14 per share.  Only one week later, following the bankruptcy announcement, 
the stock was considered worthless, with total losses for this group of shareholders 
estimated at $100 million.  
The stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. are not arguing that ABC CPA Firm would have 
necessarily discovered the actual fraud if they had performed additional procedures. It is 
well known that managers will go to great lengths to cover up fraudulent activity. Instead, 
the stockholders argue that the auditors were negligent in their evaluation  of internal 





The lack of appropriate  internal controls in place at Clovitech, Inc. permitted fraudulent 
activity to occur within the company on a continuing basis. This fraudulent activity resulted 
in financial statements that were not reliable, with sales revenue figures falsely inflated by 
over $200 million. This overstatement in sales revenue is a serious issue, because 
stockholders may not have purchased stock in the company if these false sales were not 
included in the company‘s income.  
Workpaper evidence indicates that ABC CPA Firm identified the deficiency in the internal 
controls established by the top level managers within the company that facilitated this 
fraudulent activity.   
Although the auditor will argue that they performed additional audit procedures to confirm 
that the deficiency they found was not likely to cause major issues with the financial 
statement figures, they chose not to disclose any information to the public on their findings, 
and reported that internal controls were effective in the company. This overall conclusion 
on internal controls was misleading. 
We argue that the type of evidence the auditor relied upon in this case to evaluate internal 
controls, employee interviews, was not sufficient evidence to reach their conclusions and 
allowed the auditor too much leeway in interpretation. Interview evidence is highly 
subjective, and the auditor relied heavily on professional judgment to form their opinions. 
How are we to know that the auditor performed their duties with care when they interpreted 
the interview evidence? They may have been biased against finding anything that would 
make more work for them or cause them to lose the client for next year‘s audit. Auditors are 
paid to provide their services to companies. How can we rely so heavily on the auditor‘s 
judgment when they are financially motivated to keep their job? 
Overall, the auditor’s opinion on internal controls mislead investors into thinking there 
were no problems with the internal controls of the company, when in fact auditors were 
aware of deficiencies. The auditor did not publicly disclose any concerns with the 
company‘s controls. Instead, they reported a ―clean‖ opinion on internal controls, expressing 
that controls within the company were “effective”. At the very least, auditors could have 
voluntarily disclosed the deficiencies they found to provide some type of warning to 








We claim that, because of their negligence and resulting misleading statement within their 
audit opinion on internal controls, the auditor did not signal investors of the true potential 
that the financial statements may not be accurate. Therefore, I am asking on behalf of the 
stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. that you find ABC CPA Firm liable for negligent 
misrepresentation. We ask that you compensate the stockholders $100 million for the loss 
in stock value, and that you punish the auditors appropriately by awarding punitive damages 
as well. 
_____________ 
END OF PLAINTIFF ARGUMENTS 
Please click "Next" to continue to the Defendant's Arguments 
 
Defendant Arguments 
Our position is that ABC CPA Firm fully complied with auditing standards in its audit of 
Clovitech, Inc.'s 2007 financial statements and internal controls. We argue that ABC CPA 
Firm should not be liable for negligent misrepresentation. To help you understand why the 
auditor‘s actions were in fact not negligent, I would like to first give you a short 
background on what the auditor‘s responsibilities are in the financial reporting process.  
Then, I will provide specific details about the 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc.‘s internal 
controls to show that the auditor performed well within the duty of care required by the 
audit standards in the U.S. After you hear these facts, you will no doubt find that ABC CPA 
Firm should be found not liable for negligent misrepresentation.  
An auditor‘s job is to reduce the probability that people receive misstated financial 
statements, but auditors cannot provide 100% assurance that financial statements are 
accurate. Auditors could potentially find every misstatement, but to do so they would have 
to examine every single transaction in which a company took part.  This would make the 
cost of an audit so high that no one would be able to afford an audit at all. Instead, auditors 
examine a subset of transactions by using their professional judgment and sophisticated 
sampling techniques. This is what auditing standards require.  
The auditor also conducts an evaluation of internal controls to determine if the company 
has controls in place to prevent the employees from committing fraud and/or making errors. 
Since the auditor cannot possibly look at every transaction, high quality internal controls are 
important because they provide additional assurance that a company’s financial 




in internal controls, particularly with a company this size, which could have an excellent 
system of internal controls but still end up with hundreds of small ways that fraud could be 
committed. 
Most of the time, these deficiencies are deemed to be immaterial, in the sense that they will 
not likely lead to large discrepancies in the financial statement figures. These deficiencies 
are privately disclosed to the company so that they can improve internal controls, and many 
times the company is able to resolve the issue before it becomes a problem. However, 
unless the auditor believes that an unresolved deficiency could lead to a large error in the 
financial statements, audit standards do not require that auditors modify their opinions 
about the company’s financial statements and internal controls, and they are not required 
to disclose anything about the deficiencies to the public.  
The plaintiff is arguing that if the auditor had performed procedures correctly, they would 
have known that there was an increased risk of error and fraud in the company, and would 
have modified their opinion accordingly. Unfortunately, the decisions made by auditors are 
not always black and white. It is well known in the professional community that the audit of 
internal controls is a difficult process that requires auditors to rely heavily on their 
professional judgment and instincts in certain situations. At times, there isn‘t solid evidence 
that the auditor can collect to support their judgments. 
In this particular situation, during their audit of the 2007 financial statements and internal 
controls of Clovitech, Inc., ABC CPA Firm discovered and documented 334 internal 
control deficiencies in various areas in the company, an average amount for a company of 
this size. All of these deficiencies were either corrected by Clovitech, Inc. or the auditor 
decided that the deficiency was not likely to expose the company to large errors in the 
financial statements. 
One of these 334 deficiencies was in the internal controls established by top level 
management. This deficiency was identified when the auditor performed interviews with a 
sample of sales representatives from three different offices to gain an understanding of the 
general attitude of upper level management. Only one sales representative, of the employees 
interviewed, indicated that management was overly focused on meeting sales projections, 
and would not care if the revenue figures were inflated as long as the projections were met. 
ABC CPA Firm immediately identified this as a significant deficiency in internal controls 
and documented the findings in their workpapers. To see whether the deficiency could be a 
larger issue, the auditor expanded their sample to interview an additional sample of 
employees and found no other indication that the employees felt pressured to inflate their 
revenue figures. In their routine procedures to test for the accuracy of revenue figures, the 
auditor also examined a sample of sales transactions, and found them all to be legitimate 
sales. 




established by top management would not be likely to cause a material misstatement of the 
financial statements. The auditor relied on this evidence and their own professional 
judgment in this case to formulate their opinions about the deficiency.  
Although the plaintiff argues that the auditor did not perform enough procedures to properly 
assess the impact of this internal control issue, we argue that the auditor operated within 
audit standards and documented their findings accordingly. They concluded, based on the 
evidence at the time, that there was not a material weakness in internal controls. This 
means that they do not believe that the deficiency would be bad enough to potentially lead 
to a significant error in the financial statement figures. 
Based on this conclusion and audit standards, the auditor had no responsibility to disclose 
any information on the internal control deficiency at all. Therefore, the auditors‘ failure to 
disclose the deficiency publicly is completely irrelevant to this case, as auditors are not 
required by audit standards to disclose internal control deficiencies if they are not deemed 
material weaknesses. Any additional disclosure of internal control deficiencies is considered 
entirely optional. 
To put this into perspective, this was the only deficiency, out of 334, where the auditor‘s 
judgment turned out to be inaccurate in hindsight. If we think in broader terms about how 
many deficiencies an audit firm will identify each year across all of their clients in the U.S., 
this is one deficiency out of thousands. No person should ever be held to such a standard of 
perfection, especially when they clearly performed their job within the standard guidelines 
of the profession. 
Negligent misrepresentation can be established only when an auditor fails to exercise the 
usual judgment, care, skill, and diligence employed by other Certified Public Accountants 
(CPAs) in the community. The auditor being sued in this case clearly performed the 
appropriate audit procedures to evaluate internal controls. The auditor was not required 
by auditing standards to say anything at all about the deficiency within the report. It is the 
defense's position that if an auditor complies with auditing standards, he has not been 
negligent. Has the plaintiff proven that this is a case of negligent misrepresentation on the 
part of the auditor? Absolutely not. 
 _____________ 
END OF DEFENDANT ARGUMENTS 







Plaintiff Closing Statement 
Society expects more than this from auditors.  We expect auditors to maintain an attitude of 
professional skepticism in dealing with their clients.  We expect auditors to take any 
irregularities in their clients‘ internal control procedures seriously, as such measures are in 
place to prevent fraudulent activities such as the ones that led to material misstatements in 
Clovitech, Inc.'s financial statements.  
The auditor admits that an employee of Clovitech raised a concern about the internal 
controls established by top management, but the auditor dismissed the individual on the 
basis that other employees didn‘t feel the same way. Did they stop to think that the people 
they are interviewing are likely to be the exact people perpetrating fraud? Of course, the 
auditor relied on professional judgment to make their decision, but how are we to know 
whether they made this judgment responsibly and not out of their own self interest? 
Auditors are being paid to perform their services, and have been known to downplay issues 
they find so that they are hired again for the next year. In conclusion, ABC CPA Firm 
clearly did not live up to society's expectations, and should be held accountable for their 
actions. Because of the auditor‘s negligent actions, the stockholders lost $100 million 
through their investment. Therefore, I urge you to find ABC CPA Firm liable for negligent 
misrepresentation. I also urge you to require the auditors to compensate these stockholders 
for their losses, and punish the auditors for not doing their job. 
Defendant Closing Statement 
The plaintiff has told you that ABC CPA Firm made some mistakes in its audit of the 2007 
financial statements of Clovitech, Inc., specifically in their evaluation of internal controls. It 
is now up to you to evaluate whether the actions taken by ABC CPA Firm were actually 
negligent, according to the laws and regulations established in the U.S. Is it negligent to 
follow commonly-used judgmental procedures in determining the impact of internal control 
deficiencies? Is it negligent to follow reporting guidelines and only disclose internal 
control issues that are deemed by the auditor to be material?  
This is clearly not a case of negligent misrepresentation; moreover, auditing standards 
require nothing more than these actions. The fact of the matter is that ABC CPA Firm made 
a difficult decision when evaluating whether the deficiency in the internal controls 
established by top management at Clovitech, Inc. could create material errors in the 
financial statements.  
It is well known in practice that this particular control deficiency is very difficult to evaluate 
because it requires the auditor to rely on their perceptions about a situation based on 




allow them to rely less on individual perceptions, they certainly would have done so. 
However, this is not the case, because evaluating the internal controls established by top 
management is very subjective, and the auditor was forced to make a decision based on 
their professional judgment about the situation. It is not the auditor‘s fault that they could 
not collect other types of evidence that would rely less on their professional judgment. The 
evidence the auditor collected clearly indicated to them at the time that there wasn‘t a larger 
issue with the account. 
The fact that their opinion was wrong is irrelevant; audits cannot possibly assure that the 
financial statements are 100% accurate. ABC CPA Firm performed an audit that complies 
with auditing standards. It is clear that ABC CPA Firm is not liable for negligent 
misrepresentation. The plaintiff has failed to demonstrate otherwise. Accordingly, I urge 
you to find ABC CPA Firm not liable for negligent misrepresentation. 
_____________ 
END OF CLOSING STATEMENTS 
Please click "Next" to continue to the Judge's Instructions 
 
Not Disclosed/More Auditable Condition 
Introduction to Study 
The following section provides an overview of a realistic court case that emerged following 
the bankruptcy of a public company. A large group of individuals who own stock in the 
company filed a class action suit against the auditors for negligent misrepresentation, and 
are seeking damages to recover losses in stock value. The circumstances of the case will be 
argued from the perspectives of both the plaintiff and defendant.  
While reviewing the information presented to you, we ask that you evaluate the information 
as if you were a jury member assigned to the trial. After you review the information, you 
will be asked to conclude whether the independent auditor, ABC CPA Firm, is liable for 
negligent misrepresentation, and provide your opinions about the circumstances presented 
in the case. 
Stockholders of Clovitech, Inc.  v. ABC CPA Firm  
Complaint: The plaintiffs, the stockholders of Clovitech, Inc., allege that the defendant, 
ABC CPA Firm, made false statements without exercising reasonable care of competence 
in obtaining and communicating information for the audit of the 2007 financial statements 




accounting firm, for $100 million in damages for their actual losses in stock value, and are 
asking for additional punitive damages to punish ABC CPA Firm for their negligent 
actions. 
Response: The defendant, ABC CPA Firm, responds that it fully complied with auditing 
standards and that it was not negligent in obtaining or communicating information related 
to the audit of the 2007 financial statements of Clovitech, Inc. 
 _____________ 
END OF INTRODUCTION 
Please click "Next" to continue to the Plaintiff Arguments 
 
Plaintiff Arguments 
This case is about auditor negligence. You are about to find out what can happen when 
auditors do not do their jobs properly, and stockholders lose millions of dollars as a result. 
Auditors are hired by companies to determine whether the financial statements of the 
company are accurate. Auditors also investigate whether the company has proper internal 
control policies in place, which are policies within a company that are established to either 
prevent or detect significant inaccuracies in the financial statements (for example: 
restricting access to bookkeeping functions and computer systems or requiring managers to 
approve large transactions). 
In this case, ABC CPA Firm, the auditors of Clovitech, Inc. for the past three years, 
discovered an issue in the internal controls for tracking and reporting inventory during 
their audit of Clovitech Inc. for the 2007 financial statements. However, ABC CPA Firm 
decided that the issue wasn‘t important, and concluded that the internal controls within 
Clovitech, Inc. were effective (otherwise known as a ―clean‖ opinion on internal controls).  
Their ―clean‖ opinion on internal controls was misleading, and did not contain any 
disclosure of the deficiency in internal controls that the auditors discovered during their 
audit. In fact, this particular internal control deficiency, a lack of sufficient internal 
controls for tracking and reporting inventory, was the leading cause of the company’s 
bankruptcy in 2009. 
Because of ABC CPA Firm‘s failure to properly investigate the impact of the deficiency in 
internal controls, and their failure to communicate the potential issue in Clovitech’s 
internal controls to the public, stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. lost $100 million when the 
company‘s stock became worthless after the bankruptcy. The stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. 




and are asking for additional punitive damages to punish ABC CPA Firm for their 
negligent actions.  
Although auditors are hired and paid by the companies whose financial statements they 
examine, an auditor's primary duty is to the general public. Investors and creditors often 
rely on the auditor‘s opinion on the financial statements and internal controls when deciding 
if they can trust the financial information released by the company, which can greatly 
influence their investment/lending decisions. In this case, the stockholders of Clovitech, 
Inc. relied on ABC CPA Firm’s reports when deciding to purchase stock in the company.  
Clovitech, Inc. is a large public company that manufactures computer accessories and 
distributes them to large retailers across the U.S. The 2007 financial statements of the 
company disclosed sales revenues of $400 million, and reported an overall profit of $200 
million for the year. ABC CPA Firm reported that the 2007 financial statements of 
Clovitech, Inc. were accurate. More importantly, the auditors reported that the internal 
controls within the company were sufficient to assure reliance on their financial figures. 
Relying on this information provided by Clovitech, Inc. and ABC CPA Firm, stockholders 
purchased and retained stock in the company totaling $100 million.  
In February 2009, almost a year after ABC CPA Firm released these reports, a news article 
surfaced indicating that Clovitech, Inc. filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy due to a sudden 
significant decrease in orders from stores selling their products. Details on an inventory 
fraud scheme had emerged, and it became evident that employees had been inflating sales 
revenues to meet projections and conceal significant declines in demand for their products 
for the past year.  
Specifically, individual sales teams were distributing excess inventory to retailers near the 
end of each quarter to meet short-term revenue projections. The sales teams were able to 
convince retailers to over-stock Clovitech, Inc. products by providing incentives (for 
example: highly favorable credit terms of 6 months or more with no interest). The sales 
were then recorded as income for Clovitech, Inc. The scheme was uncovered when demand 
for the product declined. Retailers were no longer able to sell the product in their stores and 
stopped ordering more stock from the sales representatives. This scheme is considered 
fraudulent, since the employees are receiving excess compensation based on intentionally 
manipulated sales revenue figures.    
The discovery that this significant overstatement of sales revenue figures had been occurring 
since the beginning of 2007 prompted the company to decrease their 2007 reported sales 
revenues by over $200 million, resulting in an overall loss of $10 million for the year.  
The restatement was also accompanied by management‘s disclosure of a serious flaw in 
internal controls, stating that the internal controls for tracking and reporting inventory  are 
ineffective and resulted in unreliable monitoring of inventory counts and demands. This 




inflate sales revenue figures without being detected.  
On the day the restatement was announced, Clovitech, Inc. stock dropped 50% in value 
from $28 to $14 per share.  Only one week later, following the bankruptcy announcement, 
the stock was considered worthless, with total losses for this group of shareholders 
estimated at $100 million.  
The stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. are not arguing that ABC CPA Firm would have 
necessarily discovered the actual fraud if they had performed additional procedures. It is 
well known that managers will go to great lengths to cover up fraudulent activity. Instead, 
the stockholders argue that the auditors were negligent in their evaluation  of internal 
controls within the company, and that their disclosures were misleading. 
The lack of appropriate  internal controls in place at Clovitech, Inc. permitted fraudulent 
activity to occur within the company on a continuing basis. This fraudulent activity resulted 
in financial statements that were not reliable, with sales revenue figures falsely inflated by 
over $200 million. This overstatement in sales revenue is a serious issue, because 
stockholders may not have purchased stock in the company if these false sales were not 
included in the company‘s income.  
Workpaper evidence indicates that ABC CPA Firm identified the deficiency in the internal 
controls for tracking and reporting inventory that facilitated this fraudulent activity.  
Although the auditor will argue that they performed additional audit procedures to confirm 
that the deficiency they found was not likely to cause major issues with the financial 
statement figures, they chose not to disclose any information to the public on their findings, 
and reported that internal controls were effective in the company. This overall conclusion 
on internal controls was misleading. 
We argue that the type of evidence the auditor relied upon in this case to evaluate internal 
controls, statistical sampling of transactions, was not sufficient evidence to reach their 
conclusions. This evidence only represents a small subset of all of the transactions in the 
company. How are we to know that the auditor performed their duties with care when they 
examined the evidence they collected? They may have been biased against finding anything 
that would make more work for them or cause them to lose the client for next year‘s audit. 
Auditors are paid to provide their services to companies. How can we rely so heavily on the 
auditor‘s judgment when they are financially motivated to keep their job? 
Overall, the auditor’s opinion on internal controls mislead investors into thinking there 
were no problems with the internal controls of the company, when in fact auditors were 
aware of deficiencies. The auditor did not publicly disclose any concerns with the 
company‘s controls. Instead, they reported a ―clean‖ opinion on internal controls, expressing 
that controls within the company were “effective”. At the very least, auditors could have 




investors about the problems within the company. 
We claim that, because of their negligence and resulting misleading statement within their 
audit opinion on internal controls, the auditor did not signal investors of the true potential 
that the financial statements may not be accurate. Therefore, I am asking on behalf of the 
stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. that you find ABC CPA Firm liable for negligent 
misrepresentation. We ask that you compensate the stockholders $100 million for the loss 
in stock value, and that you punish the auditors appropriately by awarding punitive damages 
as well. 
_____________ 
END OF PLAINTIFF ARGUMENTS 
Please click "Next" to continue to the Defendant's Arguments 
 
Defendant Arguments 
Our position is that ABC CPA Firm fully complied with auditing standards in its audit of 
Clovitech, Inc.'s 2007 financial statements and internal controls. We argue that ABC CPA 
Firm should not be liable for negligent misrepresentation. To help you understand why the 
auditor‘s actions were in fact not negligent, I would like to first give you a short 
background on what the auditor‘s responsibilities are in the financial reporting process.  
Then, I will provide specific details about the 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc.‘s internal 
controls to show that the auditor performed well within the duty of care required by the 
audit standards in the U.S. After you hear these facts, you will no doubt find that ABC CPA 
Firm should be found not liable for negligent misrepresentation.  
An auditor‘s job is to reduce the probability that people receive misstated financial 
statements, but auditors cannot provide 100% assurance that financial statements are 
accurate. Auditors could potentially find every misstatement, but to do so they would have 
to examine every single transaction in which a company took part.  This would make the 
cost of an audit so high that no one would be able to afford an audit at all. Instead, auditors 
examine a subset of transactions by using their professional judgment and sophisticated 
sampling techniques. This is what auditing standards require.  
The auditor also conducts an evaluation of internal controls to determine if the company 
has controls in place to prevent the employees from committing fraud and/or making errors. 
Since the auditor cannot possibly look at every transaction, high quality internal controls are 
important because they provide additional assurance that a company’s financial 




in internal controls, particularly with a company this size, which could have an excellent 
system of internal controls but still end up with hundreds of small ways that fraud could be 
committed. 
Most of the time, these deficiencies are deemed to be immaterial, in the sense that they will 
not likely lead to large discrepancies in the financial statement figures. These deficiencies 
are privately disclosed to the company so that they can improve internal controls, and many 
times the company is able to resolve the issue before it becomes a problem. However, 
unless the auditor believes that an unresolved deficiency could lead to a large error in the 
financial statements, audit standards do not require that auditors modify their opinions 
about the company’s financial statements and internal controls, and they are not required 
to disclose anything about the deficiencies to the public.  
The plaintiff is arguing that if the auditor had performed procedures correctly, they would 
have known that there was an increased risk of error and fraud in the company, and would 
have modified their opinion accordingly. Unfortunately, the decisions made by auditors are 
not always black and white. It is well known in the professional community that the audit of 
internal controls is a difficult process that requires auditors to rely heavily on their 
professional judgment and instincts in certain situations. At times, there isn‘t solid evidence 
that the auditor can collect to support their judgments. 
In this particular situation, during their audit of the 2007 financial statements and internal 
controls of Clovitech, Inc., ABC CPA Firm discovered and documented 334 internal 
control deficiencies in various areas in the company, an average amount for a company of 
this size. All of these deficiencies were either corrected by Clovitech, Inc. or the auditor 
decided that the deficiency was not likely to expose the company to large errors in the 
financial statements. 
One of these 334 deficiencies was in the internal controls for tracking and recording 
inventory. This deficiency was identified when the auditor examined  inventory records at 
three different offices to make sure that employees were tracking and recording inventory 
properly. Only one record, out of the records examined, indicated that inventory counts and 
records may not be consistently updated and errors may not be resolved. 
ABC CPA Firm immediately identified this as a significant deficiency in internal controls 
and documented the findings in their workpapers. To see whether the deficiency could be a 
larger issue, the auditor expanded their sample to examine an additional sample of records 
and found no other indication that the inventory count and record keeping procedures were 
deficient. In their routine procedures to test for the accuracy of revenue figures, the auditor 
also examined a sample of sales transactions, and found them all to be legitimate sales. 
Based on this evidence, ABC CPA Firm decided that this deficiency in the internal controls 
over inventory procedures would not be likely to cause a material misstatement of the 




the deficiency.  
Although the plaintiff argues that the auditor did not perform enough procedures to properly 
assess the impact of this internal control issue, we argue that the auditor operated within 
audit standards and documented their findings accordingly. They concluded, based on the 
evidence at the time, that there was not a material weakness in internal controls. This 
means that they do not believe that the deficiency would be bad enough to potentially lead 
to a significant error in the financial statement figures. 
Based on this conclusion and audit standards, the auditor had no responsibility to disclose 
any information on the internal control deficiency at all. Therefore, the auditors‘ failure to 
disclose the deficiency publicly is completely irrelevant to this case, as auditors are not 
required by audit standards to disclose internal control deficiencies if they are not deemed 
material weaknesses. Any additional disclosure of internal control deficiencies is considered 
entirely optional. 
To put this into perspective, this was the only deficiency, out of 334, where the auditor‘s 
judgment turned out to be inaccurate in hindsight. If we think in broader terms about how 
many deficiencies an audit firm will identify each year across all of their clients in the U.S., 
this is one deficiency out of thousands. No person should ever be held to such a standard of 
perfection, especially when they clearly performed their job within the standard guidelines 
of the profession. 
Negligent misrepresentation can be established only when an auditor fails to exercise the 
usual judgment, care, skill, and diligence employed by other Certified Public Accountants 
(CPAs) in the community. The auditor being sued in this case clearly performed the 
appropriate audit procedures to evaluate internal controls. The auditor was not required 
by auditing standards to say anything at all about the deficiency within the report. It is the 
defense's position that if an auditor complies with auditing standards, he has not been 
negligent. Has the plaintiff proven that this is a case of negligent misrepresentation on the 
part of the auditor? Absolutely not. 
 _____________ 
END OF DEFENDANT ARGUMENTS 








Plaintiff Closing Statement 
Society expects more than this from auditors.  We expect auditors to maintain an attitude of 
professional skepticism in dealing with their clients.  We expect auditors to take any 
irregularities in their clients‘ internal control procedures seriously, as such measures are in 
place to prevent fraudulent activities such as the ones that led to material misstatements in 
Clovitech, Inc.'s financial statements.  
The auditor admits that they found evidence of a discrepancy in the inventory records, but 
the auditor dismissed it on the basis that they didn‘t find any other discrepancies. Did they 
stop to think that there may be many more discrepancies in the account that they didn‘t even 
look at? Of course, the auditor relied on statistics to evaluate the potential for bigger issues 
in the company, but how are we to know they made this judgment responsibly and not out of 
their own self interest?  
Auditors are being paid to perform their services, and have been known to downplay issues 
they find so that they are hired again for the next year. In conclusion, ABC CPA Firm 
clearly did not live up to society's expectations, and should be held accountable for their 
actions. Because of the auditor‘s negligent actions, the stockholders lost $100 million 
through their investment. Therefore, I urge you to find ABC CPA Firm liable for negligent 
misrepresentation. I also urge you to require the auditors to compensate these stockholders 
for their losses, and punish the auditors for not doing their job. 
Defendant Closing Statement 
The plaintiff has told you that ABC CPA Firm made some mistakes in its audit of the 2007 
financial statements of Clovitech, Inc., specifically in their evaluation of internal controls. It 
is now up to you to evaluate whether the actions taken by ABC CPA Firm were actually 
negligent, according to the laws and regulations established in the U.S. Is it negligent to 
follow commonly-used judgmental procedures in determining the impact of internal control 
deficiencies? Is it negligent to follow reporting guidelines and only disclose internal 
control issues that are deemed by the auditor to be material?  
This is clearly not a case of negligent misrepresentation; moreover, auditing standards 
require nothing more than these actions. The fact of the matter is that ABC CPA Firm made 
a difficult decision when evaluating whether the deficiency in the internal controls for 
tracking and recording inventory at Clovitech, Inc. could create material errors in the 
financial statements.  
It is well known that auditors must rely on only a sample of transactions to determine their 
opinions about a company, because it would be too time consuming and expensive for 




company. The auditor collected the evidence required by audit standards, and even 
collected additional evidence after they found the one discrepancy to make sure that they 
were not missing anything. It is not the auditor‘s fault that they could not look at every 
transaction. The evidence the auditor collected clearly indicated to them at the time that 
there wasn‘t a larger issue with the account. 
The fact that their opinion was wrong is irrelevant; audits cannot possibly assure that the 
financial statements are 100% accurate. ABC CPA Firm performed an audit that complies 
with auditing standards. It is clear that ABC CPA Firm is not liable for negligent 
misrepresentation. The plaintiff has failed to demonstrate otherwise. Accordingly, I urge 
you to find ABC CPA Firm not liable for negligent misrepresentation. 
_____________ 
END OF CLOSING STATEMENTS 
Please click "Next" to continue to the Judge's Instructions 
 
Disclosure/Less Auditable Condition: 
Introduction to Study 
The following section provides an overview of a realistic court case that emerged following the 
bankruptcy of a public company. A large group of individuals who own stock in the company 
filed a class action suit against the auditors for negligent misrepresentation, and are seeking 
damages to recover losses in stock value. The circumstances of the case will be argued from the 
perspectives of both the plaintiff and defendant.  
While reviewing the information presented to you, we ask that you evaluate the information as if 
you were a jury member assigned to the trial. After you review the information, you will be 
asked to conclude whether the independent auditor, ABC CPA Firm, is liable for negligent 
misrepresentation, and provide your opinions about the circumstances presented in the case. 
Stockholders of Clovitech, Inc.  v. ABC CPA Firm  
Complaint: The plaintiffs, the stockholders of Clovitech, Inc., allege that the defendant, ABC 
CPA Firm, made false statements without exercising reasonable care of competence in 
obtaining and communicating information for the audit of the 2007 financial statements and 
internal controls of Clovitech, Inc. They are suing ABC CPA Firm, a large international 
accounting firm, for $100 million in damages for their actual losses in stock value, and are 




Response: The defendant, ABC CPA Firm, responds that it fully complied with auditing 
standards and that it was not negligent in obtaining or communicating information related to 
the audit of the 2007 financial statements of Clovitech, Inc. 
 _____________ 
END OF INTRODUCTION 
Please click "Next" to continue to the Plaintiff Arguments 
 
Plaintiff Arguments 
This case is about auditor negligence. You are about to find out what can happen when auditors 
do not do their jobs properly, and stockholders lose millions of dollars as a result. Auditors are 
hired by companies to determine whether the financial statements of the company are accurate. 
Auditors also investigate whether the company has proper internal control policies in place, 
which are policies within a company that are established to either prevent or detect significant 
inaccuracies in the financial statements (for example: restricting access to bookkeeping 
functions and computer systems or requiring managers to approve large transactions). 
In this case, ABC CPA Firm, the auditors of Clovitech, Inc. for the past three years, discovered 
an issue in the internal controls established by the top level managers within the company 
during their audit of Clovitech Inc. for the 2007 financial statements. However, ABC CPA Firm 
decided that the issue wasn‘t important, and concluded that the internal controls within 
Clovitech, Inc. were effective (otherwise known as a ―clean‖ opinion on internal controls).  
Yes, they provided a disclosure of the deficiency that they discovered during their audit, but 
their overall ―clean‖ opinion on internal controls was misleading. In fact, this particular internal 
control deficiency, a lack of sufficient internal controls established by the top level managers 
within the company, was the leading cause of the company’s bankruptcy in 2009.   
Because of ABC CPA Firm‘s failure to properly investigate the impact of the deficiency in 
internal controls, stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. lost $100 million when the company‘s stock 
became worthless after the bankruptcy. The stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. are suing the auditor, 
ABC CPA Firm, for $100 million in damages for their actual losses, and are asking for 
additional punitive damages to punish ABC CPA Firm for their negligent actions.  
Although auditors are hired and paid by the companies whose financial statements they examine, 
an auditor's primary duty is to the general public. Investors and creditors often rely on the 
auditor‘s opinion on the financial statements and internal controls when deciding if they can trust 
the financial information released by the company, which can greatly influence their 
investment/lending decisions. In this case, the stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. relied on ABC 




Clovitech, Inc. is a large public company that manufactures computer accessories and distributes 
them to large retailers across the U.S. The 2007 financial statements of the company disclosed 
sales revenues of $400 million, and reported an overall profit of $200 million for the year. ABC 
CPA Firm reported that the 2007 financial statements of Clovitech, Inc. were accurate. More 
importantly, the auditors reported that the internal controls within the company were sufficient to 
assure reliance on their financial figures. Relying on this information provided by Clovitech, 
Inc. and ABC CPA Firm, stockholders purchased and retained stock in the company totaling 
$100 million.  
In February 2009, almost a year after ABC CPA Firm released these reports, a news article 
surfaced indicating that Clovitech, Inc. filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy due to a sudden 
significant decrease in orders from stores selling their products. Details on an inventory fraud 
scheme had emerged, and it became evident that employees had been inflating sales revenues to 
meet projections and conceal significant declines in demand for their products for the past year.  
Specifically, individual sales teams were distributing excess inventory to retailers near the end of 
each quarter to meet short-term revenue projections. The sales teams were able to convince 
retailers to over-stock Clovitech, Inc. products by providing incentives (for example: highly 
favorable credit terms of 6 months or more with no interest). The sales were then recorded as 
income for Clovitech, Inc. The scheme was uncovered when demand for the product declined. 
Retailers were no longer able to sell the product in their stores and stopped ordering more stock 
from the sales representatives. This scheme is considered fraudulent, since the employees are 
receiving excess compensation based on intentionally manipulated sales revenue figures.    
The discovery that this significant overstatement of sales revenue figures had been occurring 
since the beginning of 2007 prompted the company to decrease their 2007 reported sales 
revenues by over $200 million, resulting in an overall loss of $10 million for the year.  
The restatement was also accompanied by management‘s disclosure of a serious flaw in internal 
controls, stating that the internal controls established by the top level managers within the 
company were ineffective. Company policy over-emphasized meeting short term profit goals at 
the sacrifice of internal control at the sales division level. This weakness in internal control 
contributed to the fact that the employees were able to falsely inflate sales revenue figures 
without being detected.  
On the day the restatement was announced, Clovitech, Inc. stock dropped 50% in value from 
$28 to $14 per share.  Only one week later, following the bankruptcy announcement, the stock 
was considered worthless, with total losses for this group of shareholders estimated at $100 
million.  
The stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. are not arguing that ABC CPA Firm would have necessarily 
discovered the actual fraud if they had performed additional procedures. It is well known that 
managers will go to great lengths to cover up fraudulent activity. Instead, the stockholders argue 
that the auditors were negligent in their evaluation  of internal controls within the company, and 




The lack of appropriate  internal controls in place at Clovitech, Inc. permitted fraudulent 
activity to occur within the company on a continuing basis. This fraudulent activity resulted in 
financial statements that were not reliable, with sales revenue figures falsely inflated by over 
$200 million. This overstatement in sales revenue is a serious issue, because stockholders may 
not have purchased stock in the company if these false sales were not included in the company‘s 
income.  
Workpaper evidence indicates that ABC CPA Firm identified the deficiency in the internal 
controls established by the top level managers within the company that facilitated this 
fraudulent activity.  
Although the auditor will argue that they performed additional audit procedures to confirm that 
the deficiency they found was not likely to cause major issues with the financial statement 
figures, they reported that internal controls were effective in the company. Yes, they provided a 
disclosure of the deficiency, but their overall conclusion on internal controls is misleading.   
We argue that the type of evidence the auditor relied upon in this case to evaluate internal 
controls, employee interviews, was not sufficient evidence to reach their conclusions and 
allowed the auditor too much leeway in interpretation. Interview evidence is highly subjective, 
and the auditor relied heavily on professional judgment to form their opinions. How are we to 
know that the auditor performed their duties with care when they interpreted the interview 
evidence? They may have been biased against finding anything that would make more work for 
them or cause them to lose the client for next year‘s audit. Auditors are paid to provide their 
services to companies. How can we rely so heavily on the auditor‘s judgment when they are 
financially motivated to keep their job? 
Overall, the auditor’s opinion on internal controls mislead investors into thinking there were no 
problems with the internal controls of the company, when in fact auditors were aware of 
deficiencies. Even though the auditor did voluntarily disclose the fact that they discovered the 
deficiency, they reported a ―clean‖ opinion on internal controls, expressing that controls within 
the company were “effective” 
We claim that, because of their negligence and resulting misleading statement within their audit 
opinion on internal controls, the auditor did not signal investors of the true potential that the 
financial statements may not be accurate. Therefore, I am asking on behalf of the stockholders of 
Clovitech, Inc. that you find ABC CPA Firm liable for negligent misrepresentation. We ask that 
you compensate the stockholders $100 million for the loss in stock value, and that you punish 
the auditors appropriately by awarding punitive damages as well. 
_____________ 
END OF PLAINTIFF ARGUMENTS 





Our position is that ABC CPA Firm fully complied with auditing standards in its audit of 
Clovitech, Inc.'s 2007 financial statements and internal controls. We argue that ABC CPA Firm 
should not be liable for negligent misrepresentation. To help you understand why the auditor‘s 
actions were in fact not negligent, I would like to first give you a short background on what the 
auditor‘s responsibilities are in the financial reporting process.  
Then, I will provide specific details about the 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc.‘s internal controls to 
show that the auditor performed well within the duty of care required by the audit standards in 
the U.S. In fact, the auditor went beyond their duty and voluntarily reported a deficiency in 
internal controls that they are in no way required to disclose to the public. After you hear these 
facts, you will no doubt find that ABC CPA Firm should be found not liable for negligent 
misrepresentation.  
An auditor‘s job is to reduce the probability that people receive misstated financial statements, 
but auditors cannot provide 100% assurance that financial statements are accurate. Auditors 
could potentially find every misstatement, but to do so they would have to examine every single 
transaction in which a company took part.  This would make the cost of an audit so high that no 
one would be able to afford an audit at all. Instead, auditors examine a subset of transactions by 
using their professional judgment and sophisticated sampling techniques. This is what auditing 
standards require.  
The auditor also conducts an evaluation of internal controls to determine if the company has 
controls in place to prevent the employees from committing fraud and/or making errors. Since 
the auditor cannot possibly look at every transaction, high quality internal controls are important 
because they provide additional assurance that a company’s financial statements are accurate. 
During this process, the auditor frequently identifies deficiencies in internal controls, particularly 
with a company this size, which could have an excellent system of internal controls but still end 
up with hundreds of small ways that fraud could be committed. 
Most of the time, these deficiencies are deemed to be immaterial, in the sense that they will not 
likely lead to large discrepancies in the financial statement figures. These deficiencies are 
privately disclosed to the company so that they can improve internal controls, and many times 
the company is able to resolve the issue before it becomes a problem. However, unless the 
auditor believes that an unresolved deficiency could lead to a large error in the financial 
statements, audit standards do not require that auditors modify their opinions about the 
company’s financial statements and internal controls, and they are not required to disclose 
anything about the deficiencies to the public.  
The plaintiff is arguing that if the auditor had performed procedures correctly, they would have 
known that there was an increased risk of error and fraud in the company, and would have 
modified their opinion accordingly. Unfortunately, the decisions made by auditors are not always 
black and white. It is well known in the professional community that the audit of internal 




judgment and instincts in certain situations. At times, there isn‘t solid evidence that the auditor 
can collect to support their judgments. 
In this particular situation, during their audit of the 2007 financial statements and internal 
controls of Clovitech, Inc., ABC CPA Firm discovered and documented 334 internal control 
deficiencies in various areas in the company, an average amount for a company of this size. All 
of these deficiencies were either corrected by Clovitech, Inc. or the auditor decided that the 
deficiency was not likely to expose the company to large errors in the financial statements. 
One of these 334 deficiencies was in the internal controls established by top level management. 
This deficiency was identified when the auditor performed interviews with a sample of sales 
representatives from three different offices to gain an understanding of the general attitude of 
upper level management. Only one sales representative, of the employees interviewed, indicated 
that management was overly focused on meeting sales projections, and would not care if the 
revenue figures were inflated as long as the projections were met. 
ABC CPA Firm immediately identified this as a significant deficiency in internal controls and 
documented the findings in their workpapers. To see whether the deficiency could be a larger 
issue, the auditor expanded their sample to interview an additional sample of employees and 
found no other indication that the employees felt pressured to inflate their revenue figures. In 
their routine procedures to test for the accuracy of revenue figures, the auditor also examined a 
sample of sales transactions, and found them all to be legitimate sales. 
Based on this evidence, ABC CPA Firm decided that this deficiency in the internal controls 
established by top management would not be likely to cause a material misstatement of the 
financial statements. The auditor relied on this evidence and their own professional judgment in 
this case to formulate their opinions about the deficiency.  
Although the plaintiff argues that the auditor did not perform enough procedures to properly 
assess the impact of this internal control issue, we argue that the auditor operated within audit 
standards and documented their findings accordingly. They concluded, based on the evidence at 
the time, that there was not a material weakness in internal controls. This means that they do 
not believe that the deficiency would be bad enough to potentially lead to a significant error in 
the financial statement figures. 
Based on this conclusion and audit standards, the auditor had no responsibility to disclose any 
information on the internal control deficiency at all, as auditors are not required by audit 
standards to disclose internal control deficiencies if they are not deemed material weaknesses. 
However, the auditor went above and beyond the call of duty and voluntarily disclosed that they 
found a deficiency in internal controls. This voluntary disclosure was entirely optional, and 
auditors decided to make the disclosure to communicate to investors that there may be an issue in 
internal controls, even though the auditor did not find any errors in the financial statements. 
To put this into perspective, this was the only deficiency, out of 334, where the auditor‘s 




deficiencies an audit firm will identify each year across all of their clients in the U.S., this is one 
deficiency out of thousands. No person should ever be held to such a standard of perfection, 
especially when they clearly performed their job within the standard guidelines of the profession. 
Negligent misrepresentation can be established only when an auditor fails to exercise the usual 
judgment, care, skill, and diligence employed by other Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) in 
the community. The auditor being sued in this case clearly performed the appropriate audit 
procedures to evaluate internal controls. The additional voluntary disclosure related to internal 
controls provided by the auditor went above and beyond the call of duty, as the auditor was not 
required to say anything at all about the deficiency within the report. It is the defense's position 
that if an auditor complies with auditing standards, he has not been negligent. Has the plaintiff 
proven that this is a case of negligent misrepresentation on the part of the auditor? Absolutely 
not. 
 _____________ 
END OF DEFENDANT ARGUMENTS 
Please click "Next" to continue to the Closing Statements 
 
Closing Statements 
Plaintiff Closing Statement 
Society expects more than this from auditors.  We expect auditors to maintain an attitude of 
professional skepticism in dealing with their clients.  We expect auditors to take any 
irregularities in their clients‘ internal control procedures seriously, as such measures are in place 
to prevent fraudulent activities such as the ones that led to material misstatements in Clovitech, 
Inc.'s financial statements.  
The auditor admits that an employee of Clovitech raised a concern about the internal controls 
established by top management, but the auditor dismissed the individual on the basis that other 
employees didn‘t feel the same way. Did they stop to think that the people they are interviewing 
are likely to be the exact people perpetrating fraud? Of course, the auditor relied on professional 
judgment to make their decision, but how are we to know whether they made this judgment 
responsibly and not out of their own self interest? 
Auditors are being paid to perform their services, and have been known to downplay issues they 
find so that they are hired again for the next year. In conclusion, ABC CPA Firm clearly did not 
live up to society's expectations, and should be held accountable for their actions. Because of the 
auditor‘s negligent actions, the stockholders lost $100 million through their investment. 




you to require the auditors to compensate these stockholders for their losses, and punish the 
auditors for not doing their job. 
Defendant Closing Statement 
The plaintiff has told you that ABC CPA Firm made some mistakes in its audit of the 2007 
financial statements of Clovitech, Inc., specifically in their evaluation of internal controls. It is 
now up to you to evaluate whether the actions taken by ABC CPA Firm were actually negligent, 
according to the laws and regulations established in the U.S. Is it negligent to follow commonly-
used judgmental procedures in determining the impact of internal control deficiencies? Is it 
negligent to go above and beyond reporting guidelines and disclose internal control issues that 
are deemed by the auditor to be important?  
This is clearly not a case of negligent misrepresentation; moreover, auditing standards require 
nothing more than these actions. The fact of the matter is that ABC CPA Firm made a difficult 
decision when evaluating whether the deficiency in the internal controls established by top 
management at Clovitech, Inc. could create material errors in the financial statements.  
It is well known in practice that this particular control deficiency is very difficult to evaluate 
because it requires the auditor to rely on their perceptions about a situation based on 
interviews. If the auditor had the ability to collect additional evidence in this case that would 
allow them to rely less on individual perceptions, they certainly would have done so. However, 
this is not the case, because evaluating the internal controls established by top management is 
very subjective, and the auditor was forced to make a decision based on their professional 
judgment about the situation. It is not the auditor‘s fault that they could not collect other types of 
evidence that would rely less on their professional judgment. The evidence that the auditor 
collected clearly indicated to them at the time that there wasn‘t a larger issue with the account. 
The fact that their opinion was wrong is irrelevant; audits cannot possibly assure that the 
financial statements are 100% accurate. ABC CPA Firm performed an audit that complies with, 
and even surpasses, auditing standards. The auditor even voluntarily provided a disclosure of 
the internal control deficiency in their report, which is not required by standards. It is clear that 
ABC CPA Firm is not liable for negligent misrepresentation. The plaintiff has failed to 
demonstrate otherwise. Accordingly, I urge you to find ABC CPA Firm not liable for negligent 
misrepresentation.  
_____________ 
END OF CLOSING STATEMENTS 





Disclosure/More Auditable Condition: 
Introduction to Study 
The following section provides an overview of a realistic court case that emerged following 
the bankruptcy of a public company. A large group of individuals who own stock in the 
company filed a class action suit against the auditors for negligent misrepresentation, and 
are seeking damages to recover losses in stock value. The circumstances of the case will be 
argued from the perspectives of both the plaintiff and defendant.  
While reviewing the information presented to you, we ask that you evaluate the information 
as if you were a jury member assigned to the trial. After you review the information, you 
will be asked to conclude whether the independent auditor, ABC CPA Firm, is liable for 
negligent misrepresentation, and provide your opinions about the circumstances presented 
in the case. 
Stockholders of Clovitech, Inc.  v. ABC CPA Firm  
Complaint: The plaintiffs, the stockholders of Clovitech, Inc., allege that the defendant, 
ABC CPA Firm, made false statements without exercising reasonable care of competence 
in obtaining and communicating information for the audit of the 2007 financial statements 
and internal controls of Clovitech, Inc. They are suing ABC CPA Firm, a large international 
accounting firm, for $100 million in damages for their actual losses in stock value, and are 
asking for additional punitive damages to punish ABC CPA Firm for their negligent 
actions. 
Response: The defendant, ABC CPA Firm, responds that it fully complied with auditing 
standards and that it was not negligent in obtaining or communicating information related 
to the audit of the 2007 financial statements of Clovitech, Inc. 
 _____________ 
END OF INTRODUCTION 
Please click "Next" to continue to the Plaintiff Arguments 
 
Plaintiff Arguments 
This case is about auditor negligence. You are about to find out what can happen when 
auditors do not do their jobs properly, and stockholders lose millions of dollars as a result. 
Auditors are hired by companies to determine whether the financial statements of the 




control policies in place, which are policies within a company that are established to either 
prevent or detect significant inaccuracies in the financial statements (for example: 
restricting access to bookkeeping functions and computer systems or requiring managers to 
approve large transactions). 
In this case, ABC CPA Firm, the auditors of Clovitech, Inc. for the past three years, 
discovered an issue in the internal controls for tracking and reporting inventory during 
their audit of Clovitech Inc. for the 2007 financial statements. However, ABC CPA Firm 
decided that the issue wasn‘t important, and concluded that the internal controls within 
Clovitech, Inc. were effective (otherwise known as a ―clean‖ opinion on internal controls).  
Yes, they provided a disclosure of the deficiency that they discovered during their audit, but 
their overall ―clean‖ opinion on internal controls was misleading. In fact, this particular 
internal control deficiency, a lack of sufficient internal controls for tracking and reporting 
inventory, was the leading cause of the company’s bankruptcy in 2009.  
Because of ABC CPA Firm‘s failure to properly investigate the impact of the deficiency in 
internal controls, stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. lost $100 million when the company‘s 
stock became worthless after the bankruptcy. The stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. are suing 
the auditor, ABC CPA Firm, for $100 million in damages for their actual losses, and are 
asking for additional punitive damages to punish ABC CPA Firm for their negligent 
actions.  
Although auditors are hired and paid by the companies whose financial statements they 
examine, an auditor's primary duty is to the general public. Investors and creditors often 
rely on the auditor‘s opinion on the financial statements and internal controls when deciding 
if they can trust the financial information released by the company, which can greatly 
influence their investment/lending decisions. In this case, the stockholders of Clovitech, 
Inc. relied on ABC CPA Firm’s reports when deciding to purchase stock in the company.  
Clovitech, Inc. is a large public company that manufactures computer accessories and 
distributes them to large retailers across the U.S. The 2007 financial statements of the 
company disclosed sales revenues of $400 million, and reported an overall profit of $200 
million for the year. ABC CPA Firm reported that the 2007 financial statements of 
Clovitech, Inc. were accurate. More importantly, the auditors reported that the internal 
controls within the company were sufficient to assure reliance on their financial figures. 
Relying on this information provided by Clovitech, Inc. and ABC CPA Firm, stockholders 
purchased and retained stock in the company totaling $100 million.  
In February 2009, almost a year after ABC CPA Firm released these reports, a news article 
surfaced indicating that Clovitech, Inc. filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy due to a sudden 
significant decrease in orders from stores selling their products. Details on an inventory 
fraud scheme had emerged, and it became evident that employees had been inflating sales 




for the past year.  
Specifically, individual sales teams were distributing excess inventory to retailers near the 
end of each quarter to meet short-term revenue projections. The sales teams were able to 
convince retailers to over-stock Clovitech, Inc. products by providing incentives (for 
example: highly favorable credit terms of 6 months or more with no interest). The sales 
were then recorded as income for Clovitech, Inc. The scheme was uncovered when demand 
for the product declined. Retailers were no longer able to sell the product in their stores and 
stopped ordering more stock from the sales representatives. This scheme is considered 
fraudulent, since the employees are receiving excess compensation based on intentionally 
manipulated sales revenue figures.    
The discovery that this significant overstatement of sales revenue figures had been occurring 
since the beginning of 2007 prompted the company to decrease their 2007 reported sales 
revenues by over $200 million, resulting in an overall loss of $10 million for the year.  
The restatement was also accompanied by management‘s disclosure of a serious flaw in 
internal controls, stating that the internal controls for tracking and reporting inventory  are 
ineffective and resulted in unreliable monitoring of inventory counts and demands. This 
weakness in internal control contributed to the fact that the employees were able to falsely 
inflate sales revenue figures without being detected.  
On the day the restatement was announced, Clovitech, Inc. stock dropped 50% in value 
from $28 to $14 per share.  Only one week later, following the bankruptcy announcement, 
the stock was considered worthless, with total losses for this group of shareholders 
estimated at $100 million.  
The stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. are not arguing that ABC CPA Firm would have 
necessarily discovered the actual fraud if they had performed additional procedures. It is 
well known that managers will go to great lengths to cover up fraudulent activity. Instead, 
the stockholders argue that the auditors were negligent in their evaluation  of internal 
controls within the company, and that their disclosures were misleading. 
The lack of appropriate  internal controls in place at Clovitech, Inc. permitted fraudulent 
activity to occur within the company on a continuing basis. This fraudulent activity resulted 
in financial statements that were not reliable, with sales revenue figures falsely inflated by 
over $200 million. This overstatement in sales revenue is a serious issue, because 
stockholders may not have purchased stock in the company if these false sales were not 
included in the company‘s income.  
Workpaper evidence indicates that ABC CPA Firm identified the deficiency in the internal 
controls for tracking and reporting inventory that facilitated this fraudulent activity.  




that the deficiency they found was not likely to cause major issues with the financial 
statement figures, they reported that internal controls were effective in the company. Yes, 
they provided a disclosure of the deficiency, but their overall conclusion on internal 
controls is misleading.   
We argue that the type of evidence the auditor relied upon in this case to evaluate internal 
controls, statistical sampling of transactions, was not sufficient evidence to reach their 
conclusions. This evidence only represents a small subset of all of the transactions in the 
company. How are we to know that the auditor performed their duties with care when they 
examined the evidence they collected? They may have been biased against finding anything 
that would make more work for them or cause them to lose the client for next year‘s audit. 
Auditors are paid to provide their services to companies. How can we rely so heavily on the 
auditor‘s judgment when they are financially motivated to keep their job? 
Overall, the auditor’s opinion on internal controls mislead investors into thinking there 
were no problems with the internal controls of the company, when in fact auditors were 
aware of deficiencies. Even though the auditor did voluntarily disclose the fact that they 
discovered the deficiency, they reported a ―clean‖ opinion on internal controls, expressing 
that controls within the company were “effective” 
We claim that, because of their negligence and resulting misleading statement within their 
audit opinion on internal controls, the auditor did not signal investors of the true potential 
that the financial statements may not be accurate. Therefore, I am asking on behalf of the 
stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. that you find ABC CPA Firm liable for negligent 
misrepresentation. We ask that you compensate the stockholders $100 million for the loss 
in stock value, and that you punish the auditors appropriately by awarding punitive damages 
as well. 
_____________ 
END OF PLAINTIFF ARGUMENTS 
Please click "Next" to continue to the Defendant's Arguments 
 
Defendant Arguments 
Our position is that ABC CPA Firm fully complied with auditing standards in its audit of 
Clovitech, Inc.'s 2007 financial statements and internal controls. We argue that ABC CPA 
Firm should not be liable for negligent misrepresentation. To help you understand why the 
auditor‘s actions were in fact not negligent, I would like to first give you a short 




Then, I will provide specific details about the 2007 audit of Clovitech, Inc.‘s internal 
controls to show that the auditor performed well within the duty of care required by the 
audit standards in the U.S. In fact, the auditor went beyond their duty and voluntarily 
reported a deficiency in internal controls that they are in no way required to disclose to the 
public. After you hear these facts, you will no doubt find that ABC CPA Firm should be 
found not liable for negligent misrepresentation.  
An auditor‘s job is to reduce the probability that people receive misstated financial 
statements, but auditors cannot provide 100% assurance that financial statements are 
accurate. Auditors could potentially find every misstatement, but to do so they would have 
to examine every single transaction in which a company took part.  This would make the 
cost of an audit so high that no one would be able to afford an audit at all. Instead, auditors 
examine a subset of transactions by using their professional judgment and sophisticated 
sampling techniques. This is what auditing standards require.  
The auditor also conducts an evaluation of internal controls to determine if the company 
has controls in place to prevent the employees from committing fraud and/or making errors. 
Since the auditor cannot possibly look at every transaction, high quality internal controls are 
important because they provide additional assurance that a company’s financial 
statements are accurate. During this process, the auditor frequently identifies deficiencies 
in internal controls, particularly with a company this size, which could have an excellent 
system of internal controls but still end up with hundreds of small ways that fraud could be 
committed. 
Most of the time, these deficiencies are deemed to be immaterial, in the sense that they will 
not likely lead to large discrepancies in the financial statement figures. These deficiencies 
are privately disclosed to the company so that they can improve internal controls, and many 
times the company is able to resolve the issue before it becomes a problem. However, 
unless the auditor believes that an unresolved deficiency could lead to a large error in the 
financial statements, audit standards do not require that auditors modify their opinions 
about the company’s financial statements and internal controls, and they are not required 
to disclose anything about the deficiencies to the public.  
The plaintiff is arguing that if the auditor had performed procedures correctly, they would 
have known that there was an increased risk of error and fraud in the company, and would 
have modified their opinion accordingly. Unfortunately, the decisions made by auditors are 
not always black and white. It is well known in the professional community that the audit of 
internal controls is a difficult process that requires auditors to rely heavily on their 
professional judgment and instincts in certain situations. At times, there isn‘t solid evidence 
that the auditor can collect to support their judgments. 
In this particular situation, during their audit of the 2007 financial statements and internal 
controls of Clovitech, Inc., ABC CPA Firm discovered and documented 334 internal 




this size. All of these deficiencies were either corrected by Clovitech, Inc. or the auditor 
decided that the deficiency was not likely to expose the company to large errors in the 
financial statements. 
One of these 334 deficiencies was in the internal controls for tracking and recording 
inventory. This deficiency was identified when the auditor examined  inventory records at 
three different offices to make sure that employees were tracking and recording inventory 
properly. Only one record, out of the records examined, indicated that inventory counts and 
records may not be consistently updated and errors may not be resolved. 
ABC CPA Firm immediately identified this as a significant deficiency in internal controls 
and documented the findings in their workpapers. To see whether the deficiency could be a 
larger issue, the auditor expanded their sample to examine an additional sample of records 
and found no other indication that the inventory count and record keeping procedures were 
deficient. In their routine procedures to test for the accuracy of revenue figures, the auditor 
also examined a sample of sales transactions, and found them all to be legitimate sales. 
Based on this evidence, ABC CPA Firm decided that this deficiency in the internal controls 
over inventory procedures would not be likely to cause a material misstatement of the 
financial statements. The auditor relied on this evidence to formulate their opinions about 
the deficiency.  
Although the plaintiff argues that the auditor did not perform enough procedures to properly 
assess the impact of this internal control issue, we argue that the auditor operated within 
audit standards and documented their findings accordingly. They concluded, based on the 
evidence at the time, that there was not a material weakness in internal controls. This 
means that they do not believe that the deficiency would be bad enough to potentially lead 
to a significant error in the financial statement figures. 
Based on this conclusion and audit standards, the auditor had no responsibility to disclose 
any information on the internal control deficiency at all, as auditors are not required by 
audit standards to disclose internal control deficiencies if they are not deemed material 
weaknesses. However, the auditor went above and beyond the call of duty and voluntarily 
disclosed that they found a deficiency in internal controls. This voluntary disclosure was 
entirely optional, and auditors decided to make the disclosure to communicate to investors 
that there may be an issue in internal controls, even though the auditor did not find any 
errors in the financial statements. 
To put this into perspective, this was the only deficiency, out of 334, where the auditor‘s 
judgment turned out to be inaccurate in hindsight. If we think in broader terms about how 
many deficiencies an audit firm will identify each year across all of their clients in the U.S., 
this is one deficiency out of thousands. No person should ever be held to such a standard of 




of the profession. 
Negligent misrepresentation can be established only when an auditor fails to exercise the 
usual judgment, care, skill, and diligence employed by other Certified Public Accountants 
(CPAs) in the community. The auditor being sued in this case clearly performed the 
appropriate audit procedures to evaluate internal controls. The additional voluntary 
disclosure related to internal controls provided by the auditor went above and beyond the 
call of duty, as the auditor was not required to say anything at all about the deficiency 
within the report. It is the defense's position that if an auditor complies with auditing 
standards, he has not been negligent. Has the plaintiff proven that this is a case of negligent 
misrepresentation on the part of the auditor? Absolutely not. 
 _____________ 
END OF DEFENDANT ARGUMENTS 
Please click "Next" to continue to the Closing Statements 
Closing Statements 
Plaintiff Closing Statement 
Society expects more than this from auditors.  We expect auditors to maintain an attitude of 
professional skepticism in dealing with their clients.  We expect auditors to take any 
irregularities in their clients‘ internal control procedures seriously, as such measures are in 
place to prevent fraudulent activities such as the ones that led to material misstatements in 
Clovitech, Inc.'s financial statements.  
The auditor admits that they found evidence of a discrepancy in the inventory records, but 
the auditor dismissed it on the basis that they didn‘t find any other discrepancies. Did they 
stop to think that there may be many more discrepancies in the account that they didn‘t even 
look at? Of course, the auditor relied on statistics to evaluate the potential for bigger issues 
in the company, but how are we to know they made this judgment responsibly and not out of 
their own self interest?  
Auditors are being paid to perform their services, and have been known to downplay issues 
they find so that they are hired again for the next year. In conclusion, ABC CPA Firm 
clearly did not live up to society's expectations, and should be held accountable for their 
actions. Because of the auditor‘s negligent actions, the stockholders lost $100 million 
through their investment. Therefore, I urge you to find ABC CPA Firm liable for negligent 
misrepresentation. I also urge you to require the auditors to compensate these stockholders 




Defendant Closing Statement 
The plaintiff has told you that ABC CPA Firm made some mistakes in its audit of the 2007 
financial statements of Clovitech, Inc., specifically in their evaluation of internal controls. It 
is now up to you to evaluate whether the actions taken by ABC CPA Firm were actually 
negligent, according to the laws and regulations established in the U.S. Is it negligent to 
follow commonly-used judgmental procedures in determining the impact of internal control 
deficiencies? Is it negligent to go above and beyond reporting guidelines and disclose 
internal control issues that are deemed by the auditor to be important?   
This is clearly not a case of negligent misrepresentation; moreover, auditing standards 
require nothing more than these actions. The fact of the matter is that ABC CPA Firm made 
a difficult decision when evaluating whether the deficiency in the internal controls for 
tracking and recording inventory at Clovitech, Inc. could create material errors in the 
financial statements.  
It is well known that auditors must rely on only a sample of transactions to determine their 
opinions about a company, because it would be too time consuming and expensive for 
companies to have auditors to look at every single transaction that occurs within a 
company. The auditor collected the evidence required by audit standards, and even 
collected additional evidence after they found the one discrepancy to make sure that they 
were not missing anything. It is not the auditor‘s fault that they could not look at every 
transaction. The evidence the auditor collected clearly indicated to them at the time that 
there wasn‘t a larger issue with the account. 
The fact that their opinion was wrong is irrelevant; audits cannot possibly assure that the 
financial statements are 100% accurate. ABC CPA Firm performed an audit that complies 
with, and even surpasses, auditing standards. The auditor even voluntarily provided a 
disclosure of the internal control deficiency in their report, which is not required by 
standards. It is clear that ABC CPA Firm is not liable for negligent misrepresentation. The 
plaintiff has failed to demonstrate otherwise. Accordingly, I urge you to find ABC CPA 
Firm not liable for negligent misrepresentation.  
_____________ 
END OF CLOSING STATEMENTS 










As jury members, you are now responsible for evaluating the case presented to you, keeping 
in mind the following instructions related to the laws governing claims of negligent 
misrepresentation. The burden of proof in this case lies with the plaintiff.  
In order to be successful on a claim of negligent misrepresentation, the plaintiff must prove 
that ABC CPA Firm made false statements without exercising reasonable care of 
competence in obtaining OR communicating information for the audit of the 2007 financial 
statements and internal controls of Clovitech, Inc. You should consider whether the 
defendant complied with professional auditing standards in making your evaluation.  
If you decide that ABC CPA Firm did exercise the usual judgment, care, skill, and diligence 
employed by other CPAs in the community in both obtaining AND communicating 
information, you must find them NOT LIABLE for negligent misrepresentation.  
If you decide that ABC CPA Firm did not exercise the usual judgment, care, skill, and 
diligence employed by other CPAs in the community in either obtaining OR communicating 
information, you must find them LIABLE for negligent misrepresentation. 
_____________ 
You have now concluded the audio/video portion of this task.   






Please answer the following questions as if you were a jury member in the trial for the lawsuit 
filed by the stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. against the auditors, ABC CPA Firm. Please note, 
these questions are asked to gain your opinion on the case you reviewed in the previous section, 
so there is no ―right‖ or ―wrong‖ answer to these questions.  
 
In this case, stockholders are suing the defendant, ABC CPA Firm, for negligent 
misrepresentation. A defendant may be found liable for negligent misrepresentation when the 
defendant makes false statements without exercising reasonable care of competence in obtaining 
or communicating the information.  
 
How would you vote?  
 
 The auditor is liable for negligent misrepresentation. 
The auditor is NOT liable for negligent misrepresentation. 
 
The stockholders in this case are suing for $100 million in compensatory damages and 
undetermined punitive damages. When answering the following questions, please note the 
provided definitions:  
 
Compensatory damages: Amount of money adequate to compensate for any actual damages 
caused by the party against whom they awarded. In this case, stockholders are suing for 
compensation of $100 million in actual losses. 
 
As one of the jurors, what dollar amount in compensatory damages would you recommend be 
awarded to the stockholders? You must decide on a dollar amount from $0 to $100,000,000.  
 
Please enter a whole number (no decimals) with no dollar signs or commas. ______ 
 
Punitive Damages: Amount of money awarded to punish a defendant and to deter a defendant 
and others from committing similar acts in the future. Punitive damages are usually awarded in 
cases where the defendant's actions were very offensive. Punitive damages are awarded in 
addition to the compensatory damages, so your answer to the previous question on compensatory 
damages does not impact your decision for punitive damages. In this case, assume that the 
punitive damages are limited to $200 million. 
 
As one of the jurors, what dollar amount in punitive damages would you recommend be awarded 
to the stockholders? You must decide on a dollar amount from $0 to $200,000,000.  
 






The following questions are asked to gain your perspectives about the actions of ABC CPA Firm 
(the auditor of Clovitech, Inc.) based on what you read in the scenario presented to you.  
 

























ABC CPA Firm is liable for 
negligent misrepresentation. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
ABC CPA Firm performed 
their services in compliance 
within the standards that 
dictate how audits should be 
performed. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
ABC CPA Firm made the 
appropriate disclosures in 
compliance within the 
standards that dictate what 
auditors should disclose. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
ABC CPA Firm could have 
prevented the stockholder 
losses. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
ABC CPA Firm is 
responsible for stockholder 
losses. 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
 
Please answer the remaining questions in this survey without looking back at the case: 
 
What did the auditors, ABC CPA Firm, conclude in their report on internal controls for the 2007 
financial statements for Clovitech, Inc.? 
 
The independent auditors reported a “clean” opinion on internal controls, with no 
disclosure of any significant deficiencies in internal controls. 
The independent auditors reported a “clean” opinion on internal controls, but voluntarily 







What factor was specifically mentioned in the case as the largest contributing factor in the lack 
of detection or prevention of fraud for Clovitech, and was cited as a major component in the 
plaintiff's case against the auditor, ABC CPA Firm?  
Ineffective internal controls for tracking and recording inventory; records were not 
updated and often inaccurate. 
Ineffective internal controls established by top management; employees were overly 
encouraged to meet short term goals instead of assuring long term success of the company. 
 
 
In your opinion, how much did the auditor, ABC CPA Firm, have to rely on their professional 



































The following questions are asked to gain your perspectives about this task  
 
 
Please select "Yes" or "No" depending on your experience with the task you completed. 
 
Did you listen to the audio recording provided for this task? Yes No  
 
Did you read the text provided for this task? Yes No  
 
Did you click to open the PDF file and read the auditor's report on internal controls? Yes No  
 

























The task was difficult. ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
The task was enjoyable. ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
The task was realistic. ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
 





If yes, please describe:  
 
The following questions are asked to allow the researchers to further understand the 
demographics of the individuals responding to this study. The answers are entirely voluntary, but 
are very important to the research.  
 
What is your age?  
 
What is your gender? 
 
Are you currently a U. S. Citizen? 
 
What is your current state of residence?  
 
Are you currently registered to vote in the US? 
 
Are you currently registered to vote in the US? 
 






If other, please specify 
 
Have you ever been called for jury duty in the U.S? 
 
Have you ever served on a jury in the U.S.?  
No 
Yes, for a civil trial 





Are you currently or have you ever been: 
  
A Certified Public Accountant?  
 
An Auditor?  
 
A Manager in a business where a financial audit was conducted?   
 
A Professional Investor (provided investment advice or made investments for others as your 
main source of employment)?  
An attorney?  
 
A member of an audit committee?  
 
Are you currently a student? 
 
What is the highest level of education you have attained?  
Some High School 
Completed High School (or Equivalent) 
Completed Trade or Professional School 
Some College 
Graduated College 
Some Post-Graduate School 
Completed Graduate School 
 
What is your approximate annual gross family income?  
less than $10,000 
$10,000 - $24,999 
$25,000 - $39,999 
$40,000 - $54,999 
$55,000 - $69,999 
$70,000 - $84,999 
$85,000 - $ 99,999 
$100,000 - $199,999 
$200,000 or more 
 






Stay-at-home parent or homemaker 
Unemployed (and looking for employment) 
Other 
If other, please specify  
 
If you are currently employed or self-employed, what is your field of employment (for example, 







What is your race/ethnicity? 
 
American Indian or Alaskan Native 










The following questions are commonly asked in the jury selection process for court cases. Please 
answer either ―yes‖ or ―no‖ to each of the following questions: 
 
Have you or a family member or close personal friend either currently or in the past been 
involved as a party (either a plaintiff or a defendant) in a lawsuit involving damages for 
professional negligence (medical malpractice, accounting malpractice, etc.)?  
 
Have you or a family member or close personal friend either currently or in the past been 
involved as a party (either a plaintiff or a defendant) in a class action lawsuit?  
 
A plaintiff is a person or corporation who has initiated a lawsuit. Would you have a bias for or 
against a plaintiff simply because he or she has brought a lawsuit?  
 
A defendant is a person or corporation against whom a lawsuit has been brought. Would you 
have a bias for or against a defendant simply because a lawsuit has been brought against him or 
her?  
 
If the law and evidence warranted, would you be able to render a verdict f or defendant 
regardless of any sympathy you may have for either party?  
 
Would your verdict in this case be influenced in any way by any factors other than the evidence 
in the courtroom such as friendships or family relationships or the type of work you do?  
 
Have you ever testified in any court proceeding?  
 
Have you ever been a witness in a civil matter, regardless of whether it went to trial?  
 
Do you, or have you ever, owned stock in a company?  
 
Have you ever owned stock in a company that has declared bankruptcy?  
 











Cases (presented separately by condition) 
Study Instructions 
The following section provides details related to the bankruptcy of a public company, and a 
lawsuit filed by stockholders against the company‘s auditor. While reviewing the information 
presented to you, we ask that you evaluate the information as if you were a jury member 
assigned to the trial. After you review the information, you will be asked to conclude whether the 
auditor is liable for negligent misrepresentation, and provide your opinions about the 
circumstances presented in the case.  
(Low Independence/Low Expertise Case) 
 I. Background on Clovitech, Inc.:  
Clovitech, Inc. is a large public company that manufactures computer accessories and distributes 
them to large retailers across the U.S. The 2007 financial statements of the company disclosed 
sales revenues of $400 million and an overall profit of $200 million, with positive indications for 
future growth. The stock for the company immediately following the release of the 2007 report 
was on a consistent positive trend, and analysts considered the company a solid investment.  
Clovitech, Inc. has been audited by ABC CPA Firm, a large international accounting firm, for 
the past three years. Auditors are hired by companies to determine whether the financial 
statements of the company are accurate. Auditors also investigate whether the company has 
proper internal control policies in place, which are procedures that are designed to prevent or 
detect significant inaccuracies in the financial statements. Auditors must issue an opinion on the 
adequacy of the internal controls and issue an opinion on whether the financial statements are 
fairly presented.  For 2007, ABC CPA Firm issued an opinion stating that the 2007 financial 
statements of Clovitech, Inc. were reliable. They also expressed an opinion stating that the 
internal controls within the company were sufficient to assure reliance on their financial figures.  
In their 2007 annual report Clovitech, Inc. reported details on their audit committee. Audit 
committees are required for all public companies, and serve multiple purposes. The audit 
committee selects the independent audit firm, and is in charge of paying the auditor. The 
Committee also reviews the procedures of the independent registered audit firm for ensuring the 
auditor‘s independence with respect to the services performed for the Company. Therefore, the 
members of the audit committee have an important job in assuring that the external auditors are 
performing up to standards and making independent and objective decisions.  
While audit committee members are members of the Board of Directors, only a subset of the full 
Board are on the audit committee. The members of the audit committee are usually members of 
the business community that are not currently working directly for the company in any other 
way. Members are permitted to own stock in the company; although it is encouraged they own 




stock ownership in the company might influence the ability for the audit committee member to 
make objective decisions during the auditing and reporting process. 
To remain in compliance with laws, the company must also disclose whether members of the 
audit committee would be considered experts in finance or accounting. This expertise is 
considered important because of the high level of influence the audit committee has on the 
oversight of auditing and financial reporting in the company. However, companies are not 
actually required to have an expert audit committee member. They are only required to provide a 
disclosure about the members‘ level of expertise. If none of the members could be considered 
experts in finance or auditing, the company must disclose why they feel the members are 
appropriate for the job. 
In 2007, Clovitech, Inc. publicly reported that the audit committee operated in compliance with 
the suggested requirements for public companies by assuring that all members did not have 
significant financial investments or professional relationships with the company. The company 
also disclosed details on the level of expertise of the audit committee members.   
In their report, Clovitech stated that the audit committee consisted of 3 members who own an 
average of 8% of stock in the company. Although no single member of the audit committee 
qualifies as an expert in finance or accounting, Clovitech reported that the collective knowledge 
of the audit committee covers the necessary knowledge needed to fulfill their roles.  
An independent organization that collects information about public companies and their audit 
committees performed a detailed analysis of Clovitech‘s audit committee in 2007. Their analysis 
generates a score out of 100 based on key factors that are common characteristics of high quality 
audit committees. The level of expertise for the audit committee of Clovitech, Inc. was rated 
―low‖ with a score of 30/100. The committee‘s level of freedom from financial or professional 
relationships with the company was also rated ―low‖ with a score of 30/100, meaning that the 
committee members have a close relationship to the company. 
Summary of Clovitech, Inc. audit committee characteristics, as described above:  
Clovitech, Inc. Audit Committee 
Characteristics 
Independent Audit Committee 
Quality Rating of Clovitech, Inc. 
Audit Committee 
Average Amount of Clovitech, 
Inc. Stock Owned by Audit 
Committee Members 
8% 
Level of freedom from financial or 
professional relationships with the company 
rated "Low" (Score 30/100)* 
Number of Audit Committee 
Members with Expertise in 
Accounting and/or Finance 
None 





*Note: A Low rating in this category indicates that the committee members have a close 
relationship to the company.  
II. Relationships between the Audit Committee, Top Management, and the Auditor 
Audit committees are in charge of overseeing the audit process, and are often consulted when a 
disagreement occurs between managers of the company and the external auditor in examining 
the company‘s records and internal controls. The relationship between these three groups is 
important to understand, as the quality of the audit can often depend on the qualifications and 
objectivity of each of the groups. One of the main ways that companies maintain an independent 
audit is making sure that the external auditor is not overly subjected to pressure to comply with 
management‘s requests, so that the decisions made about the audit are in the best interests of 
shareholders and creditors.  
Since managers of the company are often compensated directly based on their performance, and 
are financially motivated to show profits and meet projections, they are often deemed to have the 
least amount of objectivity when evaluating financial reporting issues.  
Audit committees are paid by the company, but are required to keep a minimum level of 
investment in the company to increase objectivity.  
Auditors are paid by the audit committee, which provides an additional level of distance between 
the auditor and management, which is intended to increase the auditor‘s objectivity when making 
decisions about the company‘s financial statements.  
III. Clovitech, Inc. Declares Bankruptcy 
On February 20th 2009, almost a year after the 2007 financial statements of Clovitech, Inc. were 
released, a news article surfaced indicating that Clovitech, Inc. filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
due to a sudden significant decrease in orders from stores selling their products. Details on an 
inventory fraud scheme emerged, and it became evident that employees had been consistently 
inflating revenues to meet projections and conceal significant declines in demand for their 
products for the past year.  
Specifically, individual sales teams were distributing excess inventory to retailers near the end of 
each quarter to meet short-term revenue projections. The sales teams were able to convince 
retailers to over-stock the products with incentives (i.e. highly favorable credit terms of 6 months 
or more with no interest). The scheme was uncovered when significant decreases in demand for 
the product caught up with the company, as retailers were no longer able to sell the product in 
their stores and stopped ordering more stock from the sales representatives. This scheme is 
considered fraudulent, since the employees are receiving excess compensation based on 
intentionally manipulated revenue figures. Multiple employees admitted their participation in the 




The discovery that this manipulation of sales revenue figures had been occurring since the 
beginning of 2007 prompted the company to decrease their 2007 reported sales revenues by over 
$200 million, resulting in an overall loss of $10 million for the year. The restatement was also 
accompanied by management‘s disclosure of a material weakness in internal controls over 
inventory, stating that the internal controls established by the top-level managers within the 
company were ineffective. Management had over-emphasized meeting short-term profit goals at 
the sacrifice of internal control at the sales division level, and did not establish proper controls in 
place to assure that employees did not exaggerate sales at the division level. This weakness 
contributed to the fact that this fraud was able to occur without being detected, and that the 
financial statement figures of Clovitech, Inc. were substantially overstated.  
ABC CPA Firm had discovered this particular deficiency in the internal controls established by 
top management during their audit of internal controls for the 2007 financial statements, and 
reported it to the audit committee. The auditor was particularly concerned that there may be 
excess pressure placed on employees to overstate revenues, and that the financial statements 
could be misleading as a result. The issue was brought up in an audit committee meeting, with 
the auditors and Clovitech executives present, to determine whether the deficiency in internal 
controls warranted further investigation and should be disclosed in the audit report.  
In this audit committee meeting, the Clovitech executives argued that there was no evidence to 
suggest that any errors existed in the financial statements, and presented evidence of a formal 
written policy that clearly instructs employees to record income only when it is appropriate. The 
audit committee sided with the Clovitech executives, arguing that the existence of the policy 
indicates that internal controls are appropriately in place to prevent manipulation of revenue 
figures. Without specific evidence to argue otherwise, the auditor agreed and did not disclose any 
issues with internal controls over revenue recognition in their audit reports for 2007.  
IV. Stockholders Sue ABC CPA Firm for Negligent Misrepresentation 
Stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. consulted a lawyer and decided to sue the auditor, ABC CPA 
Firm, as a group in a class action lawsuit, alleging that the auditors negligently supplied false 
information to stockholders. The stockholders claim that they purchased over $100 million in 
stock because they were relying on the auditor‘s statements that the 2007 financial statements of 
Clovitech, Inc. were accurate and that proper internal controls were established and operating 
effectively. On the day the restatement was announced, Clovitech, Inc. stock dropped 50% in 
value from $28 to $14 per share.  Only one week later, following the bankruptcy announcement, 
the stock was considered worthless, with total losses for this group of shareholders estimated at 
$100 million.   
The stockholders argue that ABC CPA Firm should have performed additional audit procedures 
and disclosed their discovery of a deficiency in internal controls. The stockholders allege that the 
auditors should not have relied on the audit committees‘ suggestions, as the committee clearly 
has too close of a relationship with the company to make objective decisions. They argue that the 
audit committee members‘ direct ownership in the company‘s stock likely compromises the 




The stockholders also allege that the auditors should not have relied on the audit committees‘ 
suggestions, because the committee members clearly had a low level of knowledge and expertise 
about accounting and financial reporting issues. They argue that the audit committee members‘ 
lack of specific experience in accounting or finance compromises the members‘ ability to make 
educated decisions.  
Overall, the stockholders allege that the auditor made the decision to side with the Clovitech 
executives and audit committee members, and not disclose their concerns with the company‘s 
weak internal controls established by top management, out of the auditor‘s own self-interest to 
please the client and make sure they were re-hired for the next year‘s audit. They argue that the 
audit committee‘s involvement in the disagreement with management did not increase the 
auditor‘s objectivity, since the audit committee‘s own lack of objectivity would have 
compromised the situation, and the audit committee‘s lack of experience did not allow them to 
fully understand the issues involved in the dispute.  
In response to these allegations, ABC CPA Firm maintains that they performed their audit well 
within the standards of care as dictated by U.S. audit standards. The auditors argue that they 
fulfilled the requirements of these standards by disclosing the discovery of the deficiency in 
internal controls directly to the audit committee, and the discussion with the audit committee and 
managers convinced the auditor to believe that there was no need to take further action during 
the audit.  
The auditors argue that the audit committee members‘ seemingly low level of expertise in 
accounting or finance did not impact their knowledge about accounting and financial reporting. 
They also assert that the fact that the audit committee members have close relationships with the 
company did not impact the audit committee members‘ ability to communicate objectively about 
the issues that arose during the audit.  
Overall, ABC CPA Firm asserts that they maintained high quality, independent, and objective 
decision-making throughout the entire audit, and came to conclusions based on professional 
judgment of the evidence presented to them at the time. Because audit standards do not require 
auditors to disclose minor deficiencies in internal control to the public, the auditor maintains that 
they fully complied with established professional standards, and are not liable for negligent 
misrepresentation. 
(Low Independence/High Expertise Case) 
I. Background on Clovitech, Inc.:  
Clovitech, Inc. is a large public company that manufactures computer accessories and 
distributes them to large retailers across the U.S. The 2007 financial statements of the 
company disclosed sales revenues of $400 million and an overall profit of $200 million, 
with positive indications for future growth. The stock for the company immediately 




considered the company a solid investment.  
Clovitech, Inc. has been audited by ABC CPA Firm, a large international accounting firm, 
for the past three years. Auditors are hired by companies to determine whether the financial 
statements of the company are accurate. Auditors also investigate whether the company has 
proper internal control policies in place, which are procedures that are designed to prevent 
or detect significant inaccuracies in the financial statements. Auditors must issue an opinion 
on the adequacy of the internal controls and issue an opinion on whether the financial 
statements are fairly presented.  For 2007, ABC CPA Firm issued an opinion stating that the 
2007 financial statements of Clovitech, Inc. were reliable. They also expressed an opinion 
stating that the internal controls within the company were sufficient to assure reliance on 
their financial figures.  
In their 2007 annual report Clovitech, Inc. reported details on their audit committee. Audit 
committees are required for all public companies, and serve multiple purposes. The audit 
committee selects the independent audit firm, and is in charge of paying the auditor. The 
Committee also reviews the procedures of the independent registered audit firm for ensuring 
the auditor‘s independence with respect to the services performed for the Company. 
Therefore, the members of the audit committee have an important job in assuring that the 
external auditors are performing up to standards and making independent and objective 
decisions.  
While audit committee members are members of the Board of Directors, only a subset of the 
full Board are on the audit committee. The members of the audit committee are usually 
members of the business community that are not currently working directly for the company 
in any other way. Members are permitted to own stock in the company; although it is 
encouraged they own less than 10% of the company stock to maintain a distant relationship 
with the company. Any stock ownership in the company might influence the ability for the 
audit committee member to make objective decisions during the auditing and reporting 
process. 
To remain in compliance with laws, the company must also disclose whether members of 
the audit committee would be considered experts in finance or accounting. This expertise is 
considered important because of the high level of influence the audit committee has on the 
oversight of auditing and financial reporting in the company. However, companies are not 
actually required to have an expert audit committee member. They are only required to 
provide a disclosure about the members‘ level of expertise. If none of the members could be 
considered experts in finance or auditing, the company must disclose why they feel the 
members are appropriate for the job. 
In 2007, Clovitech, Inc. publicly reported that the audit committee operated in compliance 
with the suggested requirements for public companies by assuring that all members did not 




company also disclosed details on the level of expertise of the audit committee members.   
In their report, Clovitech stated that the audit committee consisted of 3 members who own 
an average of 8% of stock in the company. Clovitech also reported that one member of the 
committee is a CPA and former CFO of a mid-sized public company, and is considered an 
expert in both finance and accounting.  
An independent organization that collects information about public companies and their 
audit committees performed a detailed analysis of Clovitech‘s audit committee in 2007. 
Their analysis generates a score out of 100 based on key factors that are common 
characteristics of high quality audit committees. The level of expertise for the audit 
committee of Clovitech, Inc. was rated ―high‖ with a score of 90/100. The committee‘s level 
of freedom from financial or professional relationships with the company was rated ―low‖ 
with a score of 30/100, meaning that the committee members have a close relationship to the 
company. 
Summary of Clovitech, Inc. audit committee characteristics, as described above:  
Clovitech, Inc. Audit Committee 
Characteristics 
Independent Audit Committee 
Quality Rating of Clovitech, 
Inc. Audit Committee 
Average Amount of 
Clovitech, Inc. Stock 
Owned by Audit 
Committee Members 
8% 
Level of freedom from financial or 
professional relationships with the 
company rated "Low" (Score 
30/100)* 
Number of Audit 
Committee Members with 
Expertise in Accounting 
and/or Finance 
1 member with 
expertise in both 
accounting and 
finance 
Level of expertise rated "High" 
(Score 90/100) 
*Note: A Low rating in this category indicates that the committee members have a close 
relationship to the company.  
II. Relationships between the Audit Committee, Top Management, and the Auditor 
Audit committees are in charge of overseeing the audit process, and are often consulted when a 
disagreement occurs between managers of the company and the external auditor in examining 
the company‘s records and internal controls. The relationship between these three groups is 
important to understand, as the quality of the audit can often depend on the qualifications and 
objectivity of each of the groups. One of the main ways that companies maintain an independent 




management‘s requests, so that the decisions made about the audit are in the best interests of 
shareholders and creditors.  
Since managers of the company are often compensated directly based on their performance, and 
are financially motivated to show profits and meet projections, they are often deemed to have the 
least amount of objectivity when evaluating financial reporting issues.  
Audit committees are paid by the company, but are required to keep a minimum level of 
investment in the company to increase objectivity.  
Auditors are paid by the audit committee, which provides an additional level of distance between 
the auditor and management, which is intended to increase the auditor‘s objectivity when making 
decisions about the company‘s financial statements.  
III. Clovitech, Inc. Declares Bankruptcy 
On February 20th 2009, almost a year after the 2007 financial statements of Clovitech, Inc. were 
released, a news article surfaced indicating that Clovitech, Inc. filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
due to a sudden significant decrease in orders from stores selling their products. Details on an 
inventory fraud scheme emerged, and it became evident that employees had been consistently 
inflating revenues to meet projections and conceal significant declines in demand for their 
products for the past year.  
Specifically, individual sales teams were distributing excess inventory to retailers near the end of 
each quarter to meet short-term revenue projections. The sales teams were able to convince 
retailers to over-stock the products with incentives (i.e. highly favorable credit terms of 6 months 
or more with no interest). The scheme was uncovered when significant decreases in demand for 
the product caught up with the company, as retailers were no longer able to sell the product in 
their stores and stopped ordering more stock from the sales representatives. This scheme is 
considered fraudulent, since the employees are receiving excess compensation based on 
intentionally manipulated revenue figures. Multiple employees admitted their participation in the 
scheme to inflate sales revenues. 
The discovery that this manipulation of sales revenue figures had been occurring since the 
beginning of 2007 prompted the company to decrease their 2007 reported sales revenues by over 
$200 million, resulting in an overall loss of $10 million for the year. The restatement was also 
accompanied by management‘s disclosure of a material weakness in internal controls over 
inventory, stating that the internal controls established by the top-level managers within the 
company were ineffective. Management had over-emphasized meeting short-term profit goals at 
the sacrifice of internal control at the sales division level, and did not establish proper controls in 
place to assure that employees did not exaggerate sales at the division level. This weakness 
contributed to the fact that this fraud was able to occur without being detected, and that the 




ABC CPA Firm had discovered this particular deficiency in the internal controls established by 
top management during their audit of internal controls for the 2007 financial statements, and 
reported it to the audit committee. The auditor was particularly concerned that there may be 
excess pressure placed on employees to overstate revenues, and that the financial statements 
could be misleading as a result. The issue was brought up in an audit committee meeting, with 
the auditors and Clovitech executives present, to determine whether the deficiency in internal 
controls warranted further investigation and should be disclosed in the audit report.  
In this audit committee meeting, the Clovitech executives argued that there was no evidence to 
suggest that any errors existed in the financial statements, and presented evidence of a formal 
written policy that clearly instructs employees to record income only when it is appropriate. The 
audit committee sided with the Clovitech executives, arguing that the existence of the policy 
indicates that internal controls are appropriately in place to prevent manipulation of revenue 
figures. Without specific evidence to argue otherwise, the auditor agreed and did not disclose any 
issues with internal controls over revenue recognition in their audit reports for 2007.  
IV. Stockholders Sue ABC CPA Firm for Negligent Misrepresentation 
Stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. consulted a lawyer and decided to sue the auditor, ABC CPA 
Firm, as a group in a class action lawsuit, alleging that the auditors negligently supplied false 
information to stockholders. The stockholders claim that they purchased over $100 million in 
stock because they were relying on the auditor‘s statements that the 2007 financial statements of 
Clovitech, Inc. were accurate and that proper internal controls were established and operating 
effectively. On the day the restatement was announced, Clovitech, Inc. stock dropped 50% in 
value from $28 to $14 per share.  Only one week later, following the bankruptcy announcement, 
the stock was considered worthless, with total losses for this group of shareholders estimated at 
$100 million.   
The stockholders argue that ABC CPA Firm should have performed additional audit procedures 
and disclosed their discovery of a deficiency in internal controls. The stockholders allege that the 
auditors should not have relied on the audit committees‘ suggestions, as the committee clearly 
has too close of a relationship with the company to make objective decisions. They argue that the 
audit committee members‘ direct ownership in the company‘s stock likely compromises the 
members‘ ability to make objective decisions.  
Overall, the stockholders allege that the auditor made the decision to side with the Clovitech 
executives and audit committee members, and not disclose their concerns with the company‘s 
weak internal controls established by top management, out of the auditor‘s own self-interest to 
please the client and make sure they were re-hired for next year‘s audit. They argue that the audit 
committee‘s involvement in the disagreement with management did not increase the auditor‘s 
objectivity, since the audit committee‘s own lack of objectivity would have compromised the 
situation.  
In response to these allegations, ABC CPA Firm maintains that they performed their audit well 




fulfilled the requirements of these standards by disclosing the discovery of the deficiency in 
internal controls directly to the audit committee, and the discussion with the audit committee and 
managers convinced the auditor to believe that there was no need to take further action during 
the audit.  
The auditors argue that an audit committee made up of highly expert members in accounting and 
finance should be a viable source of influence and communication about issues that arise during 
the audit, and that the audit committee members‘ opinions were made with sufficient levels of 
knowledge about accounting and financial reporting. They also assert that the fact that the audit 
committee members have close relationships with the company did not impact the audit 
committee members‘ ability to communicate objectively about the issues that arose during the 
audit.  
Overall, ABC CPA Firm asserts that they maintained high quality, independent, and objective 
decision-making throughout the entire audit, and came to conclusions based on professional 
judgment of the evidence presented to them at the time. Because audit standards do not require 
auditors to disclose minor deficiencies in internal control to the public, the auditor maintains that 
they fully complied with established professional standards, and are not liable for negligent 
misrepresentation. 
(High Independence/High Expertise Case) 
I. Background on Clovitech, Inc.:  
Clovitech, Inc. is a large public company that manufactures computer accessories and 
distributes them to large retailers across the U.S. The 2007 financial statements of the 
company disclosed sales revenues of $400 million and an overall profit of $200 million, 
with positive indications for future growth. The stock for the company immediately 
following the release of the 2007 report was on a consistent positive trend, and analysts 
considered the company a solid investment.  
Clovitech, Inc. has been audited by ABC CPA Firm, a large international accounting firm, 
for the past three years. Auditors are hired by companies to determine whether the financial 
statements of the company are accurate. Auditors also investigate whether the company has 
proper internal control policies in place, which are procedures that are designed to prevent 
or detect significant inaccuracies in the financial statements. Auditors must issue an opinion 
on the adequacy of the internal controls and issue an opinion on whether the financial 
statements are fairly presented.  For 2007, ABC CPA Firm issued an opinion stating that the 
2007 financial statements of Clovitech, Inc. were reliable. They also expressed an opinion 
stating that the internal controls within the company were sufficient to assure reliance on 
their financial figures.  
In their 2007 annual report Clovitech, Inc. reported details on their audit committee. Audit 




committee selects the independent audit firm, and is in charge of paying the auditor. The 
Committee also reviews the procedures of the independent registered audit firm for ensuring 
the auditor‘s independence with respect to the services performed for the Company. 
Therefore, the members of the audit committee have an important job in assuring that the 
external auditors are performing up to standards and making independent and objective 
decisions.  
While audit committee members are members of the Board of Directors, only a subset of the 
full Board are on the audit committee. The members of the audit committee are usually 
members of the business community that are not currently working directly for the company 
in any other way. Members are permitted to own stock in the company; although it is 
encouraged they own less than 10% of the company stock to maintain a distant relationship 
with the company. Any stock ownership in the company might influence the ability for the 
audit committee member to make objective decisions during the auditing and reporting 
process. 
To remain in compliance with laws, the company must also disclose whether members of 
the audit committee would be considered experts in finance or accounting. This expertise is 
considered important because of the high level of influence the audit committee has on the 
oversight of auditing and financial reporting in the company. However, companies are not 
actually required to have an expert audit committee member. They are only required to 
provide a disclosure about the members‘ level of expertise. If none of the members could be 
considered experts in finance or auditing, the company must disclose why they feel the 
members are appropriate for the job. 
In 2007, Clovitech, Inc. publicly reported that the audit committee operated in compliance 
with the suggested requirements for public companies by assuring that all members did not 
have significant financial investments or professional relationships with the company. The 
company also disclosed details on the level of expertise of the audit committee members.   
In their report, Clovitech stated that the audit committee consisted of 3 members who do not 
own any stock in the company. Clovitech also reported that one member of the committee is 
a CPA and former CFO of a mid-sized public company, and is considered an expert in both 
finance and accounting.   
An independent organization that collects information about public companies and their 
audit committees performed a detailed analysis of Clovitech‘s audit committee in 2007. 
Their analysis generates a score out of 100 based on key factors that are common 
characteristics of high quality audit committees. The level of expertise for the audit 
committee of Clovitech, Inc. was rated ―high‖ with a score of 90/100. The committee‘s level 
of freedom from financial or professional relationships with the company was also rated 
―high‖ with a score of 90/100, meaning that the committee members have a distant 




Summary of Clovitech, Inc. audit committee characteristics, as described above:  
Clovitech, Inc. Audit Committee 
Characteristics 
Independent Audit Committee 
Quality Rating of Clovitech, 
Inc. Audit Committee 
Average Amount of 
Clovitech, Inc. Stock 
Owned by Audit 
Committee Members 
None 
Level of freedom from financial or 
professional relationships with the 
company rated "High" (Score 
90/100)* 
Number of Audit 
Committee Members with 
Expertise in Accounting 
and/or Finance 
1 member with 
expertise in both 
accounting and 
finance 
Level of expertise rated "High" 
(Score 90/100) 
*Note: A High rating indicates that the committee members have a distant relationship from 
the company.  
II. Relationships between the Audit Committee, Top Management, and the Auditor 
Audit committees are in charge of overseeing the audit process, and are often consulted when a 
disagreement occurs between managers of the company and the external auditor in examining 
the company‘s records and internal controls. The relationship between these three groups is 
important to understand, as the quality of the audit can often depend on the qualifications and 
objectivity of each of the groups. One of the main ways that companies maintain an independent 
audit is making sure that the external auditor is not overly subjected to pressure to comply with 
management‘s requests, so that the decisions made about the audit are in the best interests of 
shareholders and creditors.  
Since managers of the company are often compensated directly based on their performance, and 
are financially motivated to show profits and meet projections, they are often deemed to have the 
least amount of objectivity when evaluating financial reporting issues.  
Audit committees are paid by the company, but are required to keep a minimum level of 
investment in the company to increase objectivity.  
Auditors are paid by the audit committee, which provides an additional level of distance between 
the auditor and management, which is intended to increase the auditor‘s objectivity when making 
decisions about the company‘s financial statements.  




On February 20th 2009, almost a year after the 2007 financial statements of Clovitech, Inc. were 
released, a news article surfaced indicating that Clovitech, Inc. filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
due to a sudden significant decrease in orders from stores selling their products. Details on an 
inventory fraud scheme emerged, and it became evident that employees had been consistently 
inflating revenues to meet projections and conceal significant declines in demand for their 
products for the past year.  
Specifically, individual sales teams were distributing excess inventory to retailers near the end of 
each quarter to meet short-term revenue projections. The sales teams were able to convince 
retailers to over-stock the products with incentives (i.e. highly favorable credit terms of 6 months 
or more with no interest). The scheme was uncovered when significant decreases in demand for 
the product caught up with the company, as retailers were no longer able to sell the product in 
their stores and stopped ordering more stock from the sales representatives. This scheme is 
considered fraudulent, since the employees are receiving excess compensation based on 
intentionally manipulated revenue figures. Multiple employees admitted their participation in the 
scheme to inflate sales revenues. 
The discovery that this manipulation of sales revenue figures had been occurring since the 
beginning of 2007 prompted the company to decrease their 2007 reported sales revenues by over 
$200 million, resulting in an overall loss of $10 million for the year. The restatement was also 
accompanied by management‘s disclosure of a material weakness in internal controls over 
inventory, stating that the internal controls established by the top-level managers within the 
company were ineffective. Management had over-emphasized meeting short-term profit goals at 
the sacrifice of internal control at the sales division level, and did not establish proper controls in 
place to assure that employees did not exaggerate sales at the division level. This weakness 
contributed to the fact that this fraud was able to occur without being detected, and that the 
financial statement figures of Clovitech, Inc. were substantially overstated.  
ABC CPA Firm had discovered this particular deficiency in the internal controls established by 
top management during their audit of internal controls for the 2007 financial statements, and 
reported it to the audit committee. The auditor was particularly concerned that there may be 
excess pressure placed on employees to overstate revenues, and that the financial statements 
could be misleading as a result. The issue was brought up in an audit committee meeting, with 
the auditors and Clovitech executives present, to determine whether the deficiency in internal 
controls warranted further investigation and should be disclosed in the audit report.  
In this audit committee meeting, the Clovitech executives argued that there was no evidence to 
suggest that any errors existed in the financial statements, and presented evidence of a formal 
written policy that clearly instructs employees to record income only when it is appropriate. The 
audit committee sided with the Clovitech executives, arguing that the existence of the policy 
indicates that internal controls are appropriately in place to prevent manipulation of revenue 
figures. Without specific evidence to argue otherwise, the auditor agreed and did not disclose any 





IV. Stockholders Sue ABC CPA Firm for Negligent Misrepresentation 
Stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. consulted a lawyer and decided to sue the auditor, ABC CPA 
Firm, as a group in a class action lawsuit, alleging that the auditors negligently supplied false 
information to stockholders. The stockholders claim that they purchased over $100 million in 
stock because they were relying on the auditor‘s statements that the 2007 financial statements of 
Clovitech, Inc. were accurate and that proper internal controls were established and operating 
effectively. On the day the restatement was announced, Clovitech, Inc. stock dropped 50% in 
value from $28 to $14 per share.  Only one week later, following the bankruptcy announcement, 
the stock was considered worthless, with total losses for this group of shareholders estimated at 
$100 million.   
The stockholders argue that ABC CPA Firm should have performed additional audit procedures 
and disclosed their discovery of a deficiency in internal controls. The stockholders allege that the 
auditors should not have relied on the audit committees‘ suggestions. 
Overall, the stockholders allege that the auditor made the decision to side with the Clovitech 
executives and audit committee members, and not disclose their concerns with the company‘s 
weak internal controls established by top management, out of the auditor‘s own self-interest to 
please the client and make sure they were re-hired for the next year‘s audit. They argue that the 
audit committee‘s involvement in the disagreement with management did not increase the 
auditor‘s objectivity 
In response to these allegations, ABC CPA Firm maintains that they performed their audit well 
within the standards of care as dictated by U.S. audit standards. The auditors argue that they 
fulfilled the requirements of these standards by disclosing the discovery of the deficiency in 
internal controls directly to the audit committee, and the discussion with the audit committee and 
managers convinced the auditor to believe that there was no need to take further action during 
the audit.  
The auditors argue that an audit committee made up of members who do not have close 
relationships with the company, and highly expert members in accounting and finance, should be 
a viable source of communication about issues that arise during the audit. They further note that 
the audit committee members‘ communications about the issue were objective, and made with 
sufficient knowledge about accounting and financial reporting. 
Overall, ABC CPA Firm asserts that they maintained high quality, independent, and objective 
decision-making throughout the entire audit, and came to conclusions based on professional 
judgment of the evidence presented to them at the time. Because audit standards do not require 
auditors to disclose minor deficiencies in internal control to the public, the auditor maintains that 






(High Independence/Low Expertise Case) 
I. Background on Clovitech, Inc.:  
Clovitech, Inc. is a large public company that manufactures computer accessories and 
distributes them to large retailers across the U.S. The 2007 financial statements of the 
company disclosed sales revenues of $400 million and an overall profit of $200 million, 
with positive indications for future growth. The stock for the company immediately 
following the release of the 2007 report was on a consistent positive trend, and analysts 
considered the company a solid investment.  
Clovitech, Inc. has been audited by ABC CPA Firm, a large international accounting firm, 
for the past three years. Auditors are hired by companies to determine whether the financial 
statements of the company are accurate. Auditors also investigate whether the company has 
proper internal control policies in place, which are procedures that are designed to prevent 
or detect significant inaccuracies in the financial statements. Auditors must issue an opinion 
on the adequacy of the internal controls and issue an opinion on whether the financial 
statements are fairly presented.  For 2007, ABC CPA Firm issued an opinion stating that the 
2007 financial statements of Clovitech, Inc. were reliable. They also expressed an opinion 
stating that the internal controls within the company were sufficient to assure reliance on 
their financial figures.  
In their 2007 annual report Clovitech, Inc. reported details on their audit committee. Audit 
committees are required for all public companies, and serve multiple purposes. The audit 
committee selects the independent audit firm, and is in charge of paying the auditor. The 
Committee also reviews the procedures of the independent registered audit firm for ensuring 
the auditor‘s independence with respect to the services performed for the Company. 
Therefore, the members of the audit committee have an important job in assuring that the 
external auditors are performing up to standards and making independent and objective 
decisions.  
While audit committee members are members of the Board of Directors, only a subset of the 
full Board are on the audit committee. The members of the audit committee are usually 
members of the business community that are not currently working directly for the company 
in any other way. Members are permitted to own stock in the company; although it is 
encouraged they own less than 10% of the company stock to maintain a distant relationship 
with the company. Any stock ownership in the company might influence the ability for the 
audit committee member to make objective decisions during the auditing and reporting 
process. 
To remain in compliance with laws, the company must also disclose whether members of 
the audit committee would be considered experts in finance or accounting. This expertise is 
considered important because of the high level of influence the audit committee has on the 




actually required to have an expert audit committee member. They are only required to 
provide a disclosure about the members‘ level of expertise. If none of the members could be 
considered experts in finance or auditing, the company must disclose why they feel the 
members are appropriate for the job. 
In 2007, Clovitech, Inc. publicly reported that the audit committee operated in compliance 
with the suggested requirements for public companies by assuring that all members did not 
have significant financial investments or professional relationships with the company. The 
company also disclosed details on the level of expertise of the audit committee members.   
In their report, Clovitech stated that the audit committee consisted of 3 members who do not 
own any stock in the company. Although no single member of the audit committee qualifies 
as an expert in finance or accounting, Clovitech reported that the collective knowledge of 
the audit committee covers the necessary knowledge needed to fulfill their roles.  
An independent organization that collects information about public companies and their 
audit committees performed a detailed analysis of Clovitech‘s audit committee in 2007. 
Their analysis generates a score out of 100 based on key factors that are common 
characteristics of high quality audit committees. The level of expertise for the audit 
committee of Clovitech, Inc. was rated ―low‖ with a score of 30/100.The committee‘s level 
of freedom from financial or professional relationships with the company was also rated 
―high‖ with a score of 90/100, meaning that the committee members have a distant 
relationship from the company.  
Summary of Clovitech, Inc. audit committee characteristics, as described above:  
Clovitech, Inc. Audit Committee 
Characteristics 
Independent Audit Committee 
Quality Rating of Clovitech, Inc. 
Audit Committee 
Average Amount of Clovitech, 
Inc. Stock Owned by Audit 
Committee Members 
None 
Level of freedom from financial or 
professional relationships with the company 
rated "High" (Score 90/100)* 
Number of Audit Committee 
Members with Expertise in 
Accounting and/or Finance 
None 
Level of expertise rated "Low" (Score 
30/100) 
*Note: A High rating indicates that the committee members have a distant relationship from 
the company.  
II. Relationships between the Audit Committee, Top Management, and the Auditor 
Audit committees are in charge of overseeing the audit process, and are often consulted when a 




the company‘s records and internal controls. The relationship between these three groups is 
important to understand, as the quality of the audit can often depend on the qualifications and 
objectivity of each of the groups. One of the main ways that companies maintain an independent 
audit is making sure that the external auditor is not overly subjected to pressure to comply with 
management‘s requests, so that the decisions made about the audit are in the best interests of 
shareholders and creditors.  
Since managers of the company are often compensated directly based on their performance, and 
are financially motivated to show profits and meet projections, they are often deemed to have the 
least amount of objectivity when evaluating financial reporting issues.  
Audit committees are paid by the company, but are required to keep a minimum level of 
investment in the company to increase objectivity.  
Auditors are paid by the audit committee, which provides an additional level of distance between 
the auditor and management, which is intended to increase the auditor‘s objectivity when making 
decisions about the company‘s financial statements.  
III. Clovitech, Inc. Declares Bankruptcy 
On February 20th 2009, almost a year after the 2007 financial statements of Clovitech, Inc. were 
released, a news article surfaced indicating that Clovitech, Inc. filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
due to a sudden significant decrease in orders from stores selling their products. Details on an 
inventory fraud scheme emerged, and it became evident that employees had been consistently 
inflating revenues to meet projections and conceal significant declines in demand for their 
products for the past year.  
Specifically, individual sales teams were distributing excess inventory to retailers near the end of 
each quarter to meet short-term revenue projections. The sales teams were able to convince 
retailers to over-stock the products with incentives (i.e. highly favorable credit terms of 6 months 
or more with no interest). The scheme was uncovered when significant decreases in demand for 
the product caught up with the company, as retailers were no longer able to sell the product in 
their stores and stopped ordering more stock from the sales representatives. This scheme is 
considered fraudulent, since the employees are receiving excess compensation based on 
intentionally manipulated revenue figures. Multiple employees admitted their participation in the 
scheme to inflate sales revenues. 
The discovery that this manipulation of sales revenue figures had been occurring since the 
beginning of 2007 prompted the company to decrease their 2007 reported sales revenues by over 
$200 million, resulting in an overall loss of $10 million for the year. The restatement was also 
accompanied by management‘s disclosure of a material weakness in internal controls over 
inventory, stating that the internal controls established by the top-level managers within the 
company were ineffective. Management had over-emphasized meeting short-term profit goals at 
the sacrifice of internal control at the sales division level, and did not establish proper controls in 




contributed to the fact that this fraud was able to occur without being detected, and that the 
financial statement figures of Clovitech, Inc. were substantially overstated.  
ABC CPA Firm had discovered this particular deficiency in the internal controls established by 
top management during their audit of internal controls for the 2007 financial statements, and 
reported it to the audit committee. The auditor was particularly concerned that there may be 
excess pressure placed on employees to overstate revenues, and that the financial statements 
could be misleading as a result. The issue was brought up in an audit committee meeting, with 
the auditors and Clovitech executives present, to determine whether the deficiency in internal 
controls warranted further investigation and should be disclosed in the audit report.  
In this audit committee meeting, the Clovitech executives argued that there was no evidence to 
suggest that any errors existed in the financial statements, and presented evidence of a formal 
written policy that clearly instructs employees to record income only when it is appropriate. The 
audit committee sided with the Clovitech executives, arguing that the existence of the policy 
indicates that internal controls are appropriately in place to prevent manipulation of revenue 
figures. Without specific evidence to argue otherwise, the auditor agreed and did not disclose any 
issues with internal controls over revenue recognition in their audit reports for 2007.  
IV. Stockholders Sue ABC CPA Firm for Negligent Misrepresentation 
Stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. consulted a lawyer and decided to sue the auditor, ABC CPA 
Firm, as a group in a class action lawsuit, alleging that the auditors negligently supplied false 
information to stockholders. The stockholders claim that they purchased over $100 million in 
stock because they were relying on the auditor‘s statements that the 2007 financial statements of 
Clovitech, Inc. were accurate and that proper internal controls were established and operating 
effectively. On the day the restatement was announced, Clovitech, Inc. stock dropped 50% in 
value from $28 to $14 per share.  Only one week later, following the bankruptcy announcement, 
the stock was considered worthless, with total losses for this group of shareholders estimated at 
$100 million.   
The stockholders argue that ABC CPA Firm should have performed additional audit procedures 
and disclosed their discovery of a deficiency in internal controls. The stockholders allege that the 
auditors should not have relied on the audit committees‘ suggestions, as the committee members 
clearly had a low level of knowledge and expertise about accounting and financial reporting 
issues. They argue that the audit committee members‘ lack of specific experience in accounting 
or finance compromises the members‘ ability to make educated decisions.  
Overall, the stockholders allege that the auditor made the decision to side with the Clovitech 
executives and audit committee members, and not disclose their concerns with the company‘s 
weak internal controls established by top management, out of the auditor‘s own self-interest to 
please the client and make sure they were re-hired for the next year‘s audit. They argue that the 
audit committee‘s involvement in the disagreement with management did not increase the 
auditor‘s objectivity, since the audit committee‘s lack of experience did not allow them to fully 




In response to these allegations, ABC CPA Firm maintains that they performed their audit well 
within the standards of care as dictated by U.S. audit standards. The auditors argue that they 
fulfilled the requirements of these standards by disclosing the discovery of the deficiency in 
internal controls directly to the audit committee, and the discussion with the audit committee and 
managers convinced the auditor to believe that there was no need to take further action during 
the audit.  
The auditors argue that an audit committee made up of members who do not have close 
relationships with the company should be a viable source of influence and communication about 
issues that arise during the audit, and that they believe that the audit committee members' 
opinions were objective. They also assert that the audit committee members‘ seemingly low level 
of expertise in accounting or finance did not impact their knowledge about accounting and 
financial reporting.  
Overall, ABC CPA Firm asserts that they maintained high quality, independent, and objective 
decision-making throughout the entire audit, and came to conclusions based on professional 
judgment of the evidence presented to them at the time. Because audit standards do not require 
auditors to disclose minor deficiencies in internal control to the public, the auditor maintains that 





Questionnaire (Common to all four conditions) 
 
Please answer the following questions as if you were a jury member in the trial for the lawsuit 
filed by the stockholders of Clovitech, Inc. against the auditors, ABC CPA Firm. Please note, 
these questions are asked to gain your opinion on the case you reviewed in the previous section, 
so there is no ―right‖ or ―wrong‖ answer to these questions.  
 
In this case, stockholders are suing the defendant, ABC CPA Firm, for negligent 
misrepresentation. A defendant may be found liable for negligent misrepresentation when the 
defendant makes false statements without exercising reasonable care of competence in obtaining 
or communicating the information.  
 
How would you vote?  
 
 The auditor is liable for negligent misrepresentation. 
The auditor is NOT liable for negligent misrepresentation. 
 
The stockholders in this case are suing for $100 million in compensatory damages and 
undetermined punitive damages. When answering the following questions, please note the 
provided definitions:  
 
(NOTE: IF PARTICIPANTS RESPONDED ―NOT LIABLE‖ THEY DID NOT ANSWER THE 
NEXT TWO QUESTIONS RELATED TO DAMAGES) 
 
Compensatory damages: Amount of money adequate to compensate for any actual damages 
caused by the party against whom they awarded. In this case, stockholders are suing for 
compensation of $100 million in actual losses. 
 
As one of the jurors, what dollar amount in compensatory damages would you recommend be 
awarded to the stockholders? You must decide on a dollar amount from $0 to $100,000,000.  
 
Please enter a whole number (no decimals) with no dollar signs or commas. ______ 
 
Punitive Damages: Amount of money awarded to punish a defendant and to deter a defendant 
and others from committing similar acts in the future. Punitive damages are usually awarded in 
cases where the defendant's actions were very offensive. Punitive damages are awarded in 
addition to the compensatory damages, so your answer to the previous question on compensatory 
damages does not impact your decision for punitive damages. In this case, assume that the 
punitive damages are limited to $200 million. 
 
As one of the jurors, what dollar amount in punitive damages would you recommend be awarded 
to the stockholders? You must decide on a dollar amount from $0 to $200,000,000.  
 






The following questions are asked to gain your perspectives about the actions of ABC CPA Firm 
(the auditor of Clovitech, Inc.) based on what you read in the scenario presented to you.  
 
 

























ABC CPA Firm is liable for 
negligent misrepresentation. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
ABC CPA Firm performed 
their services in compliance 
within the standards that 
dictate how audits should be 
performed. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
ABC CPA Firm made the 
appropriate disclosures in 
compliance within the 
standards that dictate what 
auditors should disclose. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
ABC CPA Firm could have 
prevented the stockholder 
losses. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
ABC CPA Firm is 
responsible for stockholder 
losses. 





The audit committee of Clovitech, Inc. was not named in the above lawsuit. Nevertheless, please 
assess the following.  
 
























The audit committee is 
liable for negligent 
misrepresentation. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
The audit committee is 
responsible for stockholder 
losses. 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
        
                The executives (upper level management)of Clovitech, Inc. were not named in the above lawsuit. 
Nevertheless, please assess the following.  
 
























The executives of Clovitech, 
Inc. are liable for negligent 
misrepresentation. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
The executives of Clovitech, 
Inc. are responsible for 
stockholder losses. 





The following questions are asked to gain your perspectives about ABC CPA Firm (the auditor 
of Clovitech, Inc.) based on what you read in the scenario presented to you.  
 
























ABC CPA Firm was 
objective during their 2007 
audit of Clovitech, Inc. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
ABC CPA Firm's decisions 
were biased during the 2007 
audit of Clovitech, Inc. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
Management exerted 
pressure on ABC CPA Firm 
NOT to disclose a 
deficiency in the internal 
controls established by top 
management. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
ABC CPA Firm's decisions 
during the audit were 
influenced by the managers 
of Clovitech, Inc. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
ABC CPA Firm was 
protecting its own interest 
by not warning stockholders 
of the client's deficiencies in 
the internal controls 
established by top 
management. 





The following questions are asked to gain your perspectives about the audit committee of 
Clovitech, Inc. (the company who declared bankruptcy) based on what you read in the scenario 
presented to you.  
 

























The audit committee had the 
relevant expertise for their 
job. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
The audit committee had 
expertise in finance. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
The audit committee had 
expertise in accounting. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
The audit committee was 
able to comprehend the 
issues that arose during the 
audit. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
The audit committee's level 
of expertise allowed them to 
make informed decisions 
about issues that arose 
during the audit. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
The audit committee's 
experience influenced the 
quality of the decisions 
made during the audit. 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 





The following questions are asked to gain your perspectives about the audit committee of 
Clovitech, Inc. (the company who declared bankruptcy) based on what you read in the scenario 
presented to you.  
 

























The audit committee 
members were objective 
during the 2007 audit of 
Clovitech, Inc.? 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
The audit committee's 
decisions were biased 
during the 2007 audit of 
Clovitech, Inc. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
Management exerted 
pressure on the audit 
committee NOT to 
recommend disclosing a 
deficiency in the internal 
controls established by top 
management. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
The audit committee‘s 
decisions during the audit 
were influenced by the 
managers of Clovitech, Inc. 
 
ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
The audit committee 
members were protecting 
their own interests by not 
warning stockholders of the 
client's deficiencies in the 
internal controls established 
by top management. 









Please answer the remaining questions in this survey without looking back at the case: 
 











The following questions are asked to gain your perspectives about this task  
 
Please select "Yes" or "No" depending on your experience with the task you completed. 
 
Did you listen to the audio recording provided for this task? Yes No  
 
Did you read the text provided for this task? Yes No  
 
Did you click to open the PDF file and read the auditor's report on internal controls? Yes No  
 

























The task was difficult. ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
The task was enjoyable. ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
The task was realistic. ο ο ο ο ο ο ο 
 
Did you experience any technical difficulties with the technology for this task?  Yes No 
 
If yes, please describe:  
 
The following questions are asked to allow the researchers to further understand the 
demographics of the individuals responding to this study. The answers are entirely voluntary, but 
are very important to the research.  
 





What is your gender? 
 
Are you currently a U. S. Citizen? 
 
What is your current state of residence?  
 
Are you currently registered to vote in the US? 
 
Are you currently registered to vote in the US? 
 






If other, please specify 
 
Have you ever been called for jury duty in the U.S? 
 
Have you ever served on a jury in the U.S.?  
No 
Yes, for a civil trial 
Yes, for a criminal trial 
 
 
Are you currently or have you ever been: 
  
A Certified Public Accountant?  
 
An Auditor?  
 
A Manager in a business where a financial audit was conducted?  
 
A Professional Investor (provided investment advice or made investments for others as your 
main source of employment)?  
 
An attorney?  
 




Are you currently a student? 
 
What is the highest level of education you have attained?  
Some High School 
Completed High School (or Equivalent) 
Completed Trade or Professional School 
Some College 
Graduated College 
Some Post-Graduate School 
Completed Graduate School 
 
What is your approximate annual gross family income?  
less than $10,000 
$10,000 - $24,999 
$25,000 - $39,999 
$40,000 - $54,999 
$55,000 - $69,999 
$70,000 - $84,999 
$85,000 - $ 99,999 
$100,000 - $199,999 
$200,000 or more 
 






Stay-at-home parent or homemaker 
Unemployed (and looking for employment) 
Other 
If other, please specify  
 
If you are currently employed or self-employed, what is your field of employment (for example, 
education, health care, manufacturing, etc.)? 
What is your race/ethnicity? 
 
American Indian or Alaskan Native 





If other, please specify  
 
The following questions are commonly asked in the jury selection process for court cases. Please 





Have you or a family member or close personal friend either currently or in the past been 
involved as a party (either a plaintiff or a defendant) in a lawsuit involving damages for 
professional negligence (medical malpractice, accounting malpractice, etc.)?  
 
Have you or a family member or close personal friend either currently or in the past been 
involved as a party (either a plaintiff or a defendant) in a class action lawsuit? 
  
A plaintiff is a person or corporation who has initiated a lawsuit. Would you have a bias for or 
against a plaintiff simply because he or she has brought a lawsuit?  
 
A defendant is a person or corporation against whom a lawsuit has been brought. Would you 
have a bias for or against a defendant simply because a lawsuit has been brought against him or 
her?  
 
If the law and evidence warranted, would you be able to render a verdict for a defendant 
regardless of any sympathy you may have for either party?  
 
Would your verdict in this case be influenced in any way by any factors other than the evidence 
in the courtroom such as friendships or family relationships or the type of work you do?  
 
Have you ever testified in any court proceeding?  
 
Have you ever been a witness in a civil matter, regardless of whether it went to trial?  
 
Do you, or have you ever, owned stock in a company?  
 
Have you ever owned stock in a company that has declared bankruptcy?  
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